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 Abstract 
 
This thesis argues that donations are relevant in different contexts of life in society. It 
examines the way that donations have been connected with the family and argues that a 
comprehensive law of donation must also necessarily pay attention to donations made in 
different contexts of life, such as the market. Focusing on donations made in a market 
context, the present thesis will critically review the suitability of existing (national) laws of 
donation to regulate these donations. Three jurisdictions have been selected for this study: 
Scotland, Portugal and France. The choice of these three jurisdictions is based on the 
different policy considerations towards donation that helped to shape each one of them. In 
France, the protection of the family is of primary relevance to the law of donation; in 
Portugal, the law of donation is often set aside, gifts being instead regulated by non-legal 
normative rules (such as moral rules); and in Scotland, the law of donation exists as a 
complement to juridical acts primarily regulated by other laws (such as the law of warrandice 
or the law of promise). These national laws of donation will be critically reviewed in order 
to assess if they are fit to the purpose of regulating donations in the market context, in 
particular, by testing the protection conferred to a) the parties in the donation, b) third parties, 
and c) the community as a whole. 
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Preface 
 
« Les tolèrerait-on que, de toute façon, les mutations, passives ou actives, de 
l’ordre juridique sont dans la nature des choses. La mort, l’amour, la vie en 
fournissent les incontestables moteurs. La mort, parce qu’elle oblige fatalement 
à transmettre les biens du défunt a d’autres, ses héritiers. L’amour, parce qu’il 
conduit à cette attitude si pleinement humaine qu’est le don, de soi ou de ses 
biens. La vie, enfin, car il faut bien vivre, et par conséquent acheter, vendre, 
louer, prêter, confier en dépôt, voire obtenir réparation du dommage que l’on 
vous a injustement cause. »1 
Donation walks side-by-side with what makes us humans: the connection with others, the 
expression of love, gratitude, the beginning of a relationship or the end of a life. Donations 
may convey both love or a business opportunity, an almost unstated truth in today’s legal 
writing. The primary motivation for writing a thesis on the law of donation is an attempt to 
understand why we give, and what motivates us as humans to benefit others, without the 
legal security of receiving something in return. 
Considering that donation happens in multiple aspects of human life, I felt that some contexts 
where donations were being given, and received, were not being studied by scholarship. The 
market, in particular, where profit is an ever-present aim, was being disregarded by scholars 
and legal writers, who do not recognise that donation is part of everyday business. The 
present thesis therefore aims to add knowledge and, perhaps, set in motion a wider reflection 
of the role played by donation in all aspects of human life, starting by one of the most 
unspoken places where gratuitous transactions occur: the market. 
                                                 
1
 A Seriaux, Manuel de droit des successions et des libéralités (2003) p 9: “It is tolerated that, in any case, the 
passive or active mutations of the legal order are in the nature of things. Death, love, and life provide its 
incontestable motives. Death, because it fatally obliges the deceased to transfer his property to others, his heirs. 
Love, because it leads to this attitude so fully human that is the gift, of self or of one’s assets. Life, finally, 
because one must live well, and therefore buy, sell, rent, lend, entrust to deposit, and even obtain compensation 
for damages unfairly caused”. 
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Introduction 
 
European society is ever evolving. Moving fast in an open Europe – where movements are 
freer than ever before2 –, nationals from different European Union Member States (MS) 
enter into legal transactions, either gratuitous or non-gratuitous. The literature on the impact 
of non-gratuitous transactions and on the way in which MS deal with these transactions is 
vast: ranging from academic and opinion articles to monographs on European sales law3, 
competition law4 or banking law5, among others. However, the legal literature is not as 
comprehensive regarding the study of gratuitous transactions6. This gap in legal knowledge 
must be recognised and addressed. Thus, the present thesis aims to contribute to the study 
and debate of gratuitous juridical acts in Europe, by critically reviewing the suitability of 
national private laws to deal with the most paradigmatic gratuitous juridical act of them all: 
donation. The fact that gratuitous transactions happen in large number in the European 
                                                 
2
 J Groenewegen, W Schreuders, C Paridon, “Changing of the European economic reality – Changing 
Economic Order” (1991) Journal of Economic Issues, p 1169. 
3
 Among others, see G Alpa (e), The proposed common European sales law: the lawyers' view (2013); R 
Schulze (e), Common European sales law (CESL): commentary (2012); L Miller, The emergence of EU 
contract law (2011); C Twigg-Flesner (e), The Cambridge companion to European Union private law (2010); 
E Hondius (e), Sales: (PELS) (2008); W Guy-Martial, Commercial agency and distribution 
agreements: law and practice in the member states of the European Community (1989). 
4
 As examples, see K Hüschelrath, H Schweitzer (eds), Public and private enforcement of competition 
law in Europe: legal and economic perspectives (2014); or A Nuyts, N E Hatzimihail (eds), Cross-border class 
actions: the European way (2014). 
5
 G Scherf, Financial stability policy in the Euro zone (2014); VVAA, European banking supervision taking 
shape: EBA and its changing context (2014); G A Walker, European banking law: policy and programme 
construction (2007); VVAA, European banking law: the banker-customer relationship (1993); S Crossick, 
European banking law: an analysis of Community and member state legislation (1983); L Quaglia, 
The European Union and global financial regulation (2014); W Ringe, P M Huber (eds), Legal challenges in 
the global financial crisis: bail-outs, the Euro and regulation (2014); or T Lindblom, S Sjogren, M Willesson, 
Financial systems, markets and institutional changes (2014). 
6
 One of the few noticeable cases is the essay written by M Schmidt-Kessel, “At the frontiers of contract law: 
donation in European private law”, European private law beyond the common frame of reference: essays in 
honour of Reinhard Zimmermann (2008) p 77-96. 
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Common Market7, a common project which has been defined as the “most ambitious of all 
economic integration projects” in Europe8, must be acknowledged and critically analysed. 
 
Donation may be found in multiple areas of life in society. The perceived success of the 
European Union (EU) for the promotion of peace and economic development9 is not 
synonymous with a full integration of an MS’s policies or laws regulating areas of life which 
are far away from the market, such as the regulation of family relationships. This obstacle to 
full integration is not just based on distrust towards the EU, leading to a referendum which 
has potentially decided the split between the United Kingdom and the EU (Brexit)10, but also 
on the respect for the cultural diversity of the MS11 and compliance with the principles of 
conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality12. Because donation is traditionally perceived as 
a gift between family members or persons with a previous relationship, it is often perceived 
as part of the individual MS’s cultural idiosyncrasies, and therefore, more obviously 
connected with the family than with the market13. But donation is more than an aid to social 
interaction. The purpose of the present thesis is to demonstrate that donation may be carried 
out with multiple motivations and aims, and between parties who did not know each other 
before the creation of the relevant donating relationship. 
 
The present thesis will review three national laws of donation. Bearing in mind the above, 
this thesis will critically review different national laws of donation in Europe, using them as 
case studies to understand whether European laws of donation are ready to deal with the 
multiple areas where donation may be found. Contrary to the assumption that donation is 
often connected with the family context, these case studies will focus not on the family but 
on the market. By looking at how present national laws of donation regulate donations made 
                                                 
7
 For detailed information, please see “An overview of philanthropy in Europe” of the Observatoire de la 
Fondation de France (CERPhi – April 2015), available at https://www.fondationdefrance.org 
/sites/default/files/atoms/files/philanthropy_in_europe_2015_0.pdf (assessed 28/10/2016). 
8
 L Kohr, “The History of the Common Market”, The Journal of Economic History (1969), p 441. 
9
 As an example, the EU has received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 “for over six decades contributed to the 
advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe”, see 
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/ (assessed 28/10/2016). 
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 Of which the most expressive case is the referendum in the UK, where a majority of voters has voted to leave 
the EU. See http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/ (assessed 28/10/2016) for more information. 
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 Art 3 TEU. 
12
 Art 5 TEU. 
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 An assumption that is starting to change. As a demonstration, the DCFR - C von Bar, E Clive, H Schulte-
Nölke et all (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law - Draft Common Frame 
of Reference (2009) - has regarded donation as a market transaction, therefore being possible to be regulated 
by market-related legislation. 
23 
 
 
in a context where, at least one of the parties acts with a view to profit (often being a 
professional or a business), it will be possible to shed light on the fitness for purpose of laws 
of donation, to regulate donations in multiple areas of life. By looking at the market, it will 
be possible to assess if an area of life which is often perceived as distant from the family, 
context often associated with donation, is being effectively regulated by the relevant national 
law of donation, or if change is necessary. Three different jurisdictions will be used as case 
studies to demonstrate that the law of donation is an area where integration is far from 
complete. Scotland, Portugal, France have been selected as case studies due to the different 
policy considerations underlying their laws of donation, and the distinctive approaches they 
have to the regulation of donation in the different contexts of life, with emphasis on the 
market. 
 
Why review Scots, Portuguese and French laws of donation? These three jurisdictions reflect 
different policy considerations towards donation. As will be discussed in the following 
chapters, Scots law of donation aims to enforce relevant expectation and reasonable reliance 
of the beneficiary14; Portuguese law of donation is concerned with not over-regulating acts 
which are already regulated under non-legal normative systems15; and finally the French law 
of donation, which aims to protect the family, and is primarily concerned with the protection 
of the donor and his family16. 
 
Scotland. It will be argued in Chapter 3 that Scots law of donation acts as a “flavour” added 
to multiple juridical acts, acting as an extra set of rules for the regulation of gratuitous 
juridical acts defined as a donation in Scotland. This unique approach to donation contributes 
to the creation of legal security in all contexts where donations are made. As a demonstration, 
in Scots law, the power to revoke a juridical act classified as a donation must be reserved by 
the donor17. The donor only holds the right to revocation if both parties agree upon the 
existence of this right, or if the right was reserved by the donor. The firm use of the principle 
of irrevocability creates security because the donor cannot unilaterally revoke a valid 
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 See Chapter 3 – Scotland, p 77. 
15
 See Chapter 4 – Portugal, p 139. 
16
 See Chapter 5 – France, p 197. 
17
 See 3.2.5 Pure donations and donatons sub modo, p 99. 
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donation. This principle is better respected in Scotland than in France, for example, where 
different revocation (legal) rights are available to the donor without being reserved18. 
 
Portugal. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, Portuguese law has refrained from regulating 
acts which would otherwise be classified as donations, and therefore regulated under the law 
of donation, in order to allow non-legal normative orders to regulate them (such as sets of 
moral and/or religious rules). This principle is set under article 940 of the Portuguese Civil 
Code, which excludes from the concept of donation all gifts performed in accordance with 
social usages19, therefore establishing a difference between donations (doações), regulated 
by the law, and gift relationships (dádivas), not regulated under the law. To understand the 
definition of “social usage”, it is necessary to analyse the relationship between the parties, 
the social context of the act, and the object of the benefit. For example, if two friends 
exchange presents during the Christmas time, their actions are unlikely to be regarded in 
Portuguese law as a “donation”. Rather, their actions would be considered as part of the 
expression of friendship, and created as the result of the community’s social expectations. 
 
France. It will be argued in Chapter 5 that French law of donation is designed to regulate 
donations made in a family context. Under French law, donation is deeply connected with 
the gratuitous circulation of real rights between family members, while other gratuitous 
juridical acts (which benefit the beneficiary by granting him a personal right or the discharge 
of a debt) are classified as “benevolent contracts”20. Connecting donation with the gratuitous 
transfer of real rights has relevant consequences for the conceptualisation of donation and 
for the connection between donation and succession law (particularly in respect of 
collation)21. It is also worth mention that while French law distinguishes between contracts 
of donation and other benevolent contracts, there seems to be no distinct social function 
performed by these two types of contracts today, and the main reason for the existence of 
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 See art 953 FCC. 
19
 Art 940 PCC. 
20
 As defined by V Chauffour, Le don (1843) p 27: "Les contrats de bienfaisance par lesquels, sans se dépouiller 
proprement de sa chose, on procure cependant à un autre un avantage purement gratuit". 
21
 Art 912 to 930-5 FCC. 
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this distinction is the protection of the family patrimony against gratuitous acts of the 
donor22. 
 
Different jurisdictions, different approaches. The Scottish, Portuguese and French laws of 
donation will be critically reviewed to assess whether they are fit to regulate donations in 
the market. The critical analysis of these three jurisdictions will rely on different sources, 
which are deemed as the most suitable to demonstrate the essential elements of donation in 
each jurisdiction. Therefore, while Chapter 3 – Scotland – relies on a critical analysis of the 
Institutional Writers, combined with court decisions and contemporary writers, for the 
critical review of donation in Scotland, Chapter 4 – Portugal – relies, instead, on a more 
‘black letter’ approach, where the letter of the law (in particular the Portuguese Civil Code23) 
is deemed of primordial relevance for this analysis. Chapter 5 – France – will primarily rely 
on the critical analysis of literature and philosophical ideas of French writers, considering 
that these sources are the most suitable to provide a better understanding of French law of 
donation as it is today.  
 
Finally, the review of these national laws of donation will focus on the analysis of the law 
which regulates the rights and obligations emerging from donation only (in France and 
Portugal, the law regulating the contract of donation, mainly found in the Portuguese and 
French Civil Codes, and in Scotland, the law of donation). Other laws which may influence 
the relationship created by the donation will not be critically reviewed in the present thesis, 
such as collation, action pauliana, or unjustified enrichment, among others. The focus of the 
analysis in the laws of donation only aims to achieve a better understanding of how donation 
operates between the parties in each jurisdiction under review, avoiding the distractions of 
other areas of private law, which may be applicable to juridical acts which are never to be 
classified as a donations. 
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 See Chapter 5 – France, p 197.  
23
 As a civil law jurisdiction, court decisions do not set a precedent in Portugal, and equity may only be used 
by the courts within the limits set under art 4 PCC. 
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Chapter 1 - Revisiting the law of donation 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Based on the premise that the European society is ever evolving, this thesis will begin by 
introducing the reader to the challenges faced by the MS today, specifically those affecting 
areas of life traditionally connected with donation. Significant changes to the European legal 
and social context were made as a result of the European Union (EU), a political, economic 
and social project built upon the development of a common internal market to promote 
economic growth, social justice and solidarity among the MS24. With a focus on the market, 
and also the human aspect of the market, the EU aimed to bring the MS ever closer together25 
and to create a cohesive European society, increasing the interaction between the people of 
different nationalities, cultures and backgrounds. Leaving aside the ongoing debate on the 
past, present and future merits of an economic and/or political union of states in Europe26, a 
link between donation and personal and family relationships has been identified. This 
connection between family and donation will be critically reviewed to assess if donation may 
still be regarded as a family phenomenon or if the context where donation is typically used 
has changed. It will be argued that donation is present in different aspects of society in 
general, and in the European Common Market context in particular. 
 
This chapter will demonstrate that donations are not restricted to family members and parties 
with past long lasting relationships, or those aiming to achieve one. On the contrary, it will 
be argued that (solitary) donations may happen between persons who do not have a previous 
relationship nor intend to maintain a relationship after the donation. This critical analysis is 
relevant for the assessment of the guiding rules towards an efficient law of donation and 
assessment of their fitness for purpose of regulating donations in multiple contexts. Finally, 
this preliminary chapter will be of fundamental relevance because it will prepare the ground 
for the enunciation of the different principles and objectives which, it is proposed, should be 
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 Art 3 TEU. 
25
 Principle of the “ever closer union”, found in the Preamble of the 1957 Treaty and Preamble of the TEU. 
26
 As examples, please see L Fabius, “The Future of the European Union”, Challenge (2001) p 5; G Wylie, 
“The Future of the European Union: What, How and Why?”, Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review (2002) p 125; 
J Santer, “A People's Europe: The Future of the European Union”, Harvard International Review (1996) p 46; 
D Begg, “The Future of the European Union: Economic Growth, Social Cohesion and Sustainability”, Studies: 
An Irish Quarterly Review (2005) p 245-253; or M Burgess, “Introduction: Federalism and Building the 
European Union”, Publius (1996) p 1-15. 
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followed by a law of donation which is fit to regulate donations made in a market context. 
Having identified these principles, it will be possible to identify which jurisdictions are 
complying with the proposed objectives and which are not ready to face the challenges 
imposed by the EU and a continually evolving European market-orientated society27. 
 
1.2. Changes occurred 
 
1.2.1. A united Europe 
 
Important changes have been introduced by the EU in general, and by the European Common 
Market in particular, to the way in which the people of Europe live and interact with each 
other in society. The establishment of the EU started with the establishment of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (1951)28 and the European Economic Community (1958)29, and 
among other objectives, it aimed for the promotion of peace and economic development for 
its members30. The Maastricht Treaty (1993) introduced the European Union as we know it 
today, as well as introducing European citizenship31. It is important to bear in mind that the 
European Union operates through a system of supranational institutions (such as the 
European Parliament, the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, the European Central Bank, among others)32 which have granted the EU 
competences that go beyond generic economic policy. The critical analysis conducted in the 
present thesis aims to contribute to a future debate on the development of the EU, as well as 
its areas of influence, by providing the elements to assess, in the future, if existing (national) 
laws of donation are fit for the purpose of regulating donations outside of the family context 
in general, and in the (EU) market in particular. The debate on this topic is more critical than 
ever before, and the continuing discussion proves the interest that exists in the topic at both 
the national33 and European level34. Furthermore, the debate on the suitability of the current 
law of donation raises the debate on the necessity for the development of a truly European 
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 G Clark, A Farewell to Alms (2007) Intr. 
28
 Established by the Treaty of Paris (formally the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. 
29
 The Treaty of Rome (formally the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community). 
30
 Please refer, in particular, to the Preamble of the Treaty of Rome. 
31
 Treaty of Maastricht on the European Union, Article B. 
32
 A Kaczorowska, European Union law (2nd ed 2011) p 128. 
33
 As is the case of Scotland, where academics recently asked the question “should the law on donation be 
bigger or smaller?” in a conference of 4 December 2014, held at the University of Edinburgh. E Clive, “Should 
the law on donation be bigger or smaller?”, European Private Law News (2014). 
34
 M Schmidt-Kessel, Donation (Principles of European Law) (2016 expected). 
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law of donation, and on how a unitary approach toward donation in Europe could be 
developed35. 
 
It is also important to mention that recent efforts were made to better understand and to build 
a European private law, which are based in the idea of continuous and further European 
integration36, an integration based in the idea of a European common market37. But the 
viability of this integration may now be in jeopardy due to the recent referendum on the 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU. In the referendum of June 2016, 52% of 
the British public voted to leave the EU38, leading to a complex process of withdrawal under 
article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. The outcome of this referendum has 
consequences for the future of Scotland in the European Common Market (one of the 
jurisdictions under review in the present thesis), but as of yet these consequences are still 
unknown. Bearing in mind this uncertainty, it is still possible to argue that the arguments in 
the present chapter remain valid when determining what the needs of market donations are. 
This is because all jurisdictions under review in the present thesis are regarded as case studies 
of national laws of donation, and how these should evolve in a constantly evolving global 
market. Even if the Scottish jurisdiction leaves the EU, there will be ties and relevant 
commercial interactions between the Scottish market and the EU, and Scotland may remain 
in the European Common Market. 
 
1.2.2. The European Common Market 
 
The creation of a common market for the EU intended to “treat the EU as one territory where 
people, money, goods and services interact freely to stimulate competition and trade, and 
improved efficiency”39. Considered by some as one of the EU’s greatest achievements40, the 
European Common Market, has gradually eliminated restrictions and obstacles to the 
freedom of trade between MS. Furthermore, it is important to notice that not only the 
freedom of trade was brought by the European Common Market, but also the freedom of 
movement of people, goods, services and capital41. The European Common Market has also 
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 See Chapter 2, 2.2 European Private Law of Donation, p 54. 
36
 Art 3 TEU. 
37
 Beginning with the reviewing the Treaty of Rome in 1957. 
38
 Official results may be accessed at: http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/ (assessed 28/10/2016). 
39
 As described at the official page of the European Union, at http://ec.europa.eu/ (assessed 28/10/2016). 
40
 E Despres, “The European Common Market”, Economic Digest (1960) p 5. 
41
 Treaty of Maastricht on the European Union. 
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changed the way that imports and exports work within the EU, with new rules being set to 
facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers (either consumers or professionals) from 
different MS. This has been achieved both by generic policy measures of approximation 
between the different MS laws and by specific implementation of rules such as common tax 
rules42, the standardisation of competition practices43 and the promotion of incentives to 
consumption within the European Common Market,44 among others. 
 
1.2.3. Changes for the family 
 
The establishment of the EU and a European Common Market has led to faster and more 
frequent communication between persons from different nationalities, backgrounds and 
cultures in Europe. This interaction has taken place in multiple areas of society in novel 
ways. The development of the European Common Market and the freedom of movement of 
people brought changes not only to commercial trade but also to the development of new 
family realities - due to the freedom of movement, new families were created, where partners 
and their family members do not share the same nationality45 (and therefore traditions and 
habits diverge). In a union of states where different languages co-exist and are “frequently 
paralleled by culture difference”46, new mixed families were created where different 
nationalities, different backgrounds and different cultures contributed to the constant 
development of new family habits and social expectations. It may therefore be argued that 
families within the same MS can no longer necessarily be regarded as labouring under the 
same social expectations and rules, which makes the assessment of social usage harder than 
ever before. Different families – and donors and donees – within the same MS may follow 
different religions, different traditions, as well as different social and moral rules. The law 
of donation must be ready to deal with these differences, being able to regulate different 
cultural backgrounds under the same law and principles, and providing a common answer 
and regulation to families labouring under different moral, religious and social systems 
within the same community and/or MS. It is not argued here, however, that these differences 
must be overcome by applying economic, commercial or market based ideas to the 
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 A Kaczorowska, European Union law (2nd ed 2011) p 82. 
43
 J A Rahl, “European Common Market Antitrust Laws” (1971) Antitrust Law Journal, p 810-826.  
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 By raising consumer confidence in the market with the issue of consumer directives and other legislative 
acts which provide the European consumer with similar consumer rights and obligations. As example, see 
Directive 1999/34/CE, of 10th may; Directive 1999/44/CE, of 25th May; Directive 2000/31/CE, of 8th June; 
Directive 2005/29/CE, of 11th May; or Directive 2011/83/EU, of 25th October 2011. 
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 J D Medrano, “Social Class and Identity” (2011) Sociology of the European Union, p 39. 
46
 K Knapp, “Common Market: Common Culture?” (1990) European Journal of Education, p 55. 
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regulation of donation. On the contrary, it will be suggested that the respect for these 
differences may only be found in an approach which is detached from religious or moralistic 
considerations, a legal regulation which respects the differences within the EU and within 
the relevant MS, and which is to be followed by everyone. An argument for a secular and 
equalitarian approach to donation will be made, and not one which follows market-based 
considerations. The study of donations made in a market context is therefore conducted, in 
the present thesis, in order to inquire if present national laws of donation are fit to regulate 
donation in multiple contexts, including in one of the contexts which is regarded as most 
distant from family: the market. 
 
1.2.4. Consequences of the changes 
 
Contrary to standard economic models47, the transfer of goods and services in our society 
does not take place entirely by exchange. Gratuitous transfers, also referred to as the gift 
economy48 or the third sector49, are part of our economy. Furthermore, the changes brought 
by a united Europe have affected different areas of life in society, both connected and 
unconnected with the market. An inquiry into the consequences for donation of the changes 
that have occurred in Europe and a consideration of the best tools to deal with these 
consequences is therefore now relevant. This does not mean that the present (national) laws 
of donation necessarily need to change because changes have occurred. On the contrary, the 
following chapters aim to assess if present (national) laws of donation are ready to deal with 
a European society where principles such as equality and security are more than ever 
necessary to the implementation of the European project. It will be therefore argued that 
these principles are necessary for the promotion of confidence, as well as a healthy 
relationship between parties which may come from diverse backgrounds and/or do not know 
each other before donating to each other, therefore promoting a more effective regulation of 
these donations. 
 
In respect of European private law in general, and European law of donation specifically, 
two opposite possibilities are available for the creation of regulation of private law in 
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 K J Arrow, “Gifts and Exchanges” (1972) Philosophy and Public Affairs, p 357. 
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 D J Cheal, The gift economy (1988). 
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 H K Anheier, W Seibel, The Third sector: comparative studies of nonprofit organizations (1990). 
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Europe: the creation of uniform rules, which are applicable in all EU equally50; or EU 
withdrawal from this competence, leaving it for the different MS to regulate. The loudest 
(academic) voices are those which defend the creation of a true European private law, equal 
for all citizens of the EU. One of those voices is Ole Lando, who advocates the need for 
uniform rules, considering that one European private law will: (i) facilitate cross-border trade 
within Europe; (ii) strengthen the European single market; (iii) create an infrastructure for 
community laws governing contracts; (iv) enable the creation of guidelines for national 
courts and legislatures, thus creating a degree of uniformity in the application of private law 
throughout Europe; and (v) the construction of a bridge between civil law and common 
law51. The present thesis intends to add to this debate by assessing the fitness for purpose of 
present national laws of donation to regulate donations in multiple contexts. As mentioned 
before, the outcome of this critical analysis will contribute to this debate, by providing 
knowledge on the existing regulation of an area of private law. 
 
1.3. Multiple dimensions of donation in Europe 
 
1.3.1. Language and literature considerations 
 
Donation is not a simple and unified concept, understood in the same way by all people. On 
the contrary, donation may signify different realities, both from a legal and from a non-legal 
perspective. This complexity is demonstrated by everyday language and by literature. In 
English, different words are used to signify donation. The word ‘gift’ may designate both 
the object of donation and the act of donating, usually connected with reduced pecuniary 
value gratuitous exchanges (alms, presents, and gratuities). The word donation, is an 
expression with Latin roots, being commonly used to designate the act of donation, rather 
than an object, usually connected with formal gratuitous transactions (and empirically 
perceived as of relevant pecuniary value). Both words are adequate legal terms to address 
the donating act – gift in England52 and donation in Scotland53. Donation is also used, in 
both Scotland and England in its Latin form, when referring to gifts on death: donatio mortis 
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 O Lando, “Principles of European Contract Law: An Alternative to or a Precursor of European Legislation?” 
(1992) American Journal of Comparative Law, p 573; O Lando, “European Contract Law” (1983) The 
American Journal of Comparative Law, p 654. 
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 O Lando, H Beale, Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (2000) p xxi. 
52
 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the laws of England (facsimile of the 1st ed [1771] 1979) 1, p 20. 
53
 W M Gordon, “Donation” (2011) The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia (SME), p 8. 
32 
 
 
causa54. Portuguese and French languages, mostly due to their strong Latin roots, separate 
the word used to describe the juridical act from the act’s object. The word used to describe 
the juridical act, like the word donation, derives from the Latin word donatio, creating the 
words doação in Portuguese55 and donation in French56. For present purposes, “donation” is 
used to describe the juridical act; “gift” is used to refer to the object of the donation.  
 
In all the above mentioned jurisdictions, the conceptualisation of donation shares common 
points, such as the existence of the act of giving by the donor and correspondent reception 
by the donee. In addition, it is possible to recognise that the act of donating is common in 
European jurisdictions and deeply connected with living in a community, undoubtedly 
present in these jurisdiction’s culture, and therefore, in European culture as well. The 
connection between donation and life in community in Europe is so strong that it is not 
surprising that many examples of donation appear in European literature. The variety and 
frequency of examples of donation being used in European literature demonstrates the 
variety of dimensions and meanings inherent in the concept of donation. Among other 
examples, it is possible to identify descriptions of the act of donation in the works of famous 
European writers such as Aristotle57; Francis Bacon58; or Jane Austen59.  
 
From a sociological literature perspective, it is impossible not to mention the work of Mauss 
and his views on donation60. Mauss’ views on donation ascertain the idea that the normative 
order of morality recognises the superiority of the giver61 (empirically justifiable by the fact 
that in some languages the word used to express gratitude also refers to the moral obligation 
to reciprocate or the superiority of the giver/donor62). Under a donation relationship/spiral 
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 W H Winder, “Delivery of a Donatio Mortis Causa” (1940) The Modern Law Review, p 310; or P S James, 
Introduction to English Law (5th ed 1962) p 422; and H MacQueen, M Hogg, “Donation in Scots Law” (2012) 
Juridical Review, p 8. 
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 Art 940(1) PCC. 
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 Art 893 FCC. 
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 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, chap 2: “for the magnificent man spends not on himself but on public objects, 
and gifts bear some resemblance to votive offerings”. 
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 F Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, chap VI: “by virtue of which grant or donative of God Solomon 
became enabled not only to write those excellent parables or aphorisms concerning divine and moral 
philosophy, but also to compile a natural history of all verdure”. 
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 J Austen, Sense and Sensibility, chap 12: “Marianne told her, with the greatest delight, that Willoughby had 
given her a horse, one that he had bred himself on his estate in Somersetshire, and which was exactly calculated 
to carry a woman”. 
60
 M Mauss, “Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques” (1925), p 30-186. 
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 M Mauss, “Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques” (1925), p 30-186. 
62
 For example, in the W Little, H W Fowler, J Coulson, C T Onions (e), The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 
on Historical Principles (3rd ed 1973) 2162, the word “thank” expresses not only gratitude, but also means the 
“obligation to” or “consider or hold responsible”; in formal English, the expected reply to express gratitude is 
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of donation63, the parties are not able to ‘exit the relationship’, and a reciprocal gift is and 
will always be expected in the future64. Because the parties are not allowed to exit the 
relationship created, long lasting relationships are created, in opposition to what is 
traditionally expected from pure market relationships. It is therefore important to recognise 
that donation is a complex reality, comprising multiple aspects of life. 
 
1.3.2. Legal considerations 
 
From a legal perspective, “donation” is defined by various European civil codes as an 
agreement, by which a party (the donor) enriches another (the donee) gratuitously65. Some 
of these civil codes even use the word “contract” to clarify that a donation emerges from a 
bilateral juridical act66. Furthermore, donation has been historically regarded in Europe as 
one of the legal institutions able to transfer property67, which does not signify that donation 
is only able to gratuitously transfer real rights. On the contrary, several European legal 
writers opine that any patrimonial right may be donated – so long as it can create a 
patrimonial benefit to the donee. Pothier offers one example, by defining donation as “an act 
by which a person deprives himself irrevocably, as a result of a liberality, of a thing in favour 
of someone who accepts”68; and Ascoli, for whom a “donation is a contract by which the 
donor freely grants to the donee a non-accessory patrimonial right, or releases him from an 
obligation with the same nature, or waives on his behalf to acquire such a right”69. 
 
One of the main influences on the conceptualisation of donation in Europe is Savigny70, who 
defines donation as any transaction with the following qualities: (i) a donation must be 
performed during the life of both parties, and cannot produce its effects after the death of the 
donor; (ii) the donation must cause an enrichment of the donee equal to the impoverishment 
of the donor; and (iii) the transaction must be entered with animus donandi of the donor, i.e. 
                                                 
“I am obliged”; and the same happens in other languages such as the Portuguese, where the word “obrigado” 
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he must perform a donation with the purpose of creating a benefit to the donee. From 
Savigny’s71 perspective, the point of departure for an analysis of the concept of donation is 
that donation is a transfer (usually of a real right) from the donor to the donee, creating a 
benefit for the donee and a correspondent loss for the donor; which means that, in the end, 
the enrichment of the donee should be in the exact same measure as the donor’s 
impoverishment72. 
 
Finally, donation is commonly regarded in Europe as a legal institute able to provide the 
donee with a legal right he did not hold before - i.e. a donation will allow the donee to hold 
a right which is directly correspondent to an economical benefit. From a comparative 
perspective, it is also possible to identify common cardinal elements for the existence of a 
donation in the European jurisdictions under study: first, an intention, or animus donandi, 
which is shown by a juridical act performed by the donor or by both parties73. This juridical 
act is, at the same time, the legal justification for the acquisition and retention of the benefit 
received by the donee74. Second, the absence of a previous legal obligation is required, as 
the relevance of an animus donandi is excluded by the existence of a previous legal 
obligation to give75. Third, there must be gratuity, where a benefit must be granted to the 
donee with no corresponding recompense76. Finally, there must be consent, which means 
that the creation of a benefit to the donee must always be accepted or there is a presumption 
in law of acceptance77. It is therefore possible to conclude that different legal definitions of 
donation exist across Europe, ranging from addressing donation as a contract, in Portugal 
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and France, to defining donation as a flavour of multiple juridical acts which may be 
unilateral or bilateral (in Scotland). 
 
1.3.3. Considerations on the social function of donation 
 
Gratuitous acts such as favours, privilege and everyday acts of kindness have systematically 
been used across Europe to establish or consolidate economic and social relationships78. 
Rulers ascertain their power and dominion over others (either individuals or groups), by 
benefiting them with nobility titles, land domains and public positions – stratifying society 
and creating social debts and obligations79. Small value gifts are exchanged between family 
and friends to celebrate special occasions such as birthdays, Christmas, Easter, or any other 
special religious or social events: they are the “cement” of social relationships80. But not 
only physical persons participate in the gift-giving phenomenon. Companies and traders use 
forms of donation such as samples, promotion vouchers or “welcome gifts” as an incentive 
to promote sales81 or monetary gifts and others as “strategic corporate philanthropy”82. Both 
physical and legal persons are donating with multiple motivations and objectives. The idea 
that donation is something that “normally” occurs and is to be expected between physical 
people only is to be denied. 
 
Different motivations lead to different types of donation. Contrary to authors such as 
Malaurie, who defend that donations never have the scope of profit83, the motivation for 
donating may be, amongst others, to create a relationship with the donee which will bring 
profit to the donor in the future. It is therefore appropriate to distinguish between motivation 
and gratuity. While motivation represents the subjective will of the donor, the reason why 
he decided to donate, gratuity represents the benefit received by the donee, which is received 
without a correspondent legal obligation to benefit the donor. In fact, a genuine altruistic 
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“behaviour is not really all that common and the spirituality edifying notion of the ‘cheerful 
giver’”84 does not fully reflect life in society.  
 
Recognising that altruism or charity are not the only explanations for the existence of 
donation in the European society, several explanations have been proposed in the past to 
better understand the gift-giving phenomenon. These explanations have been mainly 
provided not by legal writers, but by anthropologists and sociologists, such as Derrida, 
Cannell, Weiner and Carrier85. The most famous explanation is the one proposed by Marcel 
Mauss in his essays and studies on gift-giving86. Mauss's essay focuses on the exchange of 
objects between groups aimed at the development of relationships between individuals. By 
undertaking the study of archaic societies, Mauss was able to find common practices centred 
on reciprocal exchange, and to demonstrate that obligations to give, to receive, and to 
reciprocate arise in these societies, furthermore transposing this idea to in western 
societies87.  
 
This section does not intend to prove that donations are made in Europe, instead, it aims to 
demonstrate that donation plays different social functions in society, being used not only by 
physical persons, but also by legal persons alike, with different objectives and promoting the 
establishment either short or long term relationships between the parties. Consequently, it is 
important to bear in mind that different motivations exist to donate, and that such different 
motivations must be acknowledged. If all of the different dimensions of donation are not 
taken into account, the law of donation will not efficiently regulate donations in Europe, and 
its goals and objectives, whatever they might be will not be accomplished. 
 
1.3.4. Different contexts where donation may be found 
 
Donation may be found in different aspects of life in society. For the purpose of this thesis, 
and as it will be demonstrated below, it is assumed that donation is found in the European 
society in at least two contexts: (i) the family context, where connected persons, usually 
members of the same family or friends donate to each other; and (ii) the market context, 
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where people who are not necessarily connected beforehand donate in the pursuit of profit. 
Following this division, only the donations in the market will be addressed in depth in the 
present thesis, in order to understand what are its particular needs and particularities. It is 
also important to clarify that the present thesis does not aim to propose that market-based 
ideas should reshape national laws of donation, on the contrary, the analysis conducted to 
the regulation of donations made in a market context aims to critically assess whether only 
family-related donations are being regulated efficiently, or whether the relevant law of 
donation is fit for the purpose of regulating donations in multiple contexts. Considering the 
above, donations made in a market context were selected as the benchmark for this 
assessment. 
 
1.4. Donation in the family 
 
1.4.1. Generic considerations 
 
Beginning from the premise that donation may comprise a broad spectrum of gratuitous 
benefits to the donee, it is easy to understand why donation walks side by side with family, 
and why it is often associated with altruism and the pursuit of a long lasting relationship 
between donor and donee. Among other reasons, it is possible to identify three causes for 
this association: family members have a long lasting relationship with each other, often 
starting in the moment of birth and lasting to the moment of the death; the structure of the 
family in Europe has evolved, but the family cohesion has never been lost88; and the 
relationships between family members are often connected to a steady stream of gift-giving 
exchanges89, which often occur in celebratory periods or moments when presents are socially 
expected, such as weddings, birthdays or religious celebrations. Furthermore, property often 
circulates gratuitously between family members, a circulation of real rights which is often 
done by donation90. Due to the donation’s ability to circulate property gratuitously, the 
connection between donation and family has the following different dimensions: 
 
First, the consequences of donation in the family wealth as a whole, and the frustration of 
the expectations to inherit equally by the individual members of the family in particular, are 
                                                 
88
 C Manzi, V Vignoles, C Regalia, E Scabini, "Cohesion and Enmeshment Revisited: Differentiation, Identity, 
and Well-Being in Two European Cultures” (2006) Journal of Marriage and Family, p 673-689. 
89
 M Mauss, “Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques” (1925), p 30-186. 
90
 R Hyland, Gifts, A Study in Comparative Law (2009) p 10. 
38 
 
 
enunciated by legal writers across in Europe, with particular emphasis by those writing on 
French law91. The latter concern is dealt with by collation in the jurisdictions where 
frustration of the expectations to inherit is regarded as worthy of protection92, where forced 
heirship rights are created, in an attempt to contribute to family protection. Regarded with 
suspicion, donations are believed to allow one family member to dissipate (most of) the 
family’s assets, an act with serious repercussions for the donor and all his family members. 
Those repercussions may be a lower social status, a poorer lifestyle or the frustration of the 
family members’ expectations to hold and manage the relevant rights in the future. Only the 
family is protected against the negative effects of donation in this fashion, a reality which is 
one of the most prominent topics amongst legal writers, writing on the French law of 
donation today93, due to the fact that the family is often considered in France as an indirect 
victim of the donor’s generosity94. Claims for the protection of the family against the 
generosity of its individual elements are a constant through European history95 and will be 
dealt in length in the chapter on French law of donation96. 
 
Secondly, the connection between family and the gratuitous circulation of real rights leads 
to the presumption that property received by family members is done animo donandi – or 
without profit. The most obvious case occurs in Scots law, where the important principle 
debtor non presumitur donare is inverted because, in the words of Bankton, “delivery of 
goods by or to a merchant, will infer the ordinary price without any paction, and will not be 
presumed a gift, for he is in the exercise of his business, which is to buy and sell. But 
maintenance to children, either by father or mother, or other progenitor, is presumed to flow 
                                                 
91
 See H Mazeaud, L Mazeaud, H Mazeaud, F Chabas, Successions – Liberalites (5th ed 1999) part IV. 
92
 One such case being Portugal, where the heirs must return all assets donated by the de cujus under art 2104 
PCC and following. It is also worth mention that only descendants must return what was donated to them by 
the de cujus, meaning that the protection of the expectation not to be deprived of their inheritance is a protection 
against discrimination between children.  
93
 P Malaurie, Les successions, Les Libéralités (5th ed 2012) p 143; P C Timbal, Droit Romain et Ancien Droit 
Français, Régimes matrimoniaux, Successions – Libéralités (1960) p 210; M G Pelissie de Castro, Des 
donations entre époux en Droit Romain, Du don Manuel en Droit Français (1884). 
94
 J Levy, A Castaldo, Précis d’Histoire du droit civil (2002) p 1353. 
95
 J Levy, A Castaldo, Précis d’Histoire du droit civil (2002) p 1357. 
96
 See Chapter 5 – France, p 197. 
39 
 
 
from natural affection, and ex pietate, if the children have no considerable estate of their own 
to support them”97. 
 
In fact, one of the most distinctive singularities in Scots law of donation is the existence of 
a presumption against donation, which must be overcome by the donee. This means that the 
donee has the burden to prove (i) the animus donandi of the donor, and (ii) that the benefit 
was delivered98. The presumption against donation is traditionally described as based in the 
Roman maxim debitor non presumitur donare99, and is based on the distrust of benefits 
gratuitously created100, because “no person is presumed to do what, in place of bringing him 
profit, must certainly be attended with some pecuniary loss”101. A donation therefore 
establishes a personal relationship in Scots law and it is presumed to be closely connected 
with the family life102. In other words, in Scots law, a donation is regarded as a normal 
occurrence between parties who are close and who know each other. Following Watson, 
while writing about Scots law of donation, it is clear that “in certain circumstances, the 
presumption against donation is overcome, or rather inverted. For example, advances made 
by a parent or one in loco parentis, are presumed to have been made ex pietate, in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary”103. 
 
1.4.2. Customary gifts and the family 
 
The exchange of gifts is heavily regulated by a structured customary normative system104, 
which pre-exists and often remains separated from the legal system. This separation is 
stronger when gifts or small donations are given within the family or in a socially expected 
context – such as social events and occasions where gifts exchanges are expected. This may 
include feasts such as Christmas, Easter, the new year, birthdays, leaving parties or 
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weddings. For this reason, some small value or customary donations are regarded as not 
regulated under the law, instead being regarded as moral obligations105. 
 
It is possible to find examples of (gratuitous) moral obligations in all legal systems under 
study. One such case is Scotland, where “some [gratuitous] promises considered morally 
binding are not enforced by the law. Such might include promises made in social context, 
those reflecting duties of a family or religious nature, or those intended to have legal force 
but effected by some invalidating factor or want a proper form”106. In France, the regulation 
of the law of donation to gifts in a social or family context is often dealt with under the 
umbrella of gifts of reduced value. Presuming that donations within the family or in a social 
context are donations of reduced value, their regulation under the law of donation is regarded 
as “absurd”107 by some French legal writers. Such donations of reduced value – usually 
between family members – are instead regulated by non-legal normative systems such as 
moral or religion108. But the most assertive position, on the placement of gifts/small 
donations between family members, is taken by the Portuguese law of donation, where 
donations and moral gifts are distinguished according to the social context where they occur. 
The Portuguese Civil Code establishes a difference between donations (doações) regulated 
by the law and gift relationships (dádivas) that are not regulated by the law of donation and 
which are not seen as true donations because they occur “according to the social usages”109. 
This means that the Portuguese Civil Code (PCC) determines that gratuitous benefits, 
capable of being defined as a “social usage”, are not to be regulated under the law, but 
instead, are to be left to be regulated by other non-legal normative orders. 
 
To understand the definition of “social usage”, as presented in Portuguese law, it is necessary 
to analyse the relationship between the parties, the social context of the act, and the object 
of the benefit. For example, if two family members exchange presents during Christmas 
time, their actions will not (most likely) be regarded by Portuguese law as a “donation”, but 
as the expression of a family relationship that is socially expected. The economic value of 
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the transaction is also taken into consideration. The leading Portuguese writer on the subject, 
Ferreira de Almeida, lays down two tests which distinguish between donations and gifts 
entered into according to the social usages110. The first test is a positive one: it is necessary 
to understand if the gift can be considered as usual, by looking at, first, when it was made, 
second, the parties, third, the economic value of its object and fourth, the systematic 
correlation between them. Following this test, it is crucial to run a negative test: determining 
if any public law provision demands the qualification of the act as a donation. Ferreira de 
Almeida also provides the reader with an example of gift relationship that passes both tests: 
“a gratuitous promise with small economic value which is made between family 
members”111. If both tests are passed, the relationship can no longer be defined as a donation, 
which means that the law (of donation) will not apply to this relationship112. 
 
On this basis, it is possible to conclude that donations are often associated with the 
circulation of real rights amongst family members113, and that moral rules concur with legal 
rules for the regulation of customary donations, determining a strong connection between 
the provision of gratuitous benefits and the family114. Connecting donation with the family 
has relevant consequences for the principles guiding the laws of donation. It is therefore 
important to understand that looking at donation as a ‘family reality’ may create challenges 
for the functioning of the law of donation when it is applied to other realities. On the 
contrary, the law of donation may remain efficient when donations are made outside of the 
family, this being one of the key questions to be addressed in this thesis. 
 
1.4.3. Suspicion towards donation 
 
Due to the connection between donation and family, some legal writers regard gratuitous 
acts as suspicious, where a donation is often associated with an act of love115. These writers 
further describe donation as guided by strong feelings such as “benevolence”, “illusions 
produced by one’s self-esteem”, the “seductions of the passion”, or “obsession”116. This 
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assumption that donations are often motivated by powerful feelings explains why many legal 
writers117 define donation as abnormal118, “dangerous, suspicious and fragile”119. 
Furthermore, it is common for those writers to define donations as acts which are (only) 
performed and/or expected within the family – i.e. only people with a common genetic 
heritage or otherwise linked by emotional bonds (friends) would enter into gratuitous 
agreements. One such case is Henri De Page, who states that a “pure” donation contradicts 
what he regards as “normal” in a social interaction120. 
 
The characterisation of donations as abnormal explains De Page’s claim that donation is an 
“extremely rare act” 121. De Page further offers that a “liberality is inspired by other reasons 
[which are not benevolent], and is based in a will which is not the will to donate. It is nothing 
but a way” to achieve something else122. But he goes even further, by stating that “on the 
other side, even if a liberality is found in its pure form, i.e., it is only inspired by the will of 
the donor to gratify the donee, the liberality represents great danger”, and therefore 
protection needs to be conferred upon (a) the donor himself; (b) his family; and (c) his 
creditors123. 
 
Bearing in mind the above-mentioned prejudice against donation, it is possible argue that 
donation is classified as abnormal due to its association with strong feelings such as love and 
affection. But despite this association between donation and something which is not often 
regarded as normal124, it is necessary to recognise that donation is a common occurrence in 
the social lives of individuals, as it is available to all, legal and individual people alike. The 
occurrence of donation is, in fact, widespread in European society, happens on a regular 
basis, and all individuals may be potentially in the position of either benefactor or 
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beneficiary125. As a direct consequence of its constant presence in the European society, 
gratuitous acts in general, and donations in particular, cannot be classified as abnormal. 
 
Regarded with suspicion, donation is addressed by a substantial body of legal writers as a 
legal institution which must be heavily regulated by the law126. As it will be further analysed 
in the French Chapter127, this chain of thought is particularly evident in the works of legal 
writers devoted to the study of French law of donation128, leading to a claim for a substantial 
regulation of donation. A regulation which is particularly concerned with the protection of 
the family (against the alleged ‘hazard’ of donation)129. It may be argued that the law may 
therefore take two approaches to donations: (i) recognise donations as a normal act, therefore 
regulating its legal effects, while controlling its social repercussions; or (ii) abstain from 
regulating the legal effects (and correspondent social repercussions) of donations. The 
second option, where the law abstains itself from regulating donation, leaves the regulation 
of such social interactions to other normative systems such as morality and religion. Both 
routes should be regarded as a policy choice, which may change in time and space. 
 
1.4.4. Regulation of the effects of donation in a family context 
 
In addition to the evidence that laws of donation in Europe are influenced by family-related 
considerations, it is possible to identify in the jurisdictions under review – Scotland, Portugal 
and France - several protective rules which directly aim to regulate donations made in a 
family context. Among others, it is possible to identify the following rules: (i) rules on 
coalition130, where equality between heirs is enforced by reducing relevant donations 
received by other heirs131; (ii) special regulation given to donations between spouses132; (iii) 
rules which are applicable to donations motivated by family-related motivations, such as 
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donations made in view of the wedding133; (iv) rules providing special powers of revocation 
to the donor due to the birth of a new child for the donor134; (v) rules providing enforcement 
or revocability powers to the family/heirs of the donor if the donee does not comply with the 
modo or obligations emerging from the donation135; (vi) rules preventing the donee from 
payment aliments to the donor136; (vii) rules providing the family or the heirs of the donor 
with revocability rights due to behaviours suggesting that the donee is ungrateful, these being 
found in particular in France and Portugal, where the heirs of the donor are able to revoke 
the donation if the donee is found guilty of murdering the donor137; and, among others, (viii) 
a presumption of animus donandi when benefits are granted to blood relatives138. It is 
therefore possible to argue that the national laws of donation under review extensively 
regulate donations in the family context. This acknowledgement is relevant because it will 
help us to better understand how the connection between donation and the family works in 
different European jurisdictions, as well as providing us with the necessary tools to analyse 
if this connection is prejudicial for the regulation of donation outside of a family context. 
 
1.5. Donation in the market 
 
1.5.1. Generic considerations 
 
The family is traditionally regarded as the centre of the economy139. But from a historical 
perspective, it is possible to identify new players in the world of donation and in the economy 
in general – the legal persons. Legal persons may be business organisations, with a view to 
profit, and non-business organisations, which have been created with other objectives. On 
one hand, different business organisations (whether inside the same group or not) might need 
to enter into gratuitous transactions in the ordinary course of the business. For example, a 
company that produces and sells popcorn might feel the need to lend one of its trucks, for 
free, to its supplier of corn, in order to optimise the delivery time of the raw materials. On 
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 Among others, see art 1753 PCC and art 963 FCC. 
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 See as examples art 958 FCC and art 965 PCC. 
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Assignations, or other Rights, in the names of Children unforas familiat, & unprovided, as presumed to be 
Donations, because of the Parents Natural Affection, and Natural Obligation to provide Children, vid. I. 26 ff 
de Prob. Which was extended to some Goods and Money of small value, delivered by a rich Brother who 
wanted Children, to his Brother who was no Merchant, which was presumed to be animo doanndi, and was not 
imputed, in part of an annual Legacy, left thereafter by that rich Brother to the other”. 
139
 P Delnoy, Les libéralités et les successions, Précis de droit civil (3rd ed 2010) p 14. 
45 
 
 
the other hand, companies may want to use a tax relief that comes with donating to a charity; 
enter into patronage agreements, where donations are performed with the scope of promoting 
the name or brand of products which cannot be advertised to the general public (such as 
cigarettes or drugs); or they might want to give away free samples or provide consumers 
with free offers motivated by a sales promotion strategy. 
 
Bearing in mind that not only physical persons participate in the gift-giving phenomenon, 
but also companies and other legal persons do so, these persons are often motivated by non-
altruistic objectives. Among others140, the desire for profit is one of these person’s main 
motivations, and reason to be in the market, being possible to identify different donations 
which are motivated by a view of future profit, i.e. where at least one of the parties is a 
business or the motivation for the donation is the pursuit of profit. Many examples of 
donations in view of profit may be found, however, those which are most common and easily 
identifiable are donations made by businesses for the promotion of their products or services. 
These gifts are often referred to as samples, promotional vouchers or “welcome gifts”, and 
are traditionally given to consumers by businesses for the purpose of promotion of sales141. 
The recognition that some donations are made with the scope of profit might lead to these 
donations being labelled as suspicious, on the basis that they do not fit with the prejudice 
that altruism or concern about the well-being of a donee is the motive why donors donate142. 
On the contrary, donations are not solely or even primarily motivated by altruism143 and their 
motives may be altruistic or non-altruistic, where market relations are included144. As will 
be studied next in the next chapter, because donations made in a market are of crucial 
relevance today, academic studies have been conducted at a European level on the law of 
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 Such as corporate social responsibility. Defined as the involvement of companies or business in socially 
responsible activities, writers often represent this social phenomenon as “hard to determine what intentions 
motivate them to do so”, J Witkowska, “Corporate Social Responsibility: Selected Theoretical and Empirical 
Aspects” (2016) Comparative Economic Research, p 1. See also N C Cicioc, R Gabrea 
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donation, mainly aiming to study and regulate donations connected to the European 
Common Market145. 
 
It is therefore possible to identity multiple examples of donations, where either the donor or 
the donee is a business, donating or receiving donations with either an altruistic or a business 
orientated motivation. These donations should be regarded as made in a market context, 
considering the market is where companies and businesses interact with other persons. 
Several examples of donations in the market will be critically reviewed below.  
 
1.5.2. Donations with the scope of sales promotion 
 
It is easy to identify examples of donations with the scope of sales promotion in our everyday 
life: from the free sample of cheese given by the local grocery store or supermarket to the 
large donation of funds given by multinationals to our local theatre. It is important to mention 
that due to their often reduced pecuniary value, and impact on the market, donations with 
the scope of sales promotion are often classified as donations, but in practice, “the legal 
relevance of those transactions is normally confined to the rules on unfair commercial 
practices (unfair competition (basic principles); unfair competition (consequences; unfair 
competition and freedoms of movement)”146. It is understandable why donations with the 
scope of sales promotion are regulated by rules on unfair commercial practices and unfair 
competition. On one side, they are transactions able to disrupt the market, by creating a 
disproportional benefit to one company, and therefore obstructing free competition in the 
European market – for example, one company may decide to provide the consumer with free 
products resulting in sales below the cost of production, and therefore creating a case of 
dumping147. On the other side, defective products with the potential to cause harm to 
consumers could be given to them, with the business donor benefiting from reduced liability 
                                                 
145
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 M Schmidt-Kessel, The Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law (2012) I, p 499. 
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 L Davis, “Ten Years of Anti-Dumping in the EU: Economic and Political Targeting” (2009) Global Trade 
and Customs Journal, p 213-232. 
47 
 
 
– which he would not have if the product was provided to the consumer by a non-gratuitous 
juridical act148. 
 
1.5.3. Patronage 
 
Patronage is often confused with sponsorship. In fact, several legal writers are of the opinion 
that patronage and sponsorship should be treated as the same reality, considering the 
similarity of their effects in practice149. The confusion between the two figures is promoted 
by economic writers referring to both as “expenses of the company” or “expenditure on 
communication”150. This confusion is based on the impact of sponsorship and patronage in 
the promotion of sales151. But patronage and sponsorship should represent two distinct 
realities. On one side, sponsorship152 will be used in the present thesis as a service provided 
by the sponsored to the sponsor, where a product or a service is associated with an event or 
a person153. Sponsorship will therefore be used to signify a form of commercial advertising 
which “aims to disseminate a message persuading people to buy products or use services”154. 
This means that sponsorship consists in an onerous agreement reached by sponsor and 
sponsored, where both rights and obligations, emerge to both parties: the sponsor has the 
right to control the information provided to the public/consumers155, and the obligation to 
pay a price; while the sponsored has the duty to advertise the brand or name of the sponsor, 
and has the right to be paid for doing so. On the other side, patronage156 must be defined as 
a donation given to a person or a group of persons, often charities, with the scope of 
benefiting the community. The donor / patron has traditionally no control over the donee on 
how the information that a donation was given is provided to the public. Both patronage and 
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 Product liability as it is today was first introduced by Directive 85/374/EC of 25 July 1985 on the 
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customers in making use of anything established, opened, or offered for the use of the public, as a line of 
conveyances or steamers, a hotel, store, shop, or the like”. 
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sponsorship may have a non-altruistic scope, such as the promotion of sales, but they remain 
distinct in the legal effects produced, particularly in the volume and extent of obligations 
placed on the beneficiary. 
 
As mentioned above, due to the proliferation of both sponsorship and patronage, the 
distinction between these two institutions is often difficult, and several legal writers have 
attempted to draw a clear distinction between them. The most relevant criteria for the 
distinction between sponsorship and patronage as provided in the past are157: (i) the 
distinction which looks at the parties in the contract; (ii) by looking at the scope of the 
agreement – in the case where one of them is a charity, then there is no sponsorship but only 
patronage agreement – whether the agreement was reached or not with the intention of sales 
promotion; and (iii) by looking at the letter of the agreement and to how it was defined by 
the parties. It is posited that it would be more accurate to look at the animus – assessing the 
existence or absence of an intention to give gratuitously - and to the rights and obligations 
emerging from the sponsorship / patronage agreement. Therefore, if obligations emerge to 
the beneficiary, and the benefactor is given control over the form by which his name is 
associated with the person or event, then the agreement must be classified as sponsorship; 
on the contrary, if no or few obligations emerge to the beneficiary – allowing the 
classification of the agreement as gratuitous -, then the agreement may be classified as 
patronage – because only then may it be classified as a donation. 
 
Donations to the third sector or patronage158 may also be defined as the “action, organised 
activity, either ongoing or occasional, by which a physical person, a business or other legal 
person, contributes economically, often under a contract, for the benefit of a creditor, an 
artist, an interpreter, a writer or another public or private institution, for the organisation of 
a cultural, civic, educative or scientific event”159. Multiple examples of these donations may 
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be found in the jurisdictions under consideration herein, from the charitable donations given 
at the entrance of church to what is often referred to as “strategic corporate philanthropy”160.  
 
1.6. Solitary donations 
 
1.6.1. Long-term relationships 
 
Donations are often regarded by European legal writers as gratuitous transactions entered 
into between persons who have a previous relationship or who wish to pursue a close 
relationship in the future. That is one of the reasons why donation is classified as a personal 
relationship161 and presumed to be closely connected with family life162, after all, family 
relationships are presumed to be long-term relationships – from birth to death. The 
assumption that donations are entered into by two parties who are close, and who wish to 
pursue a closer relationship in the future, may also explain why legal authors such as Bell 
state that in Scots law, where a strong presumption against donation exists, this presumption 
may be overcome or even inverted in the case of donations within the family163.  
 
It is therefore necessary to inquire if a donation must always be aimed at the creation or 
maintenance of a long-term relationship. This consideration will have important 
consequences on the objectives to be pursued by an efficient law of donation, because if the 
maintenance of a long-term relationship is one of the cardinal elements of donation, then the 
national laws of donation under review must be able to promote a long-term relationship 
between donor and donee. Most legal literature is silent in this regard, and voices are only 
found describing donation as socially beneficial and aimed at the improvement of life in 
society. One of the legal writers who express this idea is Hyland, who states that “the 
customary gift is designed to improve social relations, to make life in society more cordial 
and affectionate”164. His opinion is based in arguments which are withdrawn from an 
economic analysis of donation. Hyland’s economic analysis of donation intends to explain 
the donor’s behaviour as well as his motivation to donate, which is separated into the 
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following four different motivations: altruism (“warm glow altruism”); the symbolic utility 
of the donation in a community which grants the donor with social approval; the fostering 
of future market relations (establishment of a relationship with trading partners); and the 
(previous) commitment of the donor165. 
 
Out of the four explanations provided for the motivation of the donor by Hyland, only two 
of them (the symbolic utility of the donation in a community which grants the donor with 
social approval and the fostering of future market relations) may be directly linked to the 
motivation towards the development of a long-term relationship between the parties. 
Nevertheless, altruism is the one which is mentioned the most in economics and sociological 
studies166 and social approval is the motivation for donation often referenced in economy 
studies167. Even though altruism and social approval are often mentioned in economy studies 
on gratuity in the market, these two motivations are difficult to be used in the market context 
because of the anonymity of the market institutions, which does not allow donors to disclaim 
their “good deeds” in a market context168. Despite these considerations, altruism and social 
approval may be found in sociological and psychological studies, where they “play the same 
part there as money does in economics”169, and donations may be easily found in countries 
with a strong market economy170. 
  
1.6.2. Short-term relationships 
 
Bearing in mind the above, drawing a clear distinction between the motivation to give in 
general and the motivation to foster a long-lasting relationship in particular, is of extreme 
relevance. A donation is often described as a juridical act where all parties agree to the result 
and juridical consequences of the act, and where each party assumes different risks171. But 
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this classification does not describe the true complexity of the donating act, where juridical 
effects are produced immediately and upon completion of the relevant juridical act, and 
where a relationship is created between the parties and regulated by legal norms172. It is also 
important to bear in mind that a personal relationship is connected with the identity of the 
parties, not the length of time during which the parties are in a relationship, nor does it 
foresee the establishment of new relationships in the future between those parties. It is 
therefore possible to find examples of donations which are given by the donor to strangers 
with whom the donor has no intention to create a future long lasting relationship. 
 
Two of the most common types of solitary donations are charitable donations173, which are 
given as the result of a religious, moral or altruistic motivation (for example the alms given 
to a charity, humanitarian cause, or public institution); and donations given by business to 
consumers aimed at encouraging them into a commercial transaction in the immediate 
future174. It is therefore possible to argue that donations may have as their objective the 
maintenance of long term relationships or the creation of new long term relationships, but a 
donation may also adopt the form of a solitary donation, where the donor has no interest in 
pursuing a long-term relationship with the donee. 
 
1.7. Interim conclusion 
 
Duality of social function. Bearing in mind the above, it may be argued that donations 
involve social interaction in a world where values of love, affection, friendship and gratitude 
are tied to the pursuit of personal advantage. Therefore, donation has developed two different 
functions in European society: (i) one that is motivated by the search for a moral recompense, 
where a donating act is entered into by the donee with the expectation of receiving a non-
legally binding counterpart from the beneficiary; and (ii) another that is not motivated by the 
pursuit of a benefit. The duality of social functions developed by donation has had a strong 
impact on how the laws of Europe address this reality. That explains why it is so difficult to 
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find a complete definition of “donation”, as different European countries have dealt with the 
idea of donation in private law in different ways175.  
 
Donation exists in multiple areas of life in society. Although donation is often regarded as a 
family phenomenon, that is not necessarily always the case, and it is possible to observe 
donations in different areas of life in society: from gifts exchanged between friends and 
family, to donations situated in a market context, made with the scope of sales promotion. 
By recognising that donation is present in other areas of life besides the family, it is possible 
to argue that donation needs flexibility in order to adapt itself to multiple realities. 
Furthermore, it is also important to notice that many legal writers have addressed donation 
mainly regarding it as within the family, and this prejudice has consequences for the rules 
guiding donation – which might not be suitable to address donations made outside of the 
family bubble176. 
 
A comprehensive concept of donation. It is also possible to conclude that changes have 
occurred in Europe, in particular changes which have a European dimension, due to their 
connection to the creation of a European Common Market, where people, goods and services 
move freely within the single market. More than ever in Europe, nationals from different 
MS enter into legal transactions with each other aiming to establish short or long term 
relationships. These relationships may be of two types: gratuitous or non-gratuitous. While 
the consequences of non-gratuitous relationships entered into by European citizens are 
already being widely researched, there is little consideration of how the EU and the European 
Common Market affected gratuitous relationships in general, and donations in particular. It 
is that issue which will be considered in the following chapters through the study of three 
selected European jurisdictions. Finally, and as mentioned before in the introduction, laws 
such as collation, action pauliana, or unjustified enrichment, will not be critically reviewed 
in the present thesis. The focus of the analysis is placed on the laws of donation only, aiming 
a better understanding of how donation operates between the parties in each jurisdiction 
under review. 
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Chapter 2 European contributions to the law of donation 
  
2.1. Introduction 
 
It was established in Chapter 1 that donation has multiple dimensions. These different 
dimensions make it clear that donation, although a well-established legal institution in 
Europe177, is also an elusive concept, due to the existence of contrasting definitions across 
Europe178. As an example, different conceptualisations of donation create a different 
terminology being used in different MS, as well as different underlying policy 
considerations, which vary from one jurisdiction to another179. In addition, the EU developed 
the national markets, by enlarging them to an effective European Common Market. In this 
European Common Market, people with different cultures, religions and backgrounds 
interact with each other. Because people from different cultures and religions should be 
treated the same, national social norms are no longer able to regulate the areas left 
unregulated by the law. This point is particularly relevant when the market is concerned: the 
law regulating market donations no longer can withdraw, and rely instead on social norms 
to regulate the relationship created by the parties. It may be therefore argued that the different 
ways of looking at donation and the new challenges brought by a European Common Market 
create a level of uncertainty in the market because they lead to doubt and feelings of 
insecurity for the market players. In order to promote certainty, it is therefore necessary to 
understand what are the (common) challenges faced by donations in the market, so that an 
efficient law of donation may efficiently regulate them. 
 
The present chapter aims to critically analyse the European contributions (broadly 
constructed) to the law of donation. This analysis aims to develop the principles to be 
followed and the objectives to be pursued by a law of donation which is fit to regulate 
donations made in a market context. It is expected that by looking at the European 
contributions to the development of the law of donation, further evidence will be found that 
donation is present in multiple contexts, while reinforcing the idea that donation has an 
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important place in the commercial market. Finally, the present chapter is expected to identify 
examples to be used in the construction of guidelines for a law donation which is fit to 
regulate market donations. A tool which in turn is necessary to undertake the analysis on the 
following chapters. Examples will be identified, mainly from the DCFR, for the construction 
of these guidelines, which in turn will be used in the critical analysis of the jurisdictions 
under review in Chapters 3 to 5. 
 
At a conceptual level, the present chapter aims to demonstrate that the European projects180 
and in particular the EU increased focus of private lawyers on the market, a fundamental 
switch for the law of donation. The European contribution in terms of substantive law will 
also be reviewed with particular focus on the legislation passed by the EU and the ECJ’s 
intervention. Although small, considering the boundaries of the EU competence on private 
law, this contribution will be analysed for the definition of the above mentioned guidelines. 
Therefore, the present chapter aims to establish the conceptual basis which will be used to 
assess, in future chapters, the suitability of relevant European national laws of donation for 
the purposes of regulating donations in a market context. 
 
2.2. European private law of donation 
 
Legal writers have long departed from the idea that the validity of all law depends on the 
state181, now recognising as sources of law (and its validity) supra-national sources. The 
most relevant of these sources, with regard to the law of donation for Europe, is the EU. The 
granting of legislative powers to the EU has created a gradual emergence of European private 
law. Furthermore, the study of private law emerging from EU sources, and not from the MS 
legislative organs, is a topic which has attracted the attention of legal writers in recent 
years182. In fact, the impulse for the development of a European private law is one of the 
most significant legal developments of our time183. The present section will begin by 
introducing the different institutions able to influence the development of the law of donation 
in Europe, from a supra-national perspective. Some of the supra-national entities and 
organisations under review here may hold legislative powers and therefore can influence the 
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law of donation by creating legally binding rules. Others do not hold legislative powers, but 
are nevertheless able to influence the development of the present and future law of donation 
in Europe through other means. 
 
2.2.1. Institutions and competence of the European Union 
 
Lawyers have looked at private law beyond the state with both interest184 and distrust185. 
Notwithstanding, the EU may pursue its objectives either by creating law or by following a 
soft law approach186, such as issuing non-legally binding statements or funding projects 
which aim to promote the development of (private) law in Europe. The EU legislative 
competences are based on the principle of conferral187, as defined under article 5(2) TEU188. 
Under the principle of conferral, the competences held by the EU legislative bodies have 
once been held by the MS, and have now been delegated to the EU189. The division of 
legislative competence between the EU and the MS became clearer with the signature of the 
Treaty of Lisbon190, and article 2 TFEU now identifies three types of legislative competence 
conferred to the EU: (i) exclusive competence; (ii) shared competence; and (iii) supporting, 
coordinating or supplementing competence191. 
 
The competences conferred to the EU are primarily market-related, reflecting the importance 
of the development of a coherent common-market, while other areas, such as the family, 
have been mainly left to be regulated by national law. Building on the perspective that EU 
market-related areas are better developed by a united EU policy, the market-connected 
competences to legislate have been conferred to the EU by being listed in the Treaties as of 
exclusive competence of the EU, as listed under article 3 TFEU. Policy areas not mentioned 
in articles 3 and 6 TFEU and connected with the internal market, among others, fall within 
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the category of shared competence of the EU. The EU policies are then pursued by different 
mechanisms such as regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations or opinions, all 
regulated under article 288 TFEU. 
 
2.2.2. EU competence on donation 
 
While the EU’s exclusive competences, as listed by article 3 TFEU, are limited in areas 
connected with private law, when compared with the MS’s national parliaments, article 4(1) 
TFEU enunciates that “the Union shall share competence with the Member States where the 
Treaties confer on it a competence which does not relate to the areas referred to in Articles 
3 and 6”. In addition, article 4(2) determines the areas where a shared competence between 
exists between the EU and the MS. Each competence is granted to the EU within the 
boundaries of the principles of conferral and subsidiarity, as mentioned above. Furthermore, 
the Court of Justice also plays an important role in ensuring the uniform application of EU 
rules in all MS. In order to do so, the Court develops definitions and concepts, therefore 
standardising definitions across the EU192. 
 
The European harmonisation of areas distant from the market is often regarded with 
concern193 and therefore restricted by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality194. 
The Treaty of Lisbon was relevant for the expansion of EU legislative competence and for 
the growth of EU influence in such areas, with the EU gaining considerable influence 
through ‘soft law’, policy development and co-ordination. This growth of influence is often 
associated with the “much greater emphasis on values, especially those which value the 
human as a political and social animal rather than as an economic actor”195. 
 
Aiming for economic growth, peace and social prosperity, the European project has created 
a united economic area, where common regulation is regarded as necessary in order to 
standardise trading practices and to further develop a common market196. Bearing in mind 
the different levels of industrialisation, specialisation and economic development of the 
different MS, it was also deemed as necessary a central organisation which would not only 
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standardise practices, but also actively promote equality between the different MS197. This 
centralising action is taken by the EU institutions, acting on the competences provided to 
them by the Treaties198. Article 114(1) TFEU on the “approximation of laws” is central199 to 
the definition of harmonisation, and together with art 115 TFEU200 confers competence to 
the EU organs to legislate in areas connected with the establishment and functioning of the 
European Common Market201, in a way that standardises practices and develops a unitary 
approach in all MS to the same problems. 
 
2.2.3. Regulation of donations 
 
The EU, it might be argued, only has competence to regulate aspects of donation connected 
with the market, without reference to other dimensions of donation, such as those which are 
family-related. In addition, the principle of subsidiarity202 seems a particularly powerful tool 
at the disposal of the MS in order to protect their cultural diversity, and therefore, the EU 
does not have competence to regulate the whole law of donation. Furthermore, the idea that 
what is better regulated at national level should be regulated at national level203 is essential 
for the preservation of all non-market related areas in the hands of the MS’s legislative 
organs. The use of the principle of subsidiarity, as well as the argument that the EU is not 
fully competent to regulate the law of donation, helps MS to protect their (legal, social, 
historical, cultural, etc.) identity and diversity from a harmonisation process which is deemed 
as disruptive of diversity. In short, it may be argued that harmonisation movements may 
endanger the (legal and non-legal) cultural diversity of the MS. Bearing in mind the danger, 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality restrict the powers of the EU, by governing 
the way in which the EU exercises its competencies. 
 
However, and as it will be discussed below, the EU has recognised that donations are often 
used in a market context and has begun to regulate donations in the market under article 3 
TFEU204, as a shared competence. Therefore, donation should not be regarded as a topic to 
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be solely regulated by the relevant MS, considering that the regulation of aspects connected 
with the market may be found under article 3 TFEU. In short, because donations may be 
made in a market context, this aspect of the law of donation falls within the competence of 
the EU. Only if donation were to be regarded as completely separated from the market205 
would it be possible to defend the EU having no competence whatsoever on the regulation 
of the law of donation. This perspective was dismissed in Chapter 1, where it was argued 
that donation may occur in multiple contexts of life in society, being the market one of 
them206. It is therefore possible to argue that the EU is competent to determine the policy to 
be followed by donations made in a market context. This argument is strengthened by the 
fact that the EU has already used its legislative competence in what the law of donation is 
concerned. This will be demonstrated below, in particular where a consumer is the donee207. 
 
2.3. EU law of donation 
 
2.3.1. Legislation 
 
The first relevant impulse towards the regulation of donation under EU law occurred in 2000, 
with the enactment of the Directive on Electronic Commerce208 (DEC). The provisions of 
the DEC are applicable to donations where the donee is a consumer, and they aim to protect 
the consumer-donee, who is regarded as the weaker party in the relationship209. In particular, 
the DEC has regulated the quality of the communications between donor and donee when a 
donation is entered into with the scope of sales promotion and when the relationship between 
donor and donee is classified as a consumer relationship. 
 
Furthermore, under article 6(c) DEC, on the quality of the initial declaration(s) of the trader-
donor in an electronic commerce context, the trader-donor cannot establish a relationship 
with the consumer-donee which is advertised as gratuitous, if an actual gratuitous benefit is 
not granted to the consumer-donee. It is not forbidden, however, for the trader-donor to 
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donate first, with the scope of sales promotion, and to enter afterwards into a contract of sale 
of goods with the consumer. Freedom of contract is protected, however, the consumer-donee 
cannot be misled by the trader-donator. It is therefore possible to say that article 6(c) DEC 
presupposes the possibility of a donation made in a market context. This relationship is 
presumed to take place in a market context, where the parties may be strangers. The subject-
matter of the DEC was further developed by Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair business-to-
consumer commercial practices210. The clarification was placed in Annex I of Directive 
2005/29/EC (commercial practices which are in all circumstances considered unfair), 
paragraph 20, determining that there are several duties of good faith and fair dealing to the 
donee211. The necessity for this provision is debatable. Under the principle of freedom of 
contract212, the parties are free to agree on multiple legal effects, however, once agreement 
is reached, and defined as binding by the Law, the parties must comply with the terms set by 
the agreement. Considering the above, it is possible to conclude that European law has 
established a principle which protects the consumer-donee from being deceived by a trader-
donor. 
 
2.3.2. The European Court of Justice 
 
It is in the area of tax law that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has mainly considered 
donation and other gratuitous benefits. It is important to notice that most of the court 
decisions dealing with donation do not conceptualise the notion of donation, on the contrary, 
they accept without further questioning that the gratuitous transfer of rights over land or 
money is within the boundaries of donation213. One case of particular relevance to the debate 
on a law of donation for Europe is, EMI Group Ltd v The Commissioners for Her Majesty's 
Revenue and Customs214. In this case, the ECJ defined the concept of “samples” and “gift of 
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small value”, as used in article 5(6) of Council Directive 77/388/EEC215. This decision is of 
particular importance because it makes clear that, in order to define concepts such as 
“samples” and “gift of small value”, the MS must apply criteria which regard the benefit 
received by the donee(s), and not the disposition or cost incurred by the donor. 
 
Having this authority in mind, it is possible to argue that the operative part of this decision 
starts by recognising “a certain discretion” as regards to the interpretation of the concept of 
“samples” and “gift of small value” made by each of the MS216. In the reasoning of this 
decision it is possible to identify the principle of subsidiarity217. This recognition has the 
objective of allowing MS to define the concept of donation by looking at the pecuniary value 
of the benefit received by the donee, with complete disregard for the (possible) cost incurred 
by the donor. 
 
2.4. Non-legislative endeavours 
 
Although widely used in European society, donations have not been studied by European 
legal writers in the same length as non-gratuitous transactions. European legal writers have 
overlooked gratuitous juridical acts, which led to the comparison of the study of donation 
with a sleeping beauty which waits to be awakened218. But the sleeping beauty is starting to 
wake up, and as it will be demonstrated below, it is possible to find an ever-growing 
academic movement towards the study of the law of donation in Europe, both from a national 
and from a European perspective. The most relevant private endeavours219 for the 
development of a European private law in general, and a law of donation for the market in 
particular, are therefore going to be reviewed in order to better understand the developments 
made, up to now, towards the study and development by research and scholarship of the law 
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of donation. The private endeavours listed below are either privately funded, or pushed 
forward by the EU. 
 
2.4.1. Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
 
The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (Unidroit) is an independent 
intergovernmental organisation created in 1926 as an auxiliary organ of the League of 
Nations, and re-established in 1940220. Based in Rome, its purposes are identified in article 
1 of the Unidroit Statutes: “to examine ways of harmonising and coordinating the private 
law of States and of groups of States, and to prepare gradually for the adoption by the various 
States of uniform rules of private law”221. Following this objective, and considering the 
noticeable European and world trend towards globalisation and harmonisation of the 
markets222, the Unidroit first published in 1994 the Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts (PICC)223, and further developed them in 2004 and 2010224. 
 
No direct reference is made to the regulation of donations in the market by the PICC, 
however, the absence of concepts such as “donation” or “gift” has not stopped the 
introduction in 2004225 of article 5.1.9 (release by agreement), which regulates the agreement 
by which an obligee may (gratuitously) release his rights226. Article 5.1.9 of the PICC is 
important because it establishes a principle which is relevant, and directly applicable, to 
donations in the market: by declaring that no offer to release a right shall produce juridical 
effects if not accepted by the beneficiary. This article clarifies that all benefits, including 
those provided gratuitously, must be accepted. Thus, it may be argued that acceptance should 
be regarded as key for the protection of the interests of the donee. Article 5.1.9 goes even 
further, and creates a presumption of acceptance by the beneficiary of a gratuitous benefit. 
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In conclusion, under the PICC, in case of silence of the beneficiary, the benefit is presumed 
as accepted. 
 
2.4.2. Principles of European Contract Law 
 
The Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) are the result of the work of the 
Commission on European Private Law (CECL), chaired by Ole Lando. The CECL was 
formed in 1980 and the work began in 1982227. The CECL began as a non-governmental 
body of lawyers from 15 MS with the intention to find general principles which would bring 
a “systematic harmonization of the contract law in those countries”228. The work of this 
commission is based on the need felt by the members of the Commission on European 
Private Law for common European model rules for (i) the facilitation of cross-border trade 
within Europe; (ii) the strengthening of the single European market; (iii) the creation of an 
infrastructure for community laws governing contracts; (iv) the provision of guidelines for 
national courts and legislatures; and (v) the construction of a bridge between the civil law 
and the common law229. These generic principles do not directly refer to the regulation of 
donation in Europe, however, they have introduced the idea that gratuitous transactions are 
relevant in what European contract law is concerned, without attempting to analyse 
gratuitous contracts following a consideration or causa doctrine. The background set by the 
PECL is therefore relevant for the development of the Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR), which has directly reviewed the law of donation, in particular in what it concerns 
to donations made in a market context. 
 
2.4.3. The Draft Common Frame of Reference 
 
In contrast to other private endeavours, the DCFR may be qualified as an important step 
towards the creation of a European private law in general, and a EU law of donation in 
particular. Originating in an initiative of European legal scholars230 and under the stimulus 
of the EU institutions231, the DCFR was created in the hope it would “promote knowledge 
                                                 
227
 O Lando, “How the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) Were Prepared” (2006) European Journal 
of Legal Reform, p 477. 
228
 O Lando, “The Common Core of European Private Law and the Principles of European Contract” (1997-
1998) Hastings International & Comparative Law Review, p 810. 
229
 O Lando, H Beale, Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (2000) p xxi. 
230
 DCFR, Intr. 4. 
231 Following the position of A Keirse, “European impact on contract law – A perspective on the interlinked 
contributions of legal scholars, legislators and courts to the Europeanization of contract law” (1996) Utrecht 
63 
 
 
of private law in the jurisdictions of the European Union. In particular, it will help to show 
how much national private laws resemble one another and have provided mutual stimulus 
for development”232. The DCFR may also be regarded as a toolbox primarily designed to 
ensure consistent terminology for EU legislation and has therefore given birth to both model 
rules and principles of European private law, which are being used at present by national 
courts and national entities with legislative powers233. The relevance of the DCFR for the 
development of EU law of donation must therefore be taken into consideration and will be 
used as a source for the discovery of principles and objectives that could guide a modern law 
of donation for Europe. 
 
The DCFR has gathered knowledge from multiple sources, including the work of the Study 
Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on Existing EC Private Law (also 
known as the Acquis Group)234. The DCFR has therefore received influences from at least 
two relevant sources: it has benefited from the work of comparative research of the different 
European jurisdictions, while tracking an acquis communautaire, the principles that are 
found across the EU, either present in their national law by action of history or acquired by 
the action of the legislative powers of the EU. Despite criticisms that the DCFR does not 
take the European integration process in full account235, it is important to recognise its use 
as a framework for the activity of lawmakers, courts and academic endeavours across 
Europe236. 
 
2.4.3.1. The DCFR and donations in the market 
 
Unlike PECL and the PICC, the DCFR addresses donation (in the market) directly. Donation 
is regulated in particular under Book IV of the DCFR. Historic and cultural considerations 
have influenced the content of the model rules and principles comprised within the DCFR. 
The DCFR drafters however also view themselves as creators of a manual for future law 
reform and this also seems to have played an important role in the shaping of its 
                                                 
Law Review, p 38 and the Second Progress Report of the Commission on The Common Frame of Reference of 
Reference of 25 July 2007, COM (2007) 447 final. 
232
 DCFR, Intr 7. 
233
 K Purnhagen, “Principles of European Private or Civil Law? A Reminder of the Symbiotic Relationship 
Between the ECJ and the DCFR in a Pluralistic European Private Law” (2011)) Centre for the Study of 
European Contract Law Working Paper Series, 2011/04. 
234
 DCFR Intr 1. 
235
 H Micklitz, F Cafaggi (eds), European Private Law after the Common Frame of Reference (2010) I, p x. 
236
 DCFR Intr 7. 
64 
 
 
provisions237. In the case of donation, the DCFR has pursued principles and objectives 
connected with safety, efficiency and minimal substantive restrictions in the market238. This 
action has been taken, it can be argued, with the clear intention of regulating donations in a 
market context. This intent is clearly demonstrated by the scope of the model rules comprised 
in Book IV, Part H. 
 
The first indication of the desire to regulate donations in a market is found under article 
IV.H. – 1:102(2), which mentions the word “manufacture”, an expression traditionally used 
in English language in respect of “a manufacturing establishment, or business; a factory”239. 
By referencing a reality which is empirically connected with the idea of market (goods are 
manufactured, in order to be placed in the market, so that they can be traded), it is possible 
to argue that the DCFR wishes to regulate donations which are presumed to be made in a 
market context, or which are, at least, connected to the market. Furthermore, article IV.H. – 
1:203(2)240 regulates a business practice that walks side-by-side with donation in the market: 
the practice of promotions and offers given to the consumers for the purpose of sales 
promotion. In this case, the DCFR has defined “intent to benefit” as a legal intention to 
confer a benefit on the donee. These particularities are relevant because they demonstrate 
that the DCFR regards donation and the market as two intertwined realities, which co-exist 
and must, therefore, be regulated together. Due to this connection between donation and the 
market, it may be argued that the DCFR has intended to provide a unitary (European) 
framework for the regulation of donation in a market context. The principles set by the DCFR 
therefore constitute a model against which it is possible to judge national laws of donation, 
in order to determine if they are fit for the purpose of regulating donations in the market. 
  
2.5. Principles and objectives of donations in the market 
 
2.5.1. Introduction 
 
The DCFR is particularly relevant when addressing the regulation of donations in the market 
because, as argued above, the DCFR is a comprehensive study which is concerned with the 
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regulation of all transactions in the market, either onerous or gratuitous ones. The DCFR is 
also the most comprehensive study of what features should be part of a future law of donation 
for Europe and the European Common Market. A comprehensive inquiry into the principles 
to be followed, and the objectives to be achieved by a law of donations fit to regulate 
donations in the market should be based on the premise that multiple players interact in a 
market context, where cultural and religious diversity must be respected241. The 
comprehensive study on donations and the market conducted by the DCFR, resulting in rules 
guiding donation242, makes the DCFR the most comprehensive source of principles on 
donations in a market context in general, and in a European Common market context, in 
particular. 
 
The present section aims to formulate guidelines suitable to the regulation of donations made 
in a market context. The needs of donations in the market will be critically reviewed with 
the intention of allowing us to assess, in future chapters, if present national laws of donation 
are fit for the purpose of regulating donations in the market. The word “guidelines” is used 
here to signify both, principles to be followed, and objectives to be achieved by the relevant 
national law of donation under review. These guidelines are to be extracted from multiple 
sources, but particular emphasis is to be given to the DCFR243, due to its relevance in the 
formulation of model rules directly applicable to donations in the market. 
 
2.5.2. Principles identified by the DCFR 
 
Looking at the DCFR, it is possible to identify generic principles applicable to donation, as 
well as proposed substantive regulation (model rules) from which donation-specific 
principles may be extracted. Considering that among the different sources of guidance 
towards a law of donation for Europe, only the DCFR comprises a comprehensive study on 
donation in Europe244, the DCFR is deemed as the most suitable source of guidelines guiding 
an efficient law of donation. The DCFR enunciates four principles as structural principles to 
be followed by a European private law in general and, therefore, by the law of donation in 
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particular. These principles are (i) freedom; (ii) security; (iii) justice; and (iv) efficiency245. 
These four principles actively contribute towards the objectives of stability of the market 
and the relationship between the parties. 
 
2.5.2.1. Freedom 
 
The principle of freedom, as defined by the DCFR, is a liberal approach towards private law, 
where one of the main concerns is to allow the parties to determine their own rules for their 
relationships. This principle has different dimensions because “freedom can be protected by 
not laying down mandatory rules or other controls and by not imposing unnecessary 
restrictions of a formal or procedural nature on peoples’ legal transactions”246. The principle 
of freedom is therefore regarded as very important in the EU context. It is of prime relevance 
to the EU because it prevents an “unlawful invasion of their rights and interests or indeed by 
any unwanted disturbance of the status quo”247. The principle of freedom also has multiple 
dimensions and may be applied in different areas of law. The DCFR has established that the 
different aspects to be taken into consideration are: contractual security248, the right to 
enforce performance249, the binding force of the agreement250 and the fact that parties must 
respect the situation created by the juridical act and may rely on that situation251. In a market 
context, the freedom of contract includes the possible existence of a modo or counter-
performance by the donee and the freedom to choose the identity of their counterparties – a 
rule which is particularly relevant in a context of open market and free competition252. 
 
2.5.2.2. Security 
 
The protection of the parties’ expectations is particularly relevant in all cases when a 
donation is made between strangers. Due to the eventual imbalance in a donating relationship 
caused by the gratuity aspect of donation, different laws of donation protect the donor, as 
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will be demonstrated in the following chapters. This protection is often created by legal 
rights of revocation provided to the donor253, rights which may cause uncertainty for the 
donee or his creditors. The principle of security comprised in the DCFR protects the donee’s 
expectations, so that he is not deprived, as a rule, of the benefit (gratuitously) received. This 
security is also extended to the protection of third parties’ expectations, such as the donee’s 
creditors or heirs, who expect him not to be arbitrarily deprived of benefits received either 
gratuitously or non-gratuitously. Furthermore, the protection of the binding force of the 
donation should be regarded as a crucial part of the principle of security254. That said, it is 
important to mention that the DCFR recognises that in “extreme circumstances it may be 
unjust to enforce the performance of contractual obligations that can literally still be 
performed according to the original terms” if circumstances change dramatically255. Finally, 
following the principle of security means that an effective remedy is provided to those who 
have the right to a benefit, regardless of whether this benefit is provided by a gratuitous or 
onerous juridical act256. 
 
2.5.2.3. Justice 
 
The principle of justice, as defined by the DCFR, is based on the protection of the vulnerable 
party and on the prevention of gross unfair advantages257. Bearing in mind that donation is 
created by a gratuitous juridical act258, the principle of justice must be adapted in order to 
only intervene in carefully specified circumstances, such as “if the party was dependent on 
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or had a relationship of trust with the other party, was in economic distress or had urgent 
needs, or was improvident, ignorant, inexperienced or lacking in bargaining skills”259. 
 
2.5.2.4. Efficiency 
 
The principle of efficiency has two dimensions, a micro-dimension, where it intends to 
promote efficiency to the parties, and a macro-dimension, where efficiency is promoted for 
“wider public purposes”260. Furthermore, the principle of efficiency, as described by the 
DCFR, has the objective of establishing the “minimum formal and procedural 
restrictions”261. This is not necessarily applicable to donation, where formalities confirm the 
validity of the juridical act. These formalities are required in order to create legal security – 
ritualistic formalities ensure that the will of the party (in particular, the donor’s will to 
donate) was formed freely262. Certainty created by legal formalities is relevant not only to 
protect the donor, but also to protect the donee and his creditors (they can trust that, if the 
formalities for the validity of the juridical act were observed, then the act is valid and cannot 
be revoked). 
 
2.5.3. Principles to be followed in the regulation of market donations 
 
Bearing in mind the relevance of the principles enunciated by the DCFR in what the 
regulation of market donations is concerned, these principles will be used in the following 
chapters when assessing the regulation and protection conferred upon the parties by the 
relevant national laws of donation. This means that each national law of donation under 
review will be critically reviewed with regard to the following elements: (i) the protection 
of the parties directly involved in the donation; (ii) the protection of third parties (or parties 
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who are not directly involved in the donation); and (iii) the protection of the community as 
a whole. 
 
2.5.3.1. Protection of the parties 
 
By recognising that donations occur in the market, it is necessary to provide the parties with 
the freedom to enter into gratuitous transactions with both, connected persons and strangers 
alike. The principle of freedom aims to empower the parties to define the terms of their own 
donations and to freely choose their counterparties. Therefore, a national law of donation 
that complies with this principle should only intervene when the terms of the donation are 
considered as unfair or when the identity of the counterparty is not deemed as appropriate263. 
The parties must be free to select the parties with whom they intend to establish donating 
relationships. This freedom of choice must be provided by the law of donation. 
 
The protection of the parties’ expectations is particularly relevant in all cases when a 
donation is made between strangers. A law of donation in line with the principles found in 
the DCFR must therefore provide the donee with the right to enforce performance264 and the 
right to rely on the situation created by the donation265. The right to enforce performance 
creates security in donations between strangers because strangers may not share the same 
moral codes of conduct. A national law of donation which is fit for the purpose of providing 
security to parties from different cultures or backgrounds is a law of donation that protects 
the parties’ expectations that the agreed terms of the donation will be respected and, if not, 
enforced by the law. This rule should not, however, be taken to its extreme and, as 
acknowledged by the DCFR, a dramatic change in circumstances should impact on 
donation266. Therefore, the law of donation must also be flexible when pursuing the principle 
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of security. If the circumstances are predictable at the time of donation, then they could have 
been presumed by the parties, and appropriate measures could have been taken267. 
 
Finally, considering that donations are made by both physical and legal persons alike, the 
law of donation must be guided by the principles of equality and justice. Equality because 
the law of donation should not discriminate, in principle, between physical and legal persons. 
Justice because both physical and legal persons alike, may need to be protected against 
donations which bring gross and unfair disadvantages to them268. Furthermore, and bearing 
in mind the different dimensions of donation, a law of donation which follows the principle 
of justice must not discriminate between one-off donations and those which are used to 
maintain long-term relationships. Donations made in the market may occur as a one-off 
juridical act between the parties, and no longer necessarily be part of a long-standing 
relationship between the parties (or that will not be maintained in the future). A fair law of 
donation takes into consideration a possible short-term relationship between the parties as 
well. A law of donation which is fit for the purpose of regulating donations in the market 
must therefore protect the vulnerable party and prevent gross unfair advantages in both 
cases269, when the relationship between the parties is maintained in the future, and when it 
is not. 
 
2.5.3.2. Protection of third parties 
 
Security is essential for the promotion of confidence in all areas of life, but it is of particular 
relevance in the market, where security leads to an increase of commercial transactions. This 
is particularly true in market transactions where consumers are one of the parties involved – 
if consumers trust that their rights will be respected and enforced, they will consume more270. 
A law of donation fit to regulate market donations in national, European and global contexts, 
where one of the primary goals is the promotion of cross-national transactions271, must 
therefore provide security to the parties involved. This security is achieved by making sure 
that, once made, donations are not going to be unilaterally revoked, or otherwise 
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discretionarily annulled by the donor alone. Security also means that moral and religious 
rules are separated from the legal regulation of donation, because only then parties with 
different backgrounds or which follow different religions, will be able to know and rely on 
a communal regulation for their relationship. Very often, moral considerations are 
intertwined with donation because donation is directly associated with the family. Donations 
used in the family context are heavily regulated by non-legal rules, such as moral and 
religious norms272. It is therefore important to keep these considerations separated from the 
law of donation, allowing the law of donation to regulate the effects of a donation, without 
interfering with the internal rules of one particular group in society273. Bearing in mind that 
security should not be solely about markets, it is important to note that in market concerns, 
such as the protection of third parties, respect for party autonomy and for individual self-
determination, the promotion of security is essential to the healthy increase of market 
transactions. Security is therefore of fundamental relevance in a market context. It is for this 
reason that security is so highly valued in the present review, undertaken in this thesis, of 
donations made in a market context. 
 
2.5.3.3. Protection of the community 
 
Diversity in Europe in particular, and in a globalised world in general, means that different 
communities coexist and trade with each other. These different communities are no longer 
closed within themselves and, on the contrary, they interact with each other outside and in 
the market. Different communities potentially follow diverse moral and religious norms. 
This means that they are regulated under the same law, but may guide their lives by different 
codes of conduct. A law of donation which upholds the principle of justice must therefore 
be able to respect distinct cultures and heritages, while providing security, meaning that all 
parties, with disregard for their religion or background, are treated equally under the (same) 
law. This equality also complies with article 3 TEU274. Reached here, it is necessary to 
recognise that the legal regulation of donation is the outcome of a political choice, and 
therefore, may change according to the composition of the relevant legislator. But this 
political choice may still be able to inform all subjects of the law on the common 
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dispositions, which must be followed by all parties involved, guiding the relationship created 
by the donation. Therefore, and as an example, by defining principles such as equality or 
efficiency, the TEU and the DCFR laid down a consensus, on what is fair and what should 
be followed accordingly by all relevant parties. 
 
In order to comply with the principle of efficiency, in particular, the law of donation must 
set a number of formalities which are able to create procedural efficiency in respect of market 
transactions, while also providing security in the market. The balance between security and 
efficiency means to create procedures which accomplish a high level of security without 
creating unnecessary obstacles to trade. For this reason, the DCFR has established that 
donations (of goods) need to be made by writing275, allowing exceptions to this rule if the 
donation is made by a business or if the donor has made the undertaking in a public 
statement276. The principle of efficiency applied to donations in a social context means the 
formalities should be kept to a minimum277. Formalities are required in order to create legal 
security, however, for donations between friends and family, whose interactions are heavily 
regulated by moral (and often religious) rules, the law of donation may choose to reduce the 
formalities required for the validity of the donation or reduce the regulation of the donation 
by the law. The same does not happen in the market, where donations are not expected to be 
as heavily regulated by non-legal normative systems (such as moral and religion), the law 
plays an important role in settling disputes arising from it. A law of donation which follows 
the principle of efficiency should, therefore, establish a “minimum formal and procedural 
restrictions”278, in order to facilitate the maintenance of the relationships. 
 
2.5.4. Objectives to be pursued by the law of donation 
 
Bearing in mind the above, it is possible to argue that the law of donation often assumes the 
existence of an imbalance in the donating relationship, where one party needs to be protected 
against the other279. These considerations are extracted by several legal writers from 
donations made in a family context, where donation is regarded with suspicion280. The 
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imbalance in the “economic rationality” of donations linked to the family is regarded by 
legal writers as unnatural, an unnatural transaction that is only justified by the “liberal 
intention” of the donor281. Departing from this perspective, because donations made in a 
market context are able to be explained by economic rationality, the presumption that there 
is an imbalance for the parties no longer applies. Both parties assume that the gratuitous 
transaction entered by both of them (the market donation) is often made in view of a non-
legally enforceable (future) profit. By assuming that donations in the market may be 
explained by economic rationality, and that they are no longer compelled by powerful 
feelings such as love or affection282, it may be argued that the law of donation no longer 
needs to intervene in order to correct a presumed imbalance created by the strength of the 
above-mentioned feelings. 
 
In donations made in a market context, the parties may be treated as equals because both 
parties are aware that the donation may be made in view of profit, even if this future profit 
cannot be legally enforced or demanded by the business-donor. But treating the parties as 
equals does not mean that the law of donation should not regulate donations made in a market 
context, on the contrary, the law of donation should be able to intervene whenever this 
balance is threatened283. Arguing for equality in the market means that both parties must be 
in possession of the relevant information for the correct development of their will. 
Information duties must therefore be in place for an effective equality between the parties, 
creating a climate of confidence and security in the market284. Bearing in mind that donations 
are often regarded as juridical acts made between family members, and as such, physical 
persons who donate and receive donations, the law of donation should detach itself from this 
prejudice, considering that not only physical persons, but also legal persons are able to 
donate and to receive donations. From a family perspective, only natural persons are 
perceived as relevant as donor and/or donee, a perspective which does not correspond to 
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donation today. The law of donation must therefore be able to efficiently regulate donations 
made and received by legal persons and physical persons alike. 
 
Trust is of particular relevance for the existence of a market transaction285. This means that 
the law of donation should promote confidence and security in the market. This objective 
can be achieved following different routes, including the right to enforce performance and 
the right to expect fair dealing. These rights come together to promote confidence in the 
market and in transactions entered into by strangers and connected people alike. This 
confidence is particularly relevant when strangers from different backgrounds and different 
nationalities enter into a relationship. If confidence is not promoted by the law, strangers 
will refrain from entering into transactions they perceive as dangerous or with a high degree 
of associated risk. As examples, they may fear that their donations may be revoked against 
their will, the modos may not be complied with by the donee and they may not be able to 
enforce it, the motive why the donation was made may fail without any repercussions, among 
others. 
 
2.6. Interim conclusion 
 
The European legal contributions to the development of the law of donation, both legislative 
and non-legislative, add to our understanding of donation by clearly recognising its 
placement in the market. This recognition strengthens the argument enunciated in Chapter 
1, where it was argued that donations are not just found in a family-related context, but may 
also be found in other areas of life, one of them being the market. The DCFR was presented 
as the most relevant contributor to the development of the law of donation in Europe, and 
therefore, the principles enunciated by the DCFR were used to construct guidelines. These 
guidelines (principles to be followed and objectives to be fulfilled by the law of donation) 
will be used in the following chapters to assess the fitness of relevant national laws of 
donation to regulate donations made in a market context. In short, the study of the European 
contributions has demonstrated that, at a conceptual level, donations are made in a market 
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context, and in terms of substantive law, that little contribution has been provided by the EU 
legislative bodies to the development of the law of donation in Europe. 
 
EU legislative competence is restricted in respect of donation. Considering the limited 
competence of the EU for the regulation all areas of law which are closely related to the 
family, and that donation is often associated with the family, it is possible to conclude that 
the EU legislative competence is here restricted by the Treaties286. While this competence is 
presumed to be conferred by the MS287, the EU may only take action in what the law of 
donation is concerned, where it has legal competence – the market. This relatively limited 
competence highlights the current split between family and the market, in what the law of 
donation is concerned. In addition, it is necessary bear in mind that the EU has considerable 
influence in multiple areas through “soft law” and co-ordination, or generic policy 
development. A distinction is drawn between the legislative competence of the EU to create 
EU law in all areas connected with the market and family, which is regulated at national 
level, because the EU was not vested with the competence to regulate it. In opposition, the 
European project (broadly defined) has given rise to various initiatives looking at European 
private law/harmonisation, leading to the treatment of the law of donation (and its placement 
in the market) by the DCFR.  
 
Donations in the market have special needs. It was further argued that the EU has a shared 
competence for the regulation of donations in the market. By disconnecting donations from 
the family context it is possible to recognise that donation exists outside of a circle of 
connected people, as explained in Chapter 1. If a gratuitous relationship is entered with a 
stranger, there is no reason why this relationship should not be regulated under the law of 
donation. In today’s European Common Market, people from different cultures and religions 
come together to trade (and donate), which means that national social norms are no longer 
adequate to regulate the relationship between them, where the law has not done so. It is 
further argued that non-legal normative orders cannot play a role in the regulation of 
donation. Religion, in particular, must be separated from the regulation of donations in the 
market, considering that the principle of freedom of religion288 (which includes the right to 
be free from religion) prevents it. It is therefore possible to argue that a law of donation fit 
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to regulate donations in the market must be a secular one, guided by secular principles and 
objectives. 
 
The DCFR as benchmark. This need for a secular law of donation led to the review of 
different European inputs to the law of donation. The DCFR was chosen as the most relevant 
source of guidelines to be pursued by a law of donation in the market. This choice was made 
regarding the fact that the DCFR has respected the different European jurisdictions, their 
principles and particularities, while creating a comprehensive set of principles and model 
rules aiming to regulate donations from a European Common Market perspective. The 
comprehensive study of the law of donation in Europe conducted by the DCFR cannot, 
therefore, be ignored, and it must be regarded as the main source of guidance for a future 
law of donation in Europe.  
 
The DCFR enunciates four principles as structural principles to be followed by a European 
private law in general and, therefore, by the law of donation in particular. These principles 
are (i) freedom289; (ii) security290; (iii) justice291, and (iv) efficiency292. These four principles 
actively contribute towards the objectives of stability of the market by promoting confidence. 
They should therefore be used as the operative principles to a critical analysis of national 
laws of donation, in order to assess if they are ready to cater for the necessities of donations 
in the market. Freedom is regarded as necessary for the empowerment of the parties in the 
market context. Security is regarded as necessary to prevent one of the parties from 
unilaterally revoking or changing the terms of the donation (therefore protecting the 
expectations of all parties and promoting confidence). Justice recognises that donations are 
made by legal persons and physical persons alike. Finally, efficiency is achieved by clear 
formalities, which ensure the binding legal force of donations in the market. 
 
Principles and objectives to be followed by a law of donation for the market. The above-
mentioned principles are embodying several objectives, the most relevant being: (i) the 
protection of the vulnerable party when a grossly unfair advantage was created293; (ii) the 
promotion of information duties which not only benefit the parties but also promote 
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confidence in the market294; (iii) equality of treatment for legal and physical persons295; and 
(iv) the promotion of confidence, by granting the donee the right to enforce performance and 
the right to expect fair dealing296. These different principles and objectives are going to be 
used in the following chapters to critically review national laws of donation, and assess their 
fitness for the purpose of regulating donations made in a market context. 
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Chapter 3 - Scotland 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The present chapter will critically review the Scots law of donation with the objective of 
assessing its suitability to regulate donations made in a market context. To better understand 
the Scots law of donation, a critical review of the existing law will be conducted in the first 
part of the chapter, followed by the placement of the law of donation within the taxonomy 
of Scots Private law. This will be followed by the second part of the chapter, which will 
assess the fitness for purpose of Scots law of donation for the regulation of donations in a 
market context. 
 
Following Chapter 2, where the needs of donations made in a market context have been 
reviewed297, the present chapter aims to address a dual perspective: a perspective where only 
the Scottish market is concerned, and, presumably, both parties – donor and donee – are 
familiar with Scots law of donation; as well as a cross-border perspective, where the parties 
– donor and donee – have different nationalities and backgrounds, and may need to be 
protected against rules which risk an imbalance in the contractual/legal autonomy of the 
parties. On one side, from a national market perspective, the concerns addressed by the law 
of donation are often connected with the regulation of transactions between parties who 
know each other before a donation is made, or who reinforce or establish a personal 
relationship with the donation298; while on the other side, from a supra-national perspective, 
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the concerns addressed by the law of donation must span the areas of safety and security in 
transactions299. 
 
The Scottish jurisdiction is at present one of the jurisdictions composing the EU (and the 
European Common Market)300, but which may soon stand outside of it in the context of the 
recent Brexit referendum301. In this referendum, 51.9% (against 48.1%) of those voting had 
expressed their wish for the United Kingdom to leave the EU302. As part of the United 
Kingdom, Scotland may soon leave the EU (despite a 62.0% Scottish vote expressing their 
wish to remain part of the EU303), and the consequences of exiting the EU are still unknown. 
It is not certain if the United Kingdom (and Scotland) will leave the European Common 
Market as well, or if they will remain part of the single market, but outside of the EU304. 
Despite this uncertainty, the present study remains valid, considering that its aim is to 
understand if present Scots law of donation is suitable to create security for parties donating 
in a market context, a context where persons from different backgrounds enter into 
relationships regulated under the law. 
 
3.2. Review of Scots law of donation 
 
Beginning with a review of the development of the Scots law of donation is important 
because it will allow us to understand why the present law of donation has adopted its current 
shape. After these elements have been provided, they will be used to critically assess the 
definition of donation in Scotland, with particular emphasis on the impact of classifying an 
act as a donation in a market context. Furthermore, by looking at the opinions of relevant 
legal writers, it is possible to better analyse the roots of donation in Scotland, therefore better 
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understanding the origin of particular rules which distinguish between donations and other 
(onerous) acts in the market.  
 
3.2.1. Definition of donation 
 
The definition of donation has long divided lawyers in Scotland305. While a single definition 
of donation in Scots law cannot be found, it is true that contemporary legal writers and 
Scottish courts have been heavily influenced by the “Institutional Writers” 306. It may be 
argued that these Institutional Writers may be divided into two main groups when addressing 
the topic of donation: those who see donation as a defence against the rules of unjustified 
enrichment; and those who see donation primarily as part of the law of voluntary obligations. 
 
One of the early Institutional Writers, Stair, sees donation as a modus acquirendi, which 
justifies the conservation of the benefit by the donee307. For Stair, donation is deeply 
connected with a benevolent intervention of the donor and it is seen as an expression of the 
natural law principle of gratitude308. This perspective keeps Stair away from classifying 
donation as a juridical act per se, from which obligations arise, instead regarding the 
donating phenomenon as a natural law justification (under God’s protection) for the 
maintenance of the benefit by the beneficiary/donee. Bankton broadly followed Stair in his 
definition of donation, defining it as a “grant of anything, to which one could not be 
compelled by law”309. But it may be argued that Bankton has further contributed to the 
shaping of the law of donation as it is today, by clarifying that donation is “perfected, to the 
greatest extent by bare promise or agreement”310. This means that Bankton recognised that, 
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in Scots law, donations may be created by either unilateral (promises) or bilateral 
(agreements) juridical acts311. 
 
Subsequent legal writers, writing about Scots law of donation, followed suit, having placed 
the subject primarily in the context of the law of obligations312. It is worth mentioning that 
Stair’s approach was disputed by Erskine, who is referred to as the first Institutional Writer 
to treat donation as a juridical act in its own right313. Erskine clarifies that there is a 
distinction in Scots law between an obligation to donate, as created by a juridical act, and 
the moment when the donee holds a benefit he did not hold before314. Erskine315 has based 
his writings on the novel approach towards donations taken by Bankton316, who first 
detached donation from a solely benevolent ‘God-protected’ perspective of donation taken 
by Stair317. Taking Bankton’s approach as a starting point, Erskine has further drawn a clear 
distinction between the obligation to donate and performance318. This distinction is one of 
the fundamental distinctions of Scots law of donation319, being essential for determining the 
existence of a donation in Scotland today. 
 
It is also relevant to mention that some contemporary legal writers have classified donation 
primarily as “a gratuitous transfer of property which is intended to take effect inter vivos” 
320
. A property-based law of donation walks side-by-side with the vision of donation as a 
transfer of pre-existent (real) rights. The difficult task to place the law of donation in Scots 
private law is nevertheless recognised by one of the main voices linking donation to the 
transfer of real rights in Scotland, Gordon, who declares that “although 'donation' refers 
primarily to a transfer of property (or to the creation of an obligation to transfer property, 
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which can itself be considered a form of incorporeal property), the term is sometimes used 
of any gratuitous act”321. 
 
3.2.2. Cardinal elements 
 
Despite the multiple definitions of donation provided by legal writers in Scotland, it is still 
possible to identify some cardinal elements, which are ever-present in the definition of 
donation in Scots law. These cardinal elements may be defined as the different elements of 
a juridical act which allow the lawyer or the judge to “discover” the existence of a donation. 
By establishing all the ever-present elements of donation under Scots law, it is possible to 
look at a relevant juridical act and determine if the relevant juridical act is, or it is not, to be 
qualified as a donation in Scots law.  
 
Writers on the Scots law of donation, often state the need for the existence of a subjective 
will to donate, an animus donandi, which is mainly assessed by reference to the donor. As a 
demonstration, we may find Erskine, who defines donation as “the obligation which arises 
from the mere liberality of the giver”322, or Stair, for whom a donation is characterised by a 
benefit given with animo donandi which “induces an obligation to be thankful but does not 
bind to the like Liberality”323. Erskine, for example, distinguishes the source of the donation 
(the juridical act, which creates the obligation to give), from the delivery of the subject 
matter, regarding the will of the donor as the source of donation (or the “obligation which 
arises from the mere good will and liberality of the granter”324). The idea that the animus 
donandi is a cardinal element of donation is further defended by MacQueen and Hogg325, 
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who declare that at least the donor must be “actively involved” in the juridical act in order 
to produce legal effects326. 
 
Donation is also unanimously understood in Scots law as gratuitous in general, and as an act 
which is not motivated by a previous legal obligation to give. This perspective is espoused 
by Erskine, who defined donation as the liberal grant of a right or a thing which could not 
be compelled by law 327, Bell who has connected donation with the provision of a gratuitous 
benefit328, or Bankton, who states that “the receiver, donatary, because the [donor] gets no 
valuable consideration for it”329. Professor Gordon has clearly defined gratuity as the 
absence of a previous legal obligation to give330. Hogg has also defined donation as the 
creation of a gratuitous benefit, a benefit which is received by the donee without a reciprocal 
benefit being created to the donor by the relevant juridical act331. 
 
Finally, the creation of a benefit to the donee by means of a juridical act which takes effect 
inter vivos is also commonly defined as a cardinal element of donation in Scots law. Despite 
the variety of juridical acts categorised as a donation, it is also necessary for these juridical 
acts to produce their effects inter vivos to be classified as a donation by the above mentioned 
legal writers. Stair, for example, classified different juridical acts as donations. When 
referring to acts which may be regulated whether by the law of trust or donation, he provides 
as examples the following: “bond, assignation, disposition, or other right in another man’s 
name” 332. Erskine’s position will be further discussed below, but considering that he defines 
donation as an obligation, having placed it systematically under the heading “Of obligations 
arising from consent & C.”333, Erskine has indicated that if donation creates an obligation, 
then this obligation must be born of an act of the will, an act which may be described, in 
other words, as a juridical act. Furthermore, Erskine has studied in detail the hard boundaries 
between donations and legacies, associating the production of the legal effects inter vivos 
with the irrevocability of donation (contrary to legacies, which are, by definition, 
revocable)334. The production of effects inter vivos is further defined as a cardinal element 
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of Scots law of donation by Professor Gordon, who states that “donation is the preferred 
term in Scots law for a gratuitous transfer of property which is intended to take effect inter 
vivos”335, a perspective which is followed by MacQueen and Hogg336. 
 
In short, the relevant cardinal elements, to be found, leading to its classification as a donation 
under Scots law are the following: (i) the animus donandi; (ii) the gratuity of the transaction 
(comprising the absence of a previous ‘legal’ obligation to give); and (iii) the creation of a 
benefit (produced inter vivos) by action of a juridical act. The cardinal elements for the 
application of Scots law of donation will be critically reviewed below and there will be 
particular emphasis on the clarification of the boundaries of each individual element of 
donation. 
 
3.2.2.1. Animus donandi 
 
It may be argued that the Scottish courts use two tests to assess if all above-mentioned 
cardinal elements are present in a relevant juridical act, leading to the qualification of the 
juridical act as a donation under Scots law337: the first, and perhaps most important test, 
consists of assessing if the subjective will of the donor, as demonstrated by his words or 
actions, contains the subjective elements animus donandi and gratuity; the second test 
consists of assessing if the donee was effectively vested in the benefit and if this performance 
was made inter vivos (often regarded as the discharge of an obligation undertaken by the 
donor, and referred to as “delivery” or “performance” by the Scottish courts338). Therefore, 
it is possible to say that Scottish courts demand the existence of a subjective element (the 
animus donandi of the donor) and an objective one (the performance) for the existence of a 
donation under Scots law. It is further accepted that a (subjective) intention to benefit 
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gratuitously constitutes an effective will to create a benefit to the donee and that this intention 
is not tainted by concurrent non-charitable intentions, or the pursuit of what is perceived by 
the donor as a moral or religious obligation to benefit the donee339. Conversely, if no 
subjective intention to gratuitously benefit the donee exists, the fact that the transaction is 
objectively gratuitous will not suffice. One such case is the discharge of a pre-existing legal 
obligation by the donor/benefactor to pay/benefit the donee. As it will be explained in length 
below, the existence of a previous legal obligation to benefit the donee is presumed, in Scots 
law, to destroy what is regarded as the subjective will to give (gratuitously) and leads to the 
failure of the first test, or in other words, a benefit provided to a beneficiary in the fulfilment 
of a previous legal obligation to give exempts the juridical act from being qualified as a 
donation under Scots law340. 
 
When looking at donation from a market perspective, it is necessary to be aware that for 
some Scottish legal writers “no person is presumed to do what, in place of bringing him 
profit, must certainly be attended with some pecuniary loss”341. This assumption must not 
be regarded, however, as contradictory to the existence of donations made in a market 
context, in particular those which are made with the intention of sales promotion or to receive 
a future gain. On the contrary, if the donor aims to promote his sales in the future, his 
intentions do not necessarily collide with a contemporary free will to give gratuitously. This 
means that the intention to gain in the future is not opposed to the existence of an animus 
donandi. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the will to give gratuitously, which 
may be tainted by a previous legal obligation to give, and the motivation which leads to the 
donation (which may be a charitable donation, or the uncharitable intention to receive a 
future gratuitous benefit or favourable publicity and correspondent sales promotion). It is for 
this reason that animus donandi is regarded as “intention and not motive”342 in Scotland.  
 
In order to consolidate the idea that a will to give (gratuitously) is different from the 
motivation with which the donation was made, and that such will may be tainted by the pre-
existence of an obligation to give, we may look at the case of a consumer who is provided 
with a new product, free of charge, in the fulfilment of his legal right to have a faulty product 
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replaced or repaired343. In this particular case, the consumer bought a product that is not 
working according to the specifications of the contract, or that does not perform as it is 
expected for such type of product. Under the Consumer Rights Act344 the consumer has the 
right for the product to be repaired or replaced, which means that by providing a new product 
to the consumer, in replacement of the old one, the trader is merely discharging a previously 
existing legal obligation. The trader may wish to replace the product motivated by 
benevolence, however, this act may never be classified as a donation under Scots law, 
because the trader is not acting animus donandi. In this particular case, the trader does not 
have the intention to gratuitously provide a benefit to the consumer, and even if he has, under 
Scots law, his animus donandi was presumed to be tainted by a pre-existent legal obligation 
to replace the product. It is clear that the trader may benefit his consumers with a donation, 
if he wishes so, but it is also clear that whenever the trader is complying with his obligation 
to replace a faulty item, he is not donating a new item to the consumer, on the contrary, he 
is merely complying with the contract celebrated between trader and consumer, regulated 
under the Consumer Rights Act345. 
 
Considering that animus donandi must exist for a juridical act to be classified as a donation 
in Scots law, this intention to benefit the donor is often identified as a will to provide the 
benefit to the donee in the present, and not in an uncertain future moment346. For example, 
MacQueen and Hogg suggest that not only an intention to give gratuitously is necessary to 
create a legally relevant animus donandi, but that a further intention to confer a present 
benefit (“now”)347, and not in the future is required for the creation of a donation in Scots 
law348. It may be argued that MacQueen and Hogg have adopted a more stringent concept 
of animus donandi aiming at better distinguishing between promise and donation in Scots 
law, but by doing so, they have also restricted the concept of donation in Scots law, by 
declaring that gratuitous promises are not to be classified as a source of donations, but that 
they coexist instead, side-by-side, with donation. Following Stair349 and Bankton’s350 
approach, MacQueen and Hogg seek to “re-unite the law of gratuitous obligations (especially 
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unilateral promises) and donations”351, however, it is possible to argue that they have instead 
restricted the concept of donation, by associating donation with the transfer of property in 
Scotland352. This association between donation and the gratuitous transfer of property has 
created a firm separation between the laws of donation and promise in Scots law, in a way 
that the only effective reconciliation made by MacQueen and Hogg between the two laws is 
found in their (surprisingly) firm assertion that “promises and donations are clearly both 
unilateral juridical acts and gratuitous ones”353. 
 
The restrictive approach of MacQueen and Hogg is contradicted by the broader approach 
taken by Scottish courts to the discovery of animus donandi. Scottish courts do not require 
donations to be “unilateral juridical acts”, they only request the existence of an animus 
donandi followed by the creation of an irrevocable benefit to the donee354 for the creation of 
a donation in Scotland. This requisite is in line with the second test conducted by the Scottish 
courts, where they assess if the donee is effectively vested in the benefit and if this 
performance was made inter vivos355. It may be argued that by detaching performance from 
the concept of animus donandi per se, it is possible to bring the laws of donation and 
(gratuitous) promise together under Scots law, considering that both may be qualified as a 
donation, but some are to be regulated, in particular, by the particularities of the law of 
promise (gratuitous promise being classified as a sub-type of donation in Scots law). In other 
words, the concept of animus donandi, in what the Scots law of donation is concerned, 
should not be constrained by the need for a subjective intention to confer a benefit “now”356. 
This perspective is in line with the study on cardinal elements of donation conducted so far, 
resonating in particular with “the need for the creation of a benefit produced inter vivos by 
action of a juridical act”, which may also be referred to under Scots law as performance357. 
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Performance, conferring a benefice to the donee must therefore follow the donor’s animus 
donandi for the creation of a donation under Scots law of donation. 
 
3.2.2.2. Gratuity 
 
The unanimous acceptance that donations are gratuitous transactions under Scots law358 
leads to the definition of “gratuity” as one of the cardinal elements necessarily present for 
the definition of a juridical act as a donation in Scots law. Gratuity is also often defined as a 
benefit which is provided without correspondent payment359. This is the view taken by Hogg 
who, while writing on Scots law of promise and contract, has linked gratuity in Scots private 
law to one of three different situations: (i) something done without the legal right to compel 
a counter-performance; (ii) something done without the hope or expectation of a counter-
performance; or (iii) something done with no (legal) reciprocal counter-performance de 
facto360. A relevant observation to be made is that the first and third definitions of gratuity 
above are detached from the motivation, or reason, as to why the party/parties entered into 
the juridical act. But Hogg defines gratuity in Scots (private) law when he suggests that 
“gratuitousness is best judged by whether or not the party undertaking the obligation can or 
cannot compel a counter-performance at the time he undertakes the obligation”361. It is 
therefore possible to argue that under Scots law of donation, no payment is, in principle, to 
be requested by the donor to the donee362. Although some forms of counter-performance are 
accepted in the Scots law of donation, these conditions do not provide the donor with the 
right to enforce the counter-performance. These conditional donations only allow the donor 
to suspend his performance until the occurrence of the condition363. 
 
Finally, and adding to the discussion above on the presumption against donation, the 
provision of “gratuitous” benefits is not often regarded by Scottish legal writers as a normal 
occurrence in society, in particular in a society such as Scotland, where a presumption 
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against donation (often referred to as debitor non praesumitur donare364) may be found. The 
presumption against donation in Scotland was expressed by Stair in the following terms: 
“any deed done by the debtor is either presumed to be in security, or in satisfaction of his 
debt (…) unless the deed express it to be a donation, or done for love and favour. Yea, trust 
is rather presumed than donation”365. Following this dichotomy, it is necessary to notice 
that gratuity was defined in different ways by Scottish legal writers, the following being the 
most relevant definitions: (i) the lack of equivalence, where the donor provides a benefit to 
the donee without receiving a correspondent366; and (ii) the freedom to give, or absence of a 
legal obligation or duty to give367. Donations are, therefore, gratuitous juridical acts under 
Scots law. In other words, as stated by Lord Justice-Clerk, donations are juridical acts where 
the donee may receive “advances as pure donations which laid him under no obligation of 
repayment”368. Considering the above argument that the absence of a previous obligation to 
give is connected with the formation of the will of the donor, and is therefore better discussed 
when dealing with the concept of animus donandi, the present study aligns itself with the 
first definition of gratuity, where a gratuitous juridical act is the one where a benefit is 
provided by the donor without receiving a correspondent payment. 
 
3.2.2.3. No previous legal obligation to give 
 
The presumption against donation found in Scots law369 may be regarded in two different 
lights, those being: a presumption against the donor’s will to donate, and a generic 
presumption against the classification of the juridical act as a donation. Legal writers, who 
attempted to define donation in Scotland, often mention the absence of a previous obligation 
to give as a necessary element for the creation of a donation as part of the cardinal element 
of gratuity in donation. For instance, Black defines donation as a “free gift inter vivos of any 
subject by one who is not under an antecedent legal obligation to give it”370; Mackenzie 
states that donation “is in law defined to be a mere liberality proceeding from no previous 
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compulsion”371; and Bankton concurs that “a gift or donation is the liberal grant of anything 
to which one could not be compelled by law”372. All definitions of donation presented above 
therefore demand the absence of any previous compulsion to give. At this point it is 
necessary to understand what a previous compulsion to give means for these legal writers. 
 
Generically speaking, a compulsion to give may be defined as any external force pushing a 
benefactor to give or to refrain from impoverishing the beneficiary. But not all compulsions 
matter for Scots law of donation. This compulsion must be legally relevant in order to taint 
the animus donandi. As mentioned above, the animus donandi may be defined as the will of 
the donor to give gratuitously, a will which may have different motivations, such as charity 
motives, the pursuit of future profit, the discharge of social and religious obligations, among 
others. All of these motivations are allowed and do not taint the will of the donor – i.e. they 
are not and should not be regarded by the law as causes for the will of the donor not to be 
free. Directly opposing these motivations, it is possible to find the discharge of a legal 
obligation. If the donor discharges a legal obligation, he is not giving as a consequence of 
his free will. On the contrary, it is his duty to do so. Because it is his (legal) duty to do so, 
the donor is never giving animus donandi, the donor is merely following a legal command 
which tells him to do or abstain from doing something. This is the reason why Gordon 
declares that “donation is the free gift inter vivos of any subject by one who is not under an 
antecedent legal obligation to give it”373. 
 
Bearing in mind that the demand for the absence of a previous obligation to give in Scots 
law of donation is rooted in the Roman maxim debitor non presumitur donare374 (a debtor 
is not presumed to donate), which is alive and operative in Scotland375, it is possible to argue 
that the existence of a previous obligation to give matters when assessing the will (animus) 
of the donor, and it is not relevant at the level of the gratuity of the transaction. This 
presumption denies the existence of a donation in Scots law whenever the donor is subject 
to a previous obligation to give to the donee, unless proved that the donor has acted with 
animo donandi, and not with animo solvendi. In other words, someone who is under the 
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obligation to give is presumed to wish to discharge this obligation, and not to remain in debt 
in the future. As a demonstration, Stair concurs that “any deed done by the debtor is either 
presumed to be in security, or in satisfaction of his debt (…) unless the deed express it to be 
a donation”376. 
 
For this reason, I would argue that the presumption against donation in Scots law is a 
presumption against the donor’s will to donate, and not against the gratuity of the act, 
considering that this presumption classifies the donor’s will as animus solvendi (the donor 
wishes to discharge his obligation/debt) and no longer as animus donandi (to give 
gratuitously) if a previously existent obligation is held by the donor to benefit the donee. 
Furthermore, and bearing in mind the principles of freedom of contract and free will in Scots 
law377, it is possible to argue that this presumption never “taints” the true will of the donor, 
on the contrary, it merely gives rise to a presumption that the debtor’s intention was to 
discharge his obligation, and not to donate. In other words, if the donor’s intention/will is to 
donate, and if this will is freely formed, then Scots law does not stop him from donating. 
Even if a previously existing debt between donor and donee exists, and the donor does not 
wish to discharge his obligation, wishing instead to give gratuitously to the donee, he may 
do so, and his previous debt towards the donee remains intact or unpaid. Therefore, the 
intention of the donor is the most relevant aspect in the assessment of his animus donandi378, 
where a presumption against his will to donate exists to create legal stability, providing 
courts and lawyers with a tendentiously objective way to assess the will of the donor. While 
animus donandi represents the freely formed will to give, gratuitously, to the donee, the 
animus solvendi is the will of the debtor to discharge a legal obligation, for the benefit of the 
creditor379. 
 
Dot Reid actively contributes to the present discussion, by evidencing the existence of 
presumptions against donation in Stair’s writings. Her findings build on Aquinian and 
Aristotelian ideas, in order to argue that, in Stair, donation is characterised as an unequal 
relationship where “justice requires a rebalancing of those positions, and the mechanism for 
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doing so is restitution”380. Bankton has also concurred that when a donor is the debtor of the 
donee, a donation “is never presumed, because everyone is understood to mind his own 
interest most; and therefore, whenever the deed can receive any other interpretation than that 
of a gift, it is construed accordingly: this debtor [as a rule] is not presumed to gift his 
creditor”381. It is possible to find other examples of Scottish legal writers who claim that 
donations are not to be presumed in Scots law, such as Barclay382, who declares that 
donations are never presumed if the juridical act which creates the donation “admits other 
constructions” and the debtor is never to be presumed383, or Morton, who clearly states that 
a donation from the debtor to his creditor is “in dubio presumed to be not a donation, but a 
settlement of the debt or obligation”384. The presumption against donation must be overcome 
by the donee, in order for the juridical act to be classified in court as a donation. This means 
that the donee is the one who has the burden to prove that the animus donandi of the donor 
is not negated by a previous legal obligation to give385. 
 
The reasons why a previous legal duty to give raises a presumption against donation, but not 
moral or religious duties, which are fully disregarded as cause for a presumption against 
donation in Scots law, is not often explained in depth by Scottish legal writers. This may be 
explained by the enrichment model of donation present in Scots law, or by the fact that legal 
writers do not feel the need to analyse these non-legal duties because an operative 
presumption solely against previous legal obligations exists in Scots law of donation. As 
mentioned before, the presumption against donation is traditionally described as based in the 
Roman maxim debitor non presumitur donare386, and is one of Scots law of donation’s most 
significant rules. According to the presumption against donation, which must be overcome 
by the donee, the donee has the burden to prove (i) the animus donandi of the donor, and (ii) 
that the benefit was delivered387. In other words, Scots law distrusts benefits gratuitously 
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created388, under the assumption that “no person is presumed to do what, in place of bringing 
him profit, must certainly be attended with some pecuniary loss”389. This means that, in Scots 
law, a donation is not regarded as a normal occurrence390. 
 
3.2.2.4. Performance 
 
When investigating the “gratuity” element of donation in Scots law, it is commonplace to 
read that the mere statement of an intention to give, or even the sole existence of an animus 
donandi, does not constitute a donation in Scots law391. Conversely, if an intention to create 
a gratuitous benefit exists, and the required formalities are followed, the benefactor will 
undertake an obligation to give, a gratuitous obligation which is legally enforceable in Scots 
law. This means that making a benefit available to the donee, often referred to as delivery or 
performance in Scots law392, should be regarded as a constant element in donation in Scots 
law. It is important to notice that, contrary to their French colleagues393, Scottish legal writers 
do not traditionally require the benefit to be granted to the donee in an “irrevocable”394 
manner. One historical case of this lack of need for irrevocability was the donation mortis 
causa, now abolished by the Succession (Scotland) Act 2016, s 25(1), which used to be 
represented by legal writers as one case of donation, even if this donation was by definition 
revocable395. On the contrary, under French law, irrevocability is one of the cardinal 
elements of donation under the definition provided by the majority of French legal writers 
and French courts396. Considering that the customary donation mortis causa is now abolished 
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in Scotland, an extra argument is created in defence of Scottish donations as irrevocable by 
principle, as will be discussed in 3.5. Regulation of market donations, below. 
 
In any case, the concept of performance has been developed by the Scottish courts. The need 
for the subject matter of the donation to be made accessible by the donor to the donee is so 
widely requested by the Scottish courts that any proof produced towards the evidence of 
intention to give (animus donandi), however strong, does not dispense with the requirement 
of performance for donation to be final. This principle is followed in Gray's Trustees v 
Murray397, where a testator directed his trustees to make payments as directed by any 
writings under his hand. At his death, it was necessary to determine if there had been 
performance or not, i.e. if the gratuitous juridical act made by the testator would be classified 
as a legacy or as a (final) donation under Scots law. Lord President (Clyde)398 answered this 
question by laying down the essentials which used to constitute a donation mortis causa in 
Scots law: 
 
“Three essentials must occur in order to constitute a donation mortis causa: (1) 
the donor must act in contemplation of his death; (2) the subject of the 
donation must be delivered to the donee; and (3) the donor must manifest his 
intention to make in favour of the donee a de praesenti gift, subject to the double 
condition that the subject reverts to the donor if the donee predeceases the donor, 
or if the donor revokes the gift. It is this which distinguishes a donation mortis 
causa from a legacy or bequest.” 
 
This donation was therefore distinguished from legacy by the time when the benefit was 
vested in the beneficiary – if the benefit was vested before the death of the donor, then the 
juridical act may be qualified as a donation, on the contrary if the benefit is only to be vested 
after the death of the de cujus, then the relevant juridical act could never be qualified as a 
donation. Furthermore, it is also important to notice that several of the above-mentioned 
court decisions have distinguished between the moment when the obligation to donate was 
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undertaken by the donor, i.e. the creation of the donation, and the moment when the subject 
matter of the donation is held by the donee399. 
 
Considering the above, it is possible to argue that as far as the Scots law of donation is 
concerned, performance must be qualified as a cardinal element of donation, in a sense that 
the benefit must be vested in the donee, but this delivery/performance cannot be defined as 
mere transfer. On the contrary, it must be defined broadly as granting the donee access to 
the benefit. This broad definition of delivery, in relation to the law of donation, means that 
the donee holds a new right he did not hold before: he may now access in the present or in a 
future moment (depending on the type of donation) the subject matter of the donation, and 
this access cannot be prevented by the donor in the future. In other words, and following 
Gordon, performance is defined in the present thesis as a “compendious term to cover 
completion of the gift by constitution of an obligation to give or by conveyance of the subject 
of the donation to the donee”400. Performance therefore equals irrevocable access to the 
benefit granted by the donor to the donee, this being granted by the constitution of an 
obligation (and correspondent personal right being vested in the donee) or by conveyance of 
the subject matter of the donation (and correspondent real right being vested in the donee). 
 
The broad definition of performance defended in the present thesis also follows the view of 
Erskine on the different juridical acts which may be qualified as a donation in Scots law, 
where he argues that the subject matter of the donation may be made available to the donee 
upon the constitution of the donation, or not, in which case the relevant donation still “may 
be justly ranked among obligations; and it is that obligation which arises from the mere good 
will and liberality of the granted” 401. Because the concept of performance must be defined 
widely in what the law of donation is concerned, Erskine further declares that some 
donations do not vest the donee with the real right to the subject matter of the donation right 
away. On the contrary, they may only grant the donee with a personal right, allowing him to 
access the subject matter of the donation in a posterior moment, those particular types of 
donations being called promises402. Therefore, in respect of the Scots law of donation, 
performance must be broadly defined as the vesting of the donee with a right he did not hold 
before, this right being a real right to the subject matter of the donation, or a mere personal 
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right. This broad definition is therefore able to encompass promise within the concept of 
donation. In this sense, promise is to be regarded as a constitutive act, where donation is to 
be defined as performance.  
 
At this point it is important to notice that it is undisputed that, in Scots law of donation, the 
will to donate needs to be effective and present at the moment of the donation. This is true 
even for legal writers who concede that the constitution of the benefit happens in a 
subsequent moment403. For the same reason, it may be argued that donations in Scots law 
may be of two types: immediate donations, where the subject matter of the donation is made 
available to the donee immediately, or non-immediate undertakings, where two different acts 
are necessary for the formation of the final donation: a gratuitous act followed by the 
constitution of the benefit404. Considering that donations may be conditional in Scots law, it 
is possible to have a validly formed donation in Scotland405, whose legal effects are 
postponed to a future event/time. Furthermore, it may also be argued that a distinction may 
be drawn between the formation of the obligation and the reception of the benefit by the 
donee. For this reason, animus donandi must be regarded as the essential element behind 
both types of donation, while the constitution of the gratuitous benefit is to be regarded as a 
consequence of donation. In conclusion, and following Erskine406, it is therefore possible to 
argue that delivery is not necessary for the application of the rules on donation (or for the 
juridical act to be classified as a donation), but instead, performance is needed, in the form 
of a juridical act which empowers the donee to access the benefit. 
 
In conclusion, it is true “that more than a state of mind is required to complete a donation”407, 
however, it is argued supra that this does not mean that donation may only be completed by 
the transfer of a real right from the donor to the done. On the contrary, performance, in Scots 
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law of donation, may encompass multiple realities, such as: (i) the actual disposition of the 
subject matter of the donation408, one such case being the physical separation of a calf from 
the herd, and the donee is given possession of the calf and vested in correspondent real right; 
(ii) unilateral or bilateral gratuitous promise409, where a calf is promised to the donee, vesting 
in him a personal right he did not hold before, and that he may use to access the subject 
matter of the donation; (iii) intimation to a third party410; intimation to the grantee411 or any 
other equivalent. For the same reason, it is argued that by detaching performance from the 
concept of animus donandi per se, it is possible to bring the laws of donation and (gratuitous) 
promise together under Scots law. This means that the concept of animus donandi, according 
to the Scots law of donation, should not be constrained by the need for a subjective intention 
to confer a benefit “now”412, as long as the benefit is produced inter vivos413. In short, the 
law of donation may be called to regulate gratuitous obligations validly constituted, and 
because performance is the constitutive element of voluntary obligations, performance must 
be regarded as one of donation’s cardinal elements. 
 
3.2.2.5. Juridical act 
 
The DCFR defines juridical acts as “any statement or agreement, whether express or implied 
from conduct, which is intended to have legal effect as such. It may be unilateral, bilateral 
or multilateral”414. Following this definition, it is possible to argue that, in Scotland, all 
donations are juridical acts, but not all juridical acts are donations. Under Scots law, 
donations are acts of will, or a state of mind conveyed by an act recognised by the law as 
producing of juridical effects415. The conveyance of the will or intention of the donor or 
parties “in general requires no formalities other than those which the nature of the subject 
matter may make necessary”416, while a pure donation which immediately transfers property 
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by delivery may be proved parole417. Therefore, no particular formalities, such as writing, 
are traditionally required by Scots law for the creation of a donation, except if the donation 
is constituted by a unilateral juridical act, in which the written form is the norm418, under the 
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995419. 
 
This discussion follows what is said above on the need for an animus donandi for the 
existence of a donation under Scots law, leading to the qualification of this subjective 
element as one of donation’s cardinal elements in Scotland420. Following this line of 
argument, one could defend the position that the concept of donation, in Scotland, is limited 
to juridical acts alone. For example, if an error occurs in a banking app, and one person 
transfers money to another person’s account, without intending to do so, not only does this 
act lack animus donandi, but it may not also be classified as a juridical act. Even though the 
de facto enrichment of the person who received the money in their bank account has 
occurred, this fact cannot be classified as a juridical act, and subsequently, cannot be 
classified as a donation – because it lacks the necessary intention or will for the relevant 
legal effects to be produced. The respect and empowerment of the will of the part(ies) is a 
core principle of Scots law, and therefore, an enrichment made without intention to benefit 
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would be regulated under the law of unjustified enrichment and all that was received is to be 
returned421. 
 
3.2.3. Types of donations 
 
It was argued that multiple juridical acts may be classified as donations under Scots law, 
however, some institutions422 may share similarities to donation, leading to potential 
confusion between these institutions and donation. First, the traditional types of donations 
will be reviewed. This will be followed by the confrontation between donation and similar 
institutions. In Scots law, it is common to find references to different types of donations423, 
the most common types being: (i) donations inter virum et uxorem; (ii) donations propter 
nuptias; (iii) donations mortis causa”424; (iv) pure donations425; and (v) donations sub modo, 
or imposing obligations upon the donee426. 
 
But it is possible to argue that a better distinction is the one which separates between those 
donations which are pure427, in that no obligations arise in respect of the donee, and those 
which vest the donee either with obligations he did not hold before or which impose a 
condition for their validity (such as a resolutive condition). This will be referred to as 
donations sub modo from this point on. By distinguishing between pure donations and those 
which impose an obligation upon the donee, it is possible to better understand the legal 
effects produced by different types of donations under Scots law, and the different remedies 
                                                 
421
 H MacQueen and M Hogg, “Donation in Scots Law” (2012) Juridical Review, p 6. 
422
 The word “institutions” is used in the present study to signify different juridical acts, which are regulated 
by tendentiously autonomous laws (or common rules to all juridical acts of the same type and category) under 
Scots law, such as the trust, legacy, marriage, among others. 
423
 G Watson (e), Bell’s Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland (7th ed, 1890) [2012]) p 295. 
424
 See W Gordon, “Donation” (reissue 2011) SME, 6, para 4. 
425
 A Smith, H Henderson, Glossary, Scottish Legal terms and Latin Maxims and European Community Legal 
Terms (1992) p 27. 
426
 H MacQueen and M Hogg, “Donation in Scots Law” (2012) Juridical Review, p 5 on conditional donations. 
427
 A Smith, H Henderson, Glossary, Scottish Legal terms and Latin Maxims and European Community Legal 
Terms (1992) p 27. 
100 
 
 
which may be found to deal with the different problems emerging from the diverse 
relationships created between donor and donee. 
 
3.2.4. Classic types of donations 
 
3.2.4.1. Donations mortis causa 
 
Donations mortis causa were recently abolished by the Succession (Scotland) Act 2016, s 
25(1), but they will be referred to here in order to demonstrate that all donations, including 
those which used to be described as mortis causa, produce their legal effects while all parties 
are alive. It has been argued that “donations mortis causa fall between outright gifts and 
legacies in that they share some features of each”428. As stated in Lord Advocate v Galloway, 
contrary to the name, donations mortis causa are not conditional upon death per se. On the 
contrary, they are made in contemplation of the death429 of the donor, but the donee always 
receives a benefit during the life of the donor. Because the death of the donor was the 
motivation leading to the donation, this motivation was protected by the law and two 
resolutive conditions were implied when this type of donation was made: (i) the donation 
could be revoked if the donor survives the (life threatening) reason why the donation was 
made; and (ii) the donation would be recalled if the donee predeceases the donor430. 
Furthermore, because donations mortis causa were motivated by the impending death of the 
donor, and were therefore conditional, donations mortis causa were to be regarded as a sub-
type of donations sub modo. Donations mortis causa were therefore conditional donations 
whose maintenance used to depend on the death of the donor. In addition, it is important to 
notice that donation mortis causa is now explicitly classified by the Succession (Scotland) 
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Act 2016, s25(2) as one, among other donations sub modo (in the wording of the 2016 Act, 
one among other “conditional gift[s]”). 
 
3.2.4.2. Donations inter virum et uxorem and donations propter nuptias 
 
Donations inter virum et uxorem were defined in Scots law as donations between spouses, 
ordinarily contained in antenuptial contracts, where one spouse grants a benefit to the 
other431. Traditionally, donations between spouses were classified as donations sub modo. 
This is because the motivation for the donation is based on a legally relevant fact, specifically 
the marriage between donor and donee. As a result, this donating relationship was 
specifically regulated under Scots law of donation, and power to revoke the donation was 
given to the donor, who could unilaterally revoke the donation at any time during his life432. 
The relevance of donations between spouses has, however, disappeared entirely, considering 
that the special regulation applicable to donations between spouses (and the correspondent 
revocation right conferred upon the donor) was abolished in 1920433. Following a similar 
route taken by donations between spouses, donations proper nuptias may be defined as the 
provisions made by one spouses to another “in consideration of the” wedding434. It may be 
argued that the relevance of donations proper nuptias as an independent type of donation 
has also disappeared, considering that no relevant decision has been issued by the Scottish 
courts since 1943435, dealing with these specific donations. Therefore, they should not be 
treated as an independent type of donation, but should be, instead, subject to the generic 
regulation applicable to other donations sub modo, where the motivation that lead to their 
existence is legally relevant, therefore being able to produce legal consequences. 
 
3.2.5. Pure donations and donations sub modo 
 
Donations may be said to be pure when no obligations or duties are imposed on their 
beneficiary. Because pure donations provide an unconditional benefit to the donee, it is 
presumed that it is in the best interest of the donee to accept them, and therefore, pure 
donations “do not require acceptance to complete the grant”436. Conversely, donations may 
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vest in the donee a duty or obligation, while being “regarded as gratuitous although there is 
some remote possibility of consideration”437. All donations are gratuitous transactions under 
Scots law438, but this does not necessarily mean that the benefit granted by donation needs 
to be absolute. On the contrary, this benefit only needs to be provided “at least without an 
adequate consideration”439. Bankton has stated this idea in a clear manner, by declaring that 
a donation may be “made with certain burdens and conditions, [and] it is called a donation 
sub modo, i.e. for certain ends and purposes”440. In other words, although a duty or obligation 
arises to the donee, the relevant juridical act may still be qualified as a donation in Scots law 
as long as all cardinal elements are present. This means that Scots law accepts the 
classification of juridical acts, which are not completely gratuitous, as donations441. 
Donations sub modo are therefore donations where a correspondent obligation is undertaken 
by the donee or which are made for a reason regarded as relevant by the law. The classic 
example in Scots law of a donation sub modo is the obligation to get married, where an 
engagement ring is to be returned if the betrothal is broken off before the wedding442. 
 
This modus may be a promise to do something or to abstain from doing something, or even 
a pecuniary obligation imposed to the donee. It is not a novelty to state that a donation does 
not need to be completely gratuitous under Scots law443, all the while defending that gratuity 
is one of the cardinal elements of donation in Scotland. This idea is supported by the majority 
of Scottish legal writers, including MacQueen and Hogg, who sustain that in such cases, it 
is still not appropriate for a juridical act to be classified as onerous if the juridical act was 
entered into with animus donandi444; Gordon, who has stated that “the better view would 
appear to be that what amounts to a donation is to be decided according to the context in 
which the question arises”445; or Bankton, who has declared that donations may be “made 
with certain burdens and conditions”446. A donation sub modo is therefore able to signify 
either the undertaking of a pecuniary obligation by the donee – such as paying for someone’s 
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groceries – or the undertaking of a non-pecuniary obligation by the donee447 – one such case 
being the obligation to get married, where an engagement ring is returned when the betrothal 
is broken off before the wedding448. Furthermore, contemporary legal writers continue to 
state that, in cases where an animus donandi exists, even if the juridical act is sub modo, it 
is still not appropriate for the relationship created to be classified as onerous449, therefore 
remaining gratuitous and, therefore, a donation. 
 
As far as the formation of a donation sub modo is concerned, the undertaking of a duty or 
acceptance of a condition by the donee may be achieved by one of two routes: (i) by entering 
into a bilateral juridical act with the donor, where both parties agree upon the terms and 
conditions of the donation agreement; or (ii) by a second unilateral juridical act of the donee, 
where the donee (unilaterally) undertakes the relevant obligation450. It is necessary to 
mention, at this point, that it may be argued that donations sub modo may be further 
subdivided into two different categories in Scotland: donations which are conditional, i.e. 
where revocation rights are reserved by the donor based on a condition, or where a condition 
is accepted by the donee for the production of legal effects of the donation; and donations 
made for a purpose, which always produce their effects immediately, but where the failure 
of their purpose may compromise the validity of the donation. In the first case, where a 
donation is conditional, the benefit may be suspended until the occurrence of a certain future 
event, which may include a counter performance by the donee451. In the case of donations 
made for a purpose, the motive or reason why the donation was made, is protected by the 
law, which grants revocation right to the frustrated donor. These two sub-categories of 
donations sub modo will be reviewed below. 
 
It is therefore possible to conclude that it is widely accepted in Scotland that imposing a 
modo does not stop the relevant juridical act from being classified as a donation. With regard 
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 Please bear in mind that obligations are not typically defined as “undertaken” by the parties under 
Portuguese or French law, on the contrary, they “emerge” to the parties from the relevant juridical act, i.e. 
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450
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to the Scots law of donation, this imposition on the donee does not taint the animus donandi 
of the donor. As long as the donation is intended to create a benefit to the donee and does so 
(even if a small benefit, considering the modo), the relevant juridical act may still be 
classified as a donation under Scots law, as long as all cardinal elements are present, and as 
long as the modo does not taint the animus donandi in a way that changes the relationship 
between the parties to a relationship where an exchange of benefits is deemed as more 
relevant than the creation of a benefit to the donee. 
 
3.2.5.1. Conditional donations 
 
Multiple conditions may be imposed by the donor under Scots law of donation, one such 
case being a payment to be made by the donee to the donor or to a third party, the obligation 
to do well at school, to marry someone, among many others. These conditions are often 
regarded as resolutive conditions, which are able to reverse the juridical effects of an 
otherwise valid donation, the classic example given by Scottish legal writers being the 
donation mortis causa452. As mentioned above, in a donation mortis causa, Scots law of 
donation presumes that the donor has reserved the right to revoke the relevant donation until 
the moment of his death and, for this reason, the benefit vested in the donee becomes 
irrevocable “if the donee outlives the donor”453. In this particular case, the donor has not 
imposed a condition upon the donee – nothing is expected from him –, however, the reason 
or motive why the donor decided to donate is deemed relevant by law, and a revocation right 
is provided to the donor should he survive. As a rule, Scottish legal writers have defended 
in the past that a donation could be revoked under Scots law in three cases: (i) by ingratitude 
of the donee454; (ii) subsequent birth of children455; and (iii) when a donation is entered 
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by the Succession (Scotland) Act 2016, s 29(1). 
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propter nuptias456. All three cases are not recognised by present Scots law of donation457. It 
is therefore possible to argue that, in Scots law, a rule exists stating that in the case of a 
conditional donation, a revocation right is provided to the donor only if this right has been 
reserved by the donor. In this sense, under present Scots law of donation, the donor only 
holds the right to revoke a donation in two cases: either where both parties agree upon the 
existence of this right, or if the relevant right was reserved by the donor when a donation 
emerges from a unilateral juridical act. 
 
3.2.5.2. Donations made for a purpose 
 
A different case is when a condition is not imposed upon the donee, and he is not expected 
to actively do or abstain from action, but a strong motivation has led the donor to donate. It 
was argued above that, in case of conditional donations, if the condition is not fulfilled by 
the donee, the donor may sue him. But in case of a donation made for a purpose, and the 
purpose fails, it is not clear if the frustration of the purpose may be regarded as reason for 
the revocation of the donation458. Most Scottish legal writers have avoided answering this 
question, however, it is important to understand if donations for a purpose may vest (or 
should vest) a right of revocation in the donor when the purpose or outcome is frustrated, or 
not. 
 
Different answers may be given to the question: what happens if a donation, which is made 
for a purpose, does not fulfil its purpose? Scots law of donation does not provide a clear 
answer to this question, and different arguments may be used in an attempt to shed light on 
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 Donations propter nuptias are commonly defined as “the provisions made by the husband to the wife, in 
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the answer. Bankton is one of few legal writers who has written on the frustration of the 
motives in respect of a donation, declaring that: 
 
“If the end to which the donation was to be applied cannot be precisely attained, 
or would be useless, then it may be employed to the like purpose, always 
observing the primary intention of the donor; but if the use to which the 
mortification was destinated, tho’ lawful at the time, is thereafter condemned by 
law, the right of course falls to the kind, as being caduciary and vacant, which 
was the case of popish foundations at the reformation”459. 
 
Bearing in mind the above, it is possible to argue that Bankton agrees that a donation must 
fulfil the “primary intention of the donor”, even if the benefit received by the donee is not 
used for its original purpose. It is therefore implied that, if the donation does not fulfil the 
primary intention of the donor, it cannot be used to any another purposes. In any case, 
according to Bankton, the benefit should return if its use is deemed illegal. This perspective 
empowers the will of the donor (or the parties) by looking at the motivation behind the 
donation. Following this perspective, it is possible to argue that a donation, which does not 
fulfil the purpose for which it was made, should return to the donor. Consider the example 
where a child is lost, and donations are given to his or her parents with the purpose of 
contributing to finding the child, but it is later found that the parents knew where the child 
was from the beginning. Following the logic above, the benefits received by the parents must 
return to the donors, in view of the fact that the purpose for which the donations were made 
cannot be achieved. A different case would be if a donor gives a certain amount to the parents 
of a child so that they can buy their child new books. Instead of using the money to buy 
books, the parents pay her academic fees instead. In this second example, even though the 
subject matter of donation was not used for the purpose intended, it nonetheless complies 
with the primary intention of the donor, which was to contribute to the child’s education. In 
this sense, the purpose of the donation is not frustrated and remains fulfilled. 
 
Another way to answer to this question was to use, by analogy, the rules in place to deal with 
similar realities or specific rules regulating particular donations made for a purpose. 
Following this idea, and until 2016, donations mortis causa could be qualified as donations 
made for a purpose, considering that a causa (motive or purpose) has been instrumental for 
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the formation of the animus donandi of the donor: his death460. In this particular case, Scots 
law of donation used to provide the donor with a revocation right, because it considered the 
motive for the formation of his will to be of extreme relevance. Due to the relevance of the 
purpose why the donation was given, Scots law of donation protects the expectations of the 
donor by providing him with the right to revoke the donation while alive, and the benefit 
received by the donee only becomes irrevocable “if the donee outlives the donor”461. 
Considering that, under the Succession (Scotland) Act 2016, s 25(2), it is clear that other 
conditional donations are enforceable under Scots law, then the same argument used for 
donations mortis causa in the past may be used in the present for the regulation of donations 
made for a motive or a purpose. 
 
These two sources of answers both indicate that Scots law of donation protects, up to a 
certain degree, the purpose why the donation was made, and provides tools to the donor to 
deal with its frustration. But it is necessary to bear in mind that solely valuing the intention 
of the donor when assessing the validity of the donation may compromise the security of the 
donee or third parties, who believed and trusted in the validity of an otherwise apparent valid 
donation. This security is particularly relevant for donations made in the market context. It 
is for this reason that it may be argued that, while Scots law of donation protects the 
donation’s purpose or “primary intention of the donor”462, not all donations may be revoked 
by a donor who argues that the purpose of the donation was frustrated. On the contrary, a 
donation must be presumed valid and untainted unless the law provides the donor with a 
right to revoke the donation, in case of frustration of the purpose why the donation was made, 
or this right is reserved by the donor. Therefore, the same rule followed above for the 
revocation of conditional donations must be followed when dealing with donations for a 
purpose: donations are always irrevocable unless the donor holds a right to revoke the 
donation provided to him by the law, by agreement or if he has reserved the right of 
revocation if the donation was created by a unilateral juridical act. 
 
3.2.6. Confrontation with similar institutions 
 
Donation has been defined in the present chapter as a set of rules which apply to multiple 
juridical acts, both unilateral and bilateral, as long as all cardinal elements are found in 
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them463. In order to better understand the concept of donation, as well as to consolidate its 
boundaries, donations will be compared and distinguished from other legal institutions in 
Scots private law. This comparison aims to demonstrate that Scots law of donation has hard 
boundaries, and that by acknowledging these boundaries it is possible to recognise which 
rules apply to market donations, and which do not. 
 
3.2.6.1. Legacy 
 
Considering what was said regarding the irrevocability of donation in Scots law, in particular 
what was said regarding the now abolished donations mortis causa, a distinction between 
donation (mortis causa or not) and legacy is produced by looking at the moment when the 
benefit is received by the beneficiary464. In a donation, the legal effects are created during 
the lifetime of both parties, and cannot be freely revoked by the donor. In a legacy, the benefit 
is only received by the beneficiary upon the death of the benefactor465 and it may be revoked 
at any time by the de cujus during his lifetime, following the rules of Scots succession law. 
This means that, in juridical acts mortis causa, the de cujus indicates, through a unilateral 
juridical act, usually a testament provision or a legacy, the person(s) who will receive his 
patrimony (rights and correspondent obligations) after his death. But, the provision of this 
benefit may be stopped during the de cujus’ life, i.e. it is a simple projection of the future. A 
donation, on the contrary, creates an irrevocable benefit to the donee upon completion of the 
donating act. The gratuitous receipt of a benefit mortis causa is not, therefore, a donation “in 
the proper sense, because nothing passes effectually to the receiver, while the giver is on 
life”466. This means that, even if the cardinal element of the animus donandi is present in a 
legacy, the cardinal element of delivery (during the parties’ lives) is not. The absence of one 
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of the cardinal elements of donation therefore leads to the impossibility of classifying the 
relevant juridical act as a donation. 
 
3.2.6.2. Grants and others 
 
It is clear that not all benefits received may be classified as donations, such as “situations in 
which the issue of donation may arise incidentally, as in the distribution of assets on divorce 
or dissolution of a civil partnership, are not in principle considered”467 because they lack the 
cardinal element of animus donandi. Also lacking this element are all gratuitous benefits 
provided by the State or other institutions which are commanded to provide gratuitous 
benefits by the law. In the case of subsidies and scholarships provided by charities and the 
State, which are due to be received by the public under the law, a pre-existent obligation to 
give exists. This means that even if an animus donandi exists, leading to the provision of 
gratuitous benefits to the public, this will is tainted by a pre-existent obligation to give. 
 
3.3. Taxonomy 
 
This section will be divided into two subsections: a) an historical discussion of the evolution 
of the law of donation in Scotland; and b) an analytical discussion of the existence of a “law 
of donation” in Scotland, aiming to contribute to the discussion regarding the classification 
of donation by Scots law as an autonomous juridical act of its own right, or if Scots law sees 
donation as a mere “quality” or “flavour” of multiple juridical acts; in both cases being clear 
that a(n independent) law of donation applies to the relevant juridical act. 
 
3.3.1. Historical perspective 
 
Scots law of donation is often described as an adaptation of Roman law rules on donation468. 
But it is clear that Scots law of donation is an ever evolving set of rules which has been in 
constant mutation. In order to fully understand this change, as well as the different ways in 
which donation was and is still perceived in Scotland, we must look first at the Institutional 
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Writers469, culminating with the perspective of today’s law of donation, as regarded by 
contemporary legal writers. Among the different Institutional Writers, Stair, Bankton and 
Erskine are the ones who have influenced the definition of donation in Scots law the most470, 
followed by Bell471.  
 
3.3.2. Institutional writers 
 
3.3.2.1. Stair 
 
As mentioned above472, amongst the Institutional Writers who regard donation mainly as a 
defence against the rules of unjustified enrichment it is possible to find Stair, who has 
addressed donation under the heading “Recompense or Remuneration”473, and who regards 
donation as a justification for the donee to hold any benefits received gratuitously. In Stair’s 
opinion, any benefit given with animo donandi “induces an obligation to be thankful but 
does not bind to the like Liberality”474. The need to be thankful, as defined by Stair, is 
characterised by a “tacit consent” given by the donee that he will be thankful475 and built 
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upon Roman law teachings on the need for slaves to be thankful to their previous masters, 
once free476, the customary rule on donations between spouses477. 
 
But considering the abolition of slavery and emancipation of women, leading to the 
revocation of the rules guiding donations between spouses in Scotland478, it is possible to 
argue that Stair’s teachings on the donee’s duty to be thankful have lost their relevance in 
today’s Scots law of donation. Because Stair’s argument was built on Roman law teachings, 
and they are no longer followed by today’s Scots law of donation, Stair’s views on the 
revocation of donation should also be disregarded for the construction of present Scots law 
of donation. The examples given by Stair are rooted in categories of persons which were 
regarded as inferior, or belonging to a lower class in society – such as slaves and women479. 
Their inferior position in society was therefore an argument towards the demand for them to 
be thankful. Considering that all persons are equal before the law today480, arguments based 
on the need to be thankful cannot be accepted anymore. If they were, the basis of such a duty 
should be anchored in normative orders that are separated from the law, such as morality or 
religion, and for this reason, should not play a role in the legal debate.  
 
Stair also elaborates on the distinction between juridical acts done in animo donandi, and 
those which are not done with a liberal intent, by looking at donation as a justification for 
the donee to hold the benefit received. In order to separate them, Stair uses the presumption 
debitor non presumitur donare, according to which a donation made by a debtor is either 
presumed to be in security or satisfaction of his debt, unless he expressly qualifies it to be a 
donation, or “done for love and favour”481. It is also necessary to mention that this 
presumption is overturned by the personal relationship between the parties: “yet these Rules 
have their Limitations, As first, Bonds, Assignations, or other Rights, in the names of 
Children unfor as familais, & unprovided, are presumed to be Donations, because of the 
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Parents Natural Affection, and Natural Obligation to provide Children” 482, which Stair 
extends to gifts of reduced pecuniary value, such as goods or money of small value483. 
 
Finally, it is relevant to notice that, according to Stair, donations in Scots law may take the 
form of different juridical acts such as “Bond, Assignation, Disposition, or other Right in 
another Man’s name” 484. This means that Stair does not qualify donations as one particular 
type of juridical act, instead recognising the existence of a donation in multiple gratuitous 
juridical acts, which follow the rule of being granted animo donandi and/or which have not 
been caught by the presumption debitor non presumitur donare. 
 
3.3.2.2. Bankton 
 
As mentioned above, while Stair discusses Scots law of donation comprehensively yet 
succinctly, Bankton has elaborated extensively on the topic485. Also contrary to what was 
written by Stair, who uses the word “donation” when referring to gratuitous benefits 
provided by the donor to the donee, Bankton often refers to these transactions as “gifts”486. 
Bankton reserves the use of the word donation to refer to specific types of donations, such 
as: donations between spouses (or between husband and wife)487; patronage agreements488; 
or donations which effects are to be produced upon the death of the donor, such as 
legacies489.  
 
Following Stair’s footsteps, Bankton has contributed to the development of Scots law of 
donation by associating donations with multiple gratuitous transactions. Following this line 
of thought, Bankton defined the following juridical acts as donations: escheats, as long as 
they are “granted by the barons of exchequer in the right of the crown, as they see expedient, 
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to persons applying for them”. In this case, “the grant is termed a Gift, and the receiver, 
donatary, because the king gets no valuable consideration for it”490; “forfeiture, which 
comprehends not only lands, but likewise the moveable of the party may be in the same 
signature”491; and assignation492. 
 
But Bankton’s greatest contribution to Scots law of donation is his exposition on what 
happens to donations when the motives why they were made by the donor are not met, or do 
not exist. For example, if a donor donates 30.000€ to a charity for the purchase of books for 
children in Africa, and instead, this money is entirely used for the purchase of a new car to 
be used by charity’s CEO. In this particular case, the donor wished to donate gratuitously 
(with animo donandi), he wished to donate 30.000€ (the right amount), and he wished to do 
it to this charity in particular (there is no error with regard to the person or qualities of the 
person of the donee), for the objective of providing books for kids in Africa. This means that 
the will of the donor was formed correctly, and the donation is not granted by any error, 
however, the subject matter of the donation was not used in a way which fulfilled the motives 
that led the donor to donate in the first place. 
 
This frustration of the motives – or the intention of the donor – happened in a moment 
posterior to the production of legal effects of the juridical act which created the donation. 
Should the frustration of the motives allow the donor to revoke the donation? This is not an 
easy question to be answered in Scotland, but Bankton has decisively contributed towards 
its answer. According to Bankton, “if the end to which the donation was to be applied cannot 
be precisely attained, or would be useless, then it may be employed to the like purpose, 
always observing the primary intention of the donor; but if the use to which the mortification 
was destinated, tho’ lawful at the time, is thereafter condemned by law, the right of course 
falls to the kind, as being caduciary and vacant, which was the case of popish foundations at 
the reformation”493. It is therefore possible to argue that, according to Bankton, the primary 
intention of the donor must be respected, even if the use given to the subject matter of the 
donation was not used as specified by the donor. Following the example above, this means 
that, if the car purchased for the use of the charity’s CEO is deemed as contributing to 
distribute books to African children, then the donation remains untainted, but if the use of 
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the subject matter of the donation is deemed as not following the intention of the donor, then 
this gift may be called back by the donor under Bankton. 
 
Following Bankton’s perspective, and while looking at this particular case, different 
consequences may be related to the direct or indirect contribution of the use of the subject 
matter to observe “primary intention of the donor”494. Strictly following Bankton’s defence 
of the “primary intention of the donor”, it may be argued that if the use of the subject matter 
of the donation may be directly linked to the fulfilment of the motives why the donation was 
made, then under Scots law the donation is never tainted. On the contrary, if the use of the 
subject matter of the donation cannot be defined as contributing directly to the observation 
of the intention of the donor, then the relevant donation is tainted by not fulfilling the 
objectives why it was made in the first place. The protection of the “primary intention of the 
donor” must be, however, balanced with the principle of security, and the protection of the 
expectations of the donee (and his creditors). This security is therefore particularly relevant 
in what donations in the market are concerned, where donor and donee may be strangers, 
interacting for the first time. For this reason, a stricter position was argued above, where 
revocation rights may only be granted to the donor if this right was reserved – and the 
relevance of the donor´s motivation was conveyed to the donee495. 
 
3.3.2.3. Bell 
 
Bell often associates donations with the provision of gratuitous benefits between family 
members. As examples, Bell has reviewed Scots law of donation in the following cases: 
when elaborating on donations between spouses496; when describing the tools provided by 
the law for the reduction of the heirs’ prejudice497; when discussing the antenuptial marriage 
contract; and in other instances498. It is possible to argue that, in Bell’s opinion, the proximity 
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between donation and family life is explained by the fact that donation is, in Scots law, a 
personal juridical act. If a donation takes the form of a gratuitous contract, the “error in the 
person affects the substantials of the contract, if personal identity is of importance, and may 
be supposed to have entered essentially into the view of the contract” 499. For this reason, “in 
marriage, in donation, in the hire of labour (as of that of an artist), a mistake as to the person 
will annul consent”500. It is therefore possible to argue that Bell not only regards donation as 
connected with family life, but also that he classifies donations as multiple juridical acts 
which are sources of obligations, placing the law of donation within the chapter of “General 
Principles of Obligations and Contract”, and clearly enunciating that donations may be 
created by contract under Scots law501. 
 
Bell has further elaborated on the personal aspect of donation, bringing the personal 
relationship created between donee and donor, as the result of a donation, to the area of error 
and consent. He therefore declares that on one side, the personal identity of the parties is 
always important for the formation of the juridical act “in marriage, in donation, in the hire 
of labour (as of that of an artist), [where] a mistake as to the person will annul consent”502. 
On the other side, error as to the quality of the subject matter of the donation may or may 
not be sufficient to annul consent503, depending on it being defined as an essential quality or 
not, in a way which would have “prevented the bargain”, therefore invalidating the juridical 
act504.  
 
3.3.2.4. Erskine 
 
Erskine reviews Scots law of donation under the heading “Of obligations arising from 
consent & C.”505, which may be understood as Erskine regarding donations as one, among 
many genera of contract or juridical acts. This is further evidenced by the way Erskine 
separates the source of the donation (the juridical act, creator of the obligation to give), from 
delivery of the subject matter, further defining donation as the “obligation which arises from 
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the mere good will and liberality of the granter”506. For this reason, Erskine is described as 
the first Institutional Writer to distinguish between the obligation to donate and the transfer 
of the benefit. This distinction is regarded as fundamental in Scots private law, in particular 
when associated with the transfer of property507. For the same reason, in Erskine’s view, a 
donation which has not been fully completed is a “special sort of donation, which is 
constituted verbally, is called a promise”508. In line with previous work on the subject, 
Erskine also defined the intention of the donor to donate as one of the cardinal elements of 
donation in Scots law. For this reason, and following Stair, Erskine revisits the presumption 
against donation in Scots law, arguing that this presumption does not blindly apply to all 
transactions. On the contrary, Erskine argues that it is necessary to look at the pre-existing 
relationship between donor and donee, and if the parties are creditor and debtor and 
“donation be not expressed, is presumed to be granted in security or satisfaction of the 
debt”509. The opposite is also true, and if a close relationship between the parties exists (one 
such case being “paternal affection”510), then the presumption may be disregarded. 
 
Following Erskine, the pre-existing or ongoing relationship between the parties is also 
relevant for revocability purposes, such as in the case of donations between spouses511 or 
remuneratory donations512. Under Erskine, it is relevant to distinguish between the above-
mentioned types of donations because different rules of revocation apply to them. The 
generic rule is that a donation cannot be revoked, and even though they “imply no warrandice 
but from the future facts of the donor. They are hardly revocable by our law for ingratitude, 
though it should be of the grossest kind”513. But different rules on revocation apply for these 
types of donation: donations between spouses were freely revocable by the donor in the past 
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514
, and remuneratory donations are fully protected against revocation515. Erskine declares 
that only truly gratuitous donations may be subject to unilateral revocation by the donor 
because these donations are defined as “mutual grants [that] are made in consideration of 
each other, […], except where an onerous cause is simulated, and a donation truly 
intended”516. Bearing in mind this division of different pre-existing relationship to the 
donation, between donor and donee, it is possible to argue that the identity of the parties was 
of prime relevance to Erskine, in what Scots law of donation is concerned. Not only the 
juridical act from with the donation originates, but also the relationship between donor and 
donee must, therefore, be regarded as relevant for the application of the different rules 
guiding Scots law of donation. 
 
Finally, it is important to notice that Erskine has studied in detail the boundaries between 
donations, legacy and donations mortis causa. He thus regards donation as a macro category 
of gratuitous juridical act, under which legacies and donations mortis causa are to be found. 
For this reason, Erskine has stated that “a legacy is a donation by the deceased, to the Legacy, 
paid by the executor to the legatee”517, while donations mortis causa “are of the nature of 
legacies, and like them revocable; consequently, not being effectual in the granter’s life, they 
cannot compete with any of his creditors, not even with those whose debts were contracted 
after the donation. They are understood to be given from a personal regard to the donee, and 
therefore fall by his predecease”518. 
 
3.3.3. Contemporary writers 
 
As mentioned above, contemporary legal writers often regard donation as a gratuitous 
transfer of a (real) right519. One such case is Gordon, who states that “donation is the 
preferred term in Scots law for a gratuitous transfer of property which is intended to take 
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effect inter vivos”520. This inter vivos transaction may encompass the transfer of any right 
or any property capable of being transferred, as long as the donor is not under the legal 
obligation to give, and where acceptance is not a requisite to complete donation521. This 
broad definition of donation is, however, further restricted by Professor Gordon by the 
imposition of two conditions: (i) delivery, where the donor divests himself of the subject 
matter of donation by putting it beyond his control, and (ii) an animus donandi, where the 
will of the donor to donate must be freely formed and cannot be tainted by a previous 
obligation to deliver the relevant subject matter522. 
 
Also mentioned above, and following on from the work of Professor Gordon, MacQueen 
and Hogg have produced the most recent and comprehensive study on Scots law of 
donation523. They regard donations and promises as “unilateral juridical acts and gratuitous 
ones”524. Both promises and donations are therefore defined as unilateral by reference of the 
participation of the parties for the production of juridical effects. In other words, according 
to MacQueen and Hogg, only one of the parties (the promisor/donor) is a “actively involved” 
in the juridical act, promising or donating, an act which is defined as final for the production 
of the legal effects525. 
 
It may be argued that the above-mentioned logic is only possible because the unilateral 
juridical act which results in a donation, under Scots law, is deemed as final without any 
need for acceptance. But a logic where acceptance is never needed lacks substance when 
applied to donations entered into by an agreement reached between donor and donee, where 
a modo may be imposed to the donee. In a bilateral donation, the donor is able to compel 
counter-performance to the donee in return for the benefit granted by donation526. Therefore, 
Scots law admits the imposition of a modus or counter-performances to the donee, a fact 
which does not impair the definition of donation as gratuitous. On the contrary, these 
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donations are still defined as gratuitous juridical acts in Scotland527, considering the animus 
donandi or intention of the donor to benefit the donee528. Finally, it is also important to notice 
that MacQueen and Hogg accept that donations may be made for a purpose, as long as the 
purpose is an enforceable term of the transfer rather than merely the motive for donating529. 
Concurring with Stair, they use the institute of unjustified enrichment to return to the donor 
a benefit which was transferred by a donation which purpose was not fulfilled530. 
 
Due to their approach to donation, MacQueen and Hogg argue that the cardinal elements to 
be proved in the assessment of the existence of a donation in Scots law are: (i) the existence 
of a present intention to donate (or animus donandi)531, and (ii) the delivery of the subject 
matter of the donation532. While the need for an intention to donate may be defined as the 
subjective element of donation, under MacQueen and Hogg’s definition, delivery is regarded 
as an objective constitutive element of donation, meaning that “more than a state of mind is 
required to complete donation”533. 
 
Hogg has further clarified his position on Scots law of donation writing on his own534, where 
he associated donation with the transfer of property rights in Scotland, rather than contractual 
rights535. In addition, Hogg states that “one may promise to make a donation in the future”536. 
It may therefore be argued that, in his opinion, a dissociation in Scots law between the 
moment when the obligation to give is created and the moment when this benefit is actually 
received by its beneficiary is possible. In other words, by creating a binding promise to 
donate in the future, the promisor has started a process which will be concluded by a donee 
holding a benefit he did not hold before. 
 
Considering the above, it is possible to argue that, in Scots law, a donation may be created 
by what would otherwise be defined as a promise. For example, if Alasdair promises to 
donate £10 to Britany in the future following the relevant formalities537 under Scots law, he 
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is obligated to donate in the future. However, a full donation is only achieved (i.e. the final 
benefit is only held by the beneficiary) after Alasdair actually gives the promised £10 to 
Britany. In this sense, it is possible to argue that different juridical acts may be regarded as 
donations under Scots law, as long as they fulfil the different cardinal elements of donation. 
These cardinal elements were studied in detail above and are relevant for the classification 
of a juridical act as a “donation” under Scots law, considering that specific rules on donation 
will apply to the relationship created by them. 
 
3.3.4. Concluding remarks 
 
In short, Stair, has addressed donation under the heading “Recompense or Remuneration”538, 
defining donation as a justification for the donee to hold the benefit received. Following a 
different approach, but with similar consequences, it is possible to find Bankton who regards 
donations mainly as gratuitous obligations. In this sense, Bankton defines donation as “the 
liberal grant of anything to which one could not be compelled by law”539, while 
interchangeably using the concepts of donation and “gratuitous obligation”540. Bell has not 
addressed the issue of donation in a clear, straightforward fashion. However, his association 
between donations and the provision of several gratuitous benefits to family members may 
be regarded as a call for the application of the law of donation to multiple juridical acts such 
as gifts between spouses541 or antenuptial marriage contracts542, among others. 
 
Erskine may be regarded as the distinct voice in the study of Scots law of donation543, by 
defining donation as “the obligation which arises from the mere liberality of the giver”544, 
conferring “on the donee a jus ad rem, a right of suing for performance, it gives him no right 
in the thing itself”545. In other words, Erskine regards donation as the juridical act reached 
between donor and donee where the donor undertakes an obligation to give gratuitously, and 
which is regulated by a separated law – the law of donation. These two perspectives are not 
evident in contemporary writings, where (contemporary) legal writers, often regard donation 
as a gratuitous transfer of a (real) right. One such case being Gordon, who states that 
                                                 
538
 Stair, Institutions, I.8. 
539
 Bankton, Institute, I.9.2. 
540
 Bankton, Institute, I.9.8. 
541
 Bell, Commentaries, II.II.2. 
542
 Bell, Commentaries, III.I.5. 
543
 H MacQueen and M Hogg, “Donation in Scots Law” (2012) Juridical Review, p 3. 
544
 Erskine, Institute, III.3.88. 
545
 Erskine, Institute, III.3.90. 
121 
 
 
“donation is the preferred term in Scots law for a gratuitous transfer of property which is 
intended to take effect inter vivos”546. 
 
In conclusion, it is possible to argue that Stair, Bankton and Bell define donation in Scots 
law as a flavour which can be found in many gratuitous juridical acts. In this sense, it is 
argued that Scots law of donation may be regarded as an extra regulation, applicable to all 
juridical acts defined as donations, which contributes to the regulation of the relationship 
created, considering its special characteristics. Therefore, donation is not to be perceived as 
a distinct class of juridical acts (such as promise or transfer), but instead being regarded as a 
reality which covers diverse juridical acts (of various types), which are able to be 
characterised as donations - this classification as a donation having consequences for the 
rules that apply to them. A juridical act is therefore to be regulated under Scots law of 
donation when that relevant juridical act is classified as a donation. As a dissident voice, it 
is possible to find Erskine, who defines donation as a genus of contract, i.e. as one 
identifiable juridical act, with tendentiously clear boundaries which distinguish them from 
other juridical acts. But it is also possible to argue that the Institutional Writers regard 
donation as an obligation between donor and donee547. 
 
3.3.5. Taxonomy placement of donation in Scots law 
 
The historical discussion showed us that “indeed, there is no single ‘right’ place for the law 
of donation”548. Thus, it is necessary to enquire if a donation in Scotland may be defined as 
one juridical act, to which the law of donation applies alone or if, on the contrary, a donation 
may be regarded as a quality of multiple juridical acts that gather all relevant cardinal 
elements of donation. 
 
Bearing in mind that while the legal (and practical) effect of a donation in Scots law is to 
justify the reception (and maintenance) of the benefit by the donee549, this benefit is still 
created by a juridical act – an act which is regulated under the law, and which is able to 
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create rights and obligations for both, the donor and the donee. Furthermore, adding to the 
discussion is the idea that multiple “gratuitous obligations [are] otherwise called 
donations”550, and that both, unilateral and bilateral juridical acts, have been described as 
able to create a donation in Scots law551. It is therefore possible to argue that a donation may 
emerge from different juridical acts in Scotland. The existence of different routes to achieve 
a donation is the result of a wide definition of donation in Scots law552, where the concept 
of donation is able to encompass not only the simple transfer of real rights, but also other 
institutions such as the creation or transfer of personal rights, or the forgiveness of an 
obligation, which allows the donee to retain a benefit of which he would have been otherwise 
deprived. 
 
This flexibility of Scots law of donation does not contradict legal writers, such as Gordon, 
who argue for a close link between donation and the gratuitous transfer of real rights in Scots 
law553. On the contrary, both perspectives may coexist, considering that even those legal 
writers recognise that “although ‘donation’ refers primarily to a transfer of property (or to 
the creation of an obligation to transfer property, which can itself be considered a form of 
incorporeal property), the term is sometimes used of any gratuitous act”554. Following this 
idea, and as a principle, “any subjects which can be acquired can be the subjects of a 
donation”555. It is for the same reason that not only the transfer of a real right (property) may 
be defined as a donation under Scots law, but that many other juridical acts may be defined 
as a donation as well. Among others, the following juridical acts may be defined as a 
donation in Scotland: the gratuitous assignation of delictual claims556; the creation of a 
personal right to hold real rights in the future, made by trust557; the donation of cash558; the 
gratuitous assignation of rights in a bank account559; the discharge of a trust560; or a donation 
made by a father to his son of a cheque to meet the cost of shares in a company, where the 
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cheque was drawn in favour of the company and the shares were allotted to the son561, among 
others562. 
 
Considering the above, and the flexibility of Scots law towards the definition of donation, 
as well as the wide range of benefits classified by the Scottish courts as the subject matter of 
a donation, even Gordon, who believes that “‘donation’ refers primarily to a transfer of 
property”, cannot deny that donation “is sometimes used of any gratuitous act”563. It is 
therefore possible to argue that different juridical acts are able to create a donation in Scots 
law. The existence of a donation and the correspondent call for the law of donation to 
regulate the relationship happen when the cardinal elements of donation are found in the 
relevant juridical act. 
 
3.4. Effects of donation 
 
3.4.1. Typical effects 
 
The classification of a juridical act as a donation under Scots law bears consequences: the 
production of typical juridical effects. These legal effects are: (i) a right is granted to the 
donee, this being a right the donee did not hold before (including the right not to be deprived 
of the right he holds); (ii) an obligation to provide the donee with the subject matter of the 
donation is undertaken by the donor, or in case of an immediate donation, an obligation of 
simple warrandice is undertaken by the donor, where the “donor guarantees that he or she 
will not do anything to defeat the donee's right in the future”564; (iii) in case of a donation 
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sub modo, the donee undertakes the obligation to comply with the condition or modo 
imposed by the donor565; and (iv) whenever applicable, the donor is liable if the subject 
matter of the donation is likely to cause harm to the donee or others566. In order to structure 
the analysis of these effects, the following sub-section will look at three different moments 
in the life of a donation: before delivery occurs (and the correspondent right to enforce 
delivery); after delivery occurs (right not to be deprived of the benefice); and after all legal 
effects are produced (protection of the confidence and other market considerations). 
 
3.4.1.1. Right to enforce delivery 
 
In order for a donation to exist in Scotland, the donee must hold a right he did not hold 
before, which includes the right not to be deprived of something. By looking at the example 
of transfer, where the donor benefits the donee by transferring a right he did not hold before, 
it is possible to argue that the effect of the donation is not the creation per se of an obligation 
to transfer the benefit. On the contrary, transfer is one of the modus constituitionis of 
donation567. In this case, the legal effect of donation (created by the gratuitous transfer of a 
right to the donee) is the enrichment of the donee by the transfer. As mentioned before, 
vesting a right in the donee which he did not hold before is necessary for the existence of 
donation in Scotland568, meaning “that more than a state of mind is required to complete a 
donation”569. This enrichment of the donee may be achieved following different routes, such 
as by disposition570, intimation (to a third party571 or to the grantee572), or any other act which 
results in the donee holding a right he did not hold before. 
 
In immediate donations, such as donations quod constitutionem of corporeal movables573 
where the subject matter of the donation is instantaneously held by the donee, delivery 
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happens simultaneously with the undertaking of the obligation to donate, by transferring the 
right to the relevant corporeal movable. The same happens in a valid waiver of a debt, where 
the donor delivers the benefit to the donee by exempting the donee from impoverishment 
(by payment). In respect of donations made by unilateral juridical act, the donating 
relationship is marked by two separated moments: the moment when the obligation is 
constituted, and subsequent delivery of the subject matter of donation. One such case is the 
promise to donate (unilateral undertaking), where the donor undertakes the obligation to 
provide a benefit, followed by delivery of the subject matter of the donation to the donee at 
a future moment. The particularities of these donations are regulated by the law of 
promise574, however, a donation is constituted from the moment when the donee was vested 
with the right to receive the subject matter of the donation. By effect of the promissory 
donation, the beneficiary was given a right he did not hold before; the right to access the 
subject matter of the promissory donation at a future moment. 
 
3.4.1.2. Right not to be deprived of the benefit 
 
The Scots law of donation acts as a supplement to the law of warrandice by providing the 
donee with the right not to be deprived of the benefit. Gretton and Reid define warrandice 
as a “guarantee, expressed or implied, of good and unencumbered title”575. They further 
clarify that there are three degrees of warrandice: simple, fact and deed, and absolute 
warrandice576. It is also noted that where there is no warrandice clause, “the law will imply 
one” 577. Donation follows this rule, where when no warrandice clause exists, the law 
presumes that the benefit was granted to the donee with simple warrandice, meaning that the 
donor undertakes the obligation that he will do nothing to subsequently prejudice the title of 
the donee578. The right not to be deprived of the benefit received by a donation is not enforced 
or justified by Scots law of donation. On the contrary, other laws (such as warrandice or 
promise) provide title to the donee. It is possible to see this phenomenon in respect of the 
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law of warrandice where, once the law of donation is called to regulate the relationship 
created by the relevant gratuitous juridical act, it restricts the warrandice as mentioned above. 
 
It is also worth mentioning that in general, in respect of onerous juridical acts, a party cannot 
unilaterally revoke the juridical act, with the aim of invalidating the legal effects produced 
by the relevant juridical act. Such a unilateral power would create extreme uncertainty in the 
legal trade, in particular in what the market is concerned. It is therefore necessary to 
distinguish between generic protection given to any juridical acts and the protection specific 
to donations. The most noticeable of all is the protection conferred upon certain types of 
donation, where the right to revoke the donation is granted to the donor in certain 
circumstances. As a general rule, and except in limited circumstances, donations are not 
revocable under Scots law of donation unless the power to revoke is reserved by the donor, 
and therefore, known to the parties579. 
 
3.4.2. Effects for the market 
 
In a market context, donations may be given between parties who do not have a previous 
relationship and who may not know each other. This fact raises trust issues, which are often 
dealt with by legislation concerning the quality of the object. In respect of the quality of the 
object, it is important to notice that in Scots law of donation, the donor is liable for all his 
acts (or omissions) that defeat the donee’s right to access the benefit580. But the donor is not 
responsible for the “good quality” of the subject matter of the donation. That is to say that, 
if the subject matter of the donation is tainted by heritable securities or any other real rights 
or obligations affecting it581, they pass attached to the subject matter of the donation as it is. 
As a demonstration, it is possible to see the very recent authority laid down by Lloyds TSB 
Foundation for Scotland v Lloyds Banking Group Plc.582, where it was held that the donor 
must comply with the terms of the donation and that the courts are not able to equitably 
adjust a contract on the basis of its performance, not even if this contract is based on 
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gratuitous payments583. Furthermore, the donor also incurs liability when the donee or third 
parties suffer damages where a gift is likely to cause danger584. 
 
3.5. Regulation of market donations 
 
The present section will review whether Scots law of donation is fit for the purpose of 
regulating donations in a market context. This review will be conducted by looking at the 
protection conferred upon the parties directly involved in the donation (protection of their 
lawful expectations), third parties (protection against unlawful harmful direct or indirect 
consequences of a donation) and the community as a whole (from the perspective of the 
security of transactions and promotion of trade and social peace), as well as the requirements 
of the market, where a discussion of topics such as capacity will allow for these to be 
critically reviewed. As stated in Chapter 2, in order to be efficient and well suited to the 
regulation of today’s market demands, a law of donation must depart from the idea of 
imbalance between the parties answering to concerns connected with the protection of the 
family, and focus on the promotion of efficiency and security585. 
 
3.5.1.  Protection of the parties 
 
3.5.1.1. Protection against mistake 
 
The protection of the donor in case of mistake extends to all donations, including donations 
in a market context. As a rule, the donor may therefore avoid the donation if this donation 
was concluded because of a mistake. This mistake may refer to the lack of intention to benefit 
the person who has received the benefit; the qualities and identity of the subject matter of 
the donation; and if the donor was acting under the mistaken belief that he was legally 
obliged to donate. If the mistake is proven, several remedies are available to the donor, the 
most relevant being the condictio indebiti, “a term which is still commonly used in Scotland 
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to denote an action having for its object the recovery of money paid under the mistaken belief 
that it was due”586. Consequently, it is possible to find authority specifically on the provision 
of a gratuitous benefit mistakenly given to one person, when it was intended to benefit 
someone else. One such case is Costin v Hume587, where money was sent in error to one 
person, when it was intended to benefit another. In this case, it was held that the real 
beneficiary had a title to sue the receiver of the gift, in order to recover the benefit. 
 
3.5.1.2. Protection against unfair exploitation 
 
When entering into a donation, each party must have full capacity to act by himself or for 
his own benefit. However, there are certain limitations on the contractual capacity to 
donate588. These limitations are specific to the law of donation, due to the ability of donation 
to impoverish the donor. The central principle holds that there should be no intervention in 
the affairs of an adult, but in the case of persons labouring under mental derangement or 
adults with incapacity589, their actions are not regarded as valid unless validated by a 
responsible person590. In respect of corporate bodies and legal persons, one of the main 
players in the market, the capacity to make (and/or receive) donations depends on the 
constitutional documents of the relevant corporate body or legal person. The purpose for 
which the legal body or legal person has been constituted is also relevant when evaluating 
their capacity to enter into gratuitous juridical acts, as well as the extent of the powers 
provided to them in the moment of incorporation591. 
 
The limitations imposed on relevant categories of relationship between donor and donee are 
mainly concerned with cases where the donee is in a ‘position of trust’. If the donee is in a 
position of trust, the irrevocability of the donation is tainted, and the donor holds the right to 
seek reduction of the donation. It is presumed by Scots law that, if a donee is in a position 
of trust towards the donor, he may have been unfairly influenced to donate. The main focus 
of this rule is placed on the action of persons such as doctors or clergymen592. In respect of 
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commercial influence on the decisions of the donor, the influence of persons who may abuse 
their status and influence an otherwise non-willing donor to donate for their benefit, is yet 
to be tested in court. Finally, it is also worth mentioning that some relationships give rise to 
a right for the donor to seek reduction of the donation. These relationships are not 
exhaustively listed in Scots law, but donations to other persons deemed in a ‘position of 
trust’ (or in “a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship”593) are deemed potentially tainted 
by the abuse of a position of trust594, and are therefore capable of being reduced. 
 
3.5.1.3. Right to enforce delivery 
 
In Scots law, the right to enforce performance is regulated under the general rules for 
enforcing the performance of obligations, as guided by the principle ubi jus ibi remedium 
(wherever there is a right there is a remedy)595. This same principle applies to obligations 
constituted by bilateral or unilateral gratuitous juridical act, where the discharge of an 
obligation to give in the future may be enforced in court. The right to enforce the delivery 
of a gratuitous obligation is one of the cornerstones of the protection provided by Scots law 
to donations in the market context – it provides security to the donee, who knows that if 
delivery does not occur, he is able to enforce it in court. 
 
It is worth highlighting that, in Scotland, courts have refused to enforce or to award damages 
for the breach of an agreement which is directly connected with a purely social or family 
matter. This behaviour may be explained by the essence of family relationships, where 
family members often interact with each other without the intention to legally bind 
themselves596, and therefore, courts avoid having to provide the pursuer with a legal remedy 
for the breach of an agreement which was not intended by the parties to be legally binding. 
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The relevance of the above-mentioned decisions, where the courts have refused to recognise 
the interest to sue, are not directly connected to donations. Instead, they are connected with 
rights under the rules of voluntary associations of different kinds (such as clubs, trade unions 
or churches). This means that the application of this authority to donation is yet to be tested 
in court. But it is possible to argue that, even if tested in court, these exceptions would not 
be applicable to donations made in a market context. This opinion is based in the fact that 
the reason for non-enforcement of the gratuitous obligations in Forbes v Eden597, Anderson 
v Manson598, or Bell v Trustees599, has been justified by the context where they were made: 
as part of the intimate or private lives of the parties. 
 
3.5.2.  Protection of third parties 
 
When operating in the market, it is also relevant to bear in mind that donors and donees 
maintain trading relationships with third parties. Due to the gratuitous character of donation, 
third parties are potentially affected by the gratuitous dissipation of the donor’s patrimony, 
with potential risk to their rights of credit. From the perspective of third parties associated 
with the donee, any patrimonial gains by the donee may be regarded as desirable, and 
securing their rights in credit towards the donee-debtor. Recognising the relevance of the 
third parties’ expectations, the Scots law of donation will be reviewed, in order to understand 
if it may permit the fulfilment of rights held by third parties connected with the donating 
parties, which may be endangered by the donation. 
 
Under Scots law of donation, the donee takes the subject matter of the donation cum onere. 
This means that the benefit granted to the donee is subject to any rights or obligations 
affecting it, such as heritable securities600. Therefore, all third party rights or claims secured 
by heritable securities601, mostly connected with donations whose subject matter is the 
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transfer of real rights, will be valid. Furthermore, other third party rights based on succession 
law, such as provisions relating to the legitim602 or insolvency rules603, will also apply. 
 
The legitim, collation, and insolvency rules are applicable to donations in a market context. 
However, this thesis is concerned with the answers provided by national laws of donation to 
issues concerning third parties being affected by market donations which are potentially 
detrimental to their rights in credit. This protection exists in Scotland, being embodied by 
the presumption against donation604. As mentioned above, the presumption against donation 
is one of the most distinctive particularities of Scots law of donation. It must be overcome 
by the donee, in order for the juridical act to be classified in court as a donation. This means 
that the donee has the burden to prove (i) the animus donandi of the donor, and (ii) that the 
benefit was delivered605. The presumption against donation is traditionally described as 
based in the Roman maxim debitor non presumitur donare606, and is one of Scots law’s 
particularities607. Scots law therefore distrusts benefits gratuitously created in the market 
context608, because “no person is presumed to do what, in place of bringing him profit, must 
certainly be attended with some pecuniary loss”609. This presumption is particularly strong 
in the market context, where at least one of the parties in the donating relationship is acting 
with a view to profit. 
 
A donation establishes a personal relationship in Scots law and it is presumed to be closely 
connected with the family life610. This means that, in Scots law, a donation is regarded as a 
normal occurrence between parties who are close and who know each other. The existence 
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of the assumption that donations are entered into by two parties who are close has the effect 
of tempering the burden of proof placed on the donee’s shoulders when the donation is made 
in a market context. For example, Watson, while writing about Scots law of donation, states 
that “in certain circumstances, the presumption against donation is overcome, or rather 
inverted. For example, advances made by a parent or one in loco parentis, are presumed to 
have been made ex pietate, in the absence of evidence to the contrary”611. It is therefore 
possible to conclude that Scots law of donation is fit to protect the expectations of third 
parties associated with the donor because of the presumption that, if a donor is acting in a 
market context, he is acting in the pursuit of profit. Therefore, a gratuitous juridical act which 
is potentially able to impoverish him is unlikely to occur. If such gratuitous act is to occur, 
then the burden of proof is on the donee, who has to prove that the donation was made with 
animus donandi and that the benefit was delivered. 
 
Furthermore, the expectations of third parties associated with the donee are that he will be 
allowed to keep the subject matter of the donation. This expectation is particularly strong 
when the third parties hold rights in credit, to be paid by the donee, which may be enforced 
against the benefit gratuitously received. In order to provide security to this class of third 
parties, the donee cannot be arbitrarily deprived from the benefit received under the 
donation. In other words, donations need to be irrevocable, and may not be revocable at the 
discretion of the donor. If a donation is allowed to be discretionarily revoked by the donor, 
the third party-creditor is deprived of access to the benefit received by the donee-debtor, now 
called back by the donor. 
 
3.5.3. Protection of the community 
 
The protection of the community reflects the fitness for purpose of national laws of donation 
to regulate both, donations made in a national market context and in the European Common 
Market context. The EU, as well as the development of the European Common Market, 
brought people from different nationalities, different backgrounds and, in essence, different 
communities together. Consequently, persons from different corners of Europe may now 
donate to each other with the purpose of sales promotion or similar motivation, often 
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connected with the pursuit of profit in the Common Market. As argued in Chapter 2612, the 
different backgrounds, religions and cultural references of parties interacting in the European 
Common Market demands a law of donation which promotes equality to all parties involved. 
For this reason, the present part of the chapter will review the security provided by Scots law 
of donation for the promotion of: (i) the security of gratuitous transactions in the 
marketplace, and (ii) for the promotion of transactional clarity. 
 
3.5.3.1. Security 
 
The presumption against donation and distrust of gratuitous transactions is particularly 
relevant when dealing with donation in the market context, and it may be argued that this 
presumption actually adds efficiency to the market because it eliminates the instability and 
insecurity brought by the subjective element of the motivation/intention of the donor. 
Because parties interacting in a market context are expected to act in view of profit, this 
provides courts and other legal actors with a tool capable of objectively evaluating the 
donor’s will. Therefore, by looking at the existence or absence of a previous legal obligation, 
the presumption against donation helps to create a more egalitarian and fair application of 
the law. Furthermore, if Scots law would allow moral and/or religious rules to determine the 
legal outcome of a juridical act, this would demand either social and/or religious uniformity 
within the jurisdiction (with religious law being the law of the land) or it would create high 
levels of uncertainty and inequality, because similar issues arising from similar transactions 
would be treated differently by the courts. On the contrary, because only legal obligations 
matter, the same problems are subject to the same rules by the courts, leading to the 
promotion of confidence, and to the same problems being treated in the same way, with 
complete disregard to the morality or religious background of the parties613. 
 
Legal writers often describe donation as establishing a personal relationship between the 
donor and donee due to its presumed connection with family life614. Therefore, in Scots law, 
a donation is regarded as a normal occurrence between parties who are close and who know 
each other at the time of the donation. This explains why, in certain circumstances, the 
above-mentioned presumption against donation existent in Scots law “is overcome, or rather 
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inverted. For example, advances made by a parent or one in loco parentis, are presumed to 
have been” with the intention to benefit615. Looking at donations as a familiar phenomenon 
also explains why Scots law does not demand heavy formalities for the creation of a 
donation. On the contrary, “in general requires no formalities other than those which the 
nature of the subject matter may make necessary”616. Furthermore, “a donation in the sense 
of the actual transfer of property by delivery could be proved parole”617. That is to say that 
no particular formalities, such as writing, are traditionally required by Scots law for the 
creation of a donation, as long as delivery and the intention to donate (animus donandi) are 
proved. 
 
In respect of donations in a market context, their security is guarded primarily by reliance 
on the formalities adopted by the juridical act creating the donation. Compliance with 
formalities provides security to the parties. They are often able to demonstrate the subjective 
element of donation (the animus donandi) while fulfilling the legal requirements for the 
production of legal effects. Bearing in mind that donations in Scots law may be achieved by 
both unilateral and bilateral juridical acts, it is necessary to assess which rules guide both 
types of donating act. 
 
Until 1995618, the undertaking of a unilateral gratuitous obligation by the donor could follow 
any form, including the oral form. However, these obligations could only be proved by writ 
or oath of the person undertaking the obligation619. This means that, theoretically, an 
obligation to donate could be created unilaterally and orally, but could not be enforced in 
court without evidence produced by the benefactor himself. It may be argued that this 
redundant rule of evidence defeats the idea that freedom of form existed for the creation of 
gratuitous unilateral juridical acts in Scots law (before 1995), considering that, if the 
benefactor did not want to comply with a gratuitous obligation orally created, he was able to 
do so by not acknowledging the benefit in written (or by confession). The best renowned 
authority on this restrictive approach to the proof of formation of gratuitous obligations is 
the classic decision Smith v Oliver620. In this case, a church was built based on an oral 
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gratuitous promise made by one of its followers, stating that she would pay for building the 
church. Upon her death, the church was not able to claim the money against her estate 
because she had not left any written acknowledgment of the obligation to pay. 
 
This rule was abolished by the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, the legislation 
which regulates the formalities to be undertaken by donations in Scotland today. It is 
therefore relevant to notice that, under the same Act621, the written form is no longer 
necessary to prove the undertaking of a unilateral gratuitous obligation. On the contrary, the 
written form is now required for the undertaking/creation of the unilateral gratuitous 
obligation itself. 
 
Under the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, section 1(1), “writing shall not be 
required for the constitution of a contract, unilateral obligation or trust”. However, it is also 
clear under section 1(2) that a written document is necessary for the constitution of any 
“gratuitous unilateral obligation except an obligation undertaken in the course of 
business”622, as well as any gratuitous (or onerous) creation, transfer, variation or extinction 
of real rights in land623. Considering that donations made in a market context are likely to be 
made in the course of business, it is possible to argue that the written form is not required 
for the undertaking of a high number of market donations. 
 
A written document is not, however, necessary for the constitution of: (i) gratuitous 
obligations undertaken by unilateral juridical act in the course of business624; (ii) gratuitous 
obligations undertaken by unilateral juridical act in any other form other than in writing may 
be enforced in court if they led the donee to act (or refrain from acting) in reliance on the 
promise, this with the promisor’s knowledge or acquiescence625; (iii) gratuitous obligations 
undertaken by unilateral juridical act in any other form other than in writing may be enforced 
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in court if they were made to the public626; and (iv) in the case when the subject matter of a 
donation is a real right in a moveable good, the transfer of possession of the good indicates 
transfer of property627. 
 
It is therefore possible to argue that Scots law of donation promotes security by laying down 
clear rules on which donations are enforceable under the law and which are not. This is 
achieved by enforcing unilateral gratuitous juridical acts made in the course of business. The 
enforcement of these unilateral juridical acts is particularly relevant when assessing the 
validity of donations made by business organisations in the course of business (while 
requiring writing or possession for the gratuitous transfer of real rights). Finally, it is also 
worth noticing that Scots law of donation promotes the security and confidence of the market 
actors by enforcing gratuitous obligations that led the donee to act (or refrain from acting) 
in reliance on a promise with the promisor’s knowledge or acquiescence628 and unilateral 
gratuitous juridical acts made to the public629. 
 
3.5.3.2. Transactional clarity 
 
In order to achieve transactional clarity, the law of donation must promote the exchange of 
information between the parties. In other words, the parties must know the terms on which 
the donation is made, as well as agree to them. Knowing the terms on which the donation is 
made is particularly relevant to the donee who, as the result of the donation, will gratuitously 
hold a right he did not hold before. The donee may accept to be vested in the relevant 
right/benefit in an explicitly or implicitly fashion. Acceptance is explicit if clearly expressed 
or demonstrated by the donee by his actions (for example, resorting to the clear statement ‘I 
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 And may be enforced by a party unaware of the promise at the time of performing the act in question, see 
Regus (Maxim) Ltd v Bank of Scotland plc 2013 SC 331, paras 33-34. 
627
 That is why W Gordon, “Donation” (reissue 2011) SME, 6, para 5 states that “after some hesitation, it was 
settled in the course of the nineteen century that a donation in the sense of actual transfer of property by delivery 
could be proved parole”, following a steady stream of court decisions comprising, among others, Morris v 
Riddick (1867) 5 M 1036; Robertson v Taylor (1868) 6 M 917; Wright’s Executors v City of Glasgow Bank 
(1880) 7 R 527 and Sharp v Paton (1883) 10 R 1000; Hutton's Trustees v Hutton's Trustees (1916) S.C. 860. 
628
 The requirements of form are therefore variable depending on the aspect of life in society where the promise 
to donate was made: a) if the promise to donate was made within the family or friends – all of them 
individuals/parties acting for non-commercial purposes –, then oral promises are not legally binding and do 
not create an obligation to the promisor; b) if unilateral juridical act is made in the course of business, there are 
no limits to the form used to create an obligation to donate. This flexibility intends to promote confidence and 
therefore to promote commercial activity by incurring in liability if a trader changes his mind. Finally, in c) it 
is being protected the confidence of the promisee in the actions of the promisor – basically, if the promisor led 
the promisee to act in a certain way, he should be liable for his actions. 
629
 And may be enforced by a party unaware of the promise at the time of performing the act in question, see 
Regus (Maxim) Ltd v Bank of Scotland plc 2013 SC 331, paras 33-34. 
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accept’). It may be implicit where the donee’s actions do not expressly demonstrate his 
acceptance, but acceptance may be inferred by his actions (for example, if the donee 
promises to sell or assign the subject matter of the donation or enforce his right to delivery 
in court). It could also be implied by his silence, which can only be conceived by the 
attribution of a positive legal value to the donee’s silence. 
 
Several legal writers espouse the position that a donation does not need to be accepted by 
the donor under Scots law to be binding on the donor. This idea is followed by the 
presumption that while a donation does not need to be accepted by the donee to produce 
legal effects, it may also be rejected by him at any time. One such writer is Stair, who states 
that: “if he in whose favour they are made, accept not, they become void, not by the negative 
non-acceptance, but by contrary rejection”630. This idea is followed by other legal writers 
such as Bankton, who has defended that the donee does not need to accept a gratuitous 
benefit because Scots law presumes acceptance where no express rejection of donation is 
made631. This is followed by contemporary legal writers such as Gordon632 and Wark633. But 
it is worth mentioning that the idea that donation does not need to be accepted has not been 
taken to its limits. While Bankton introduced the idea of presumed acceptance if there is no 
express rejection by the donee634, Erskine stated that: “acceptance, admitting that it is 
necessary towards constituting an obligation, may be reasonably presumed, without any 
formal act, in pure and simple donations, which imply no burden upon the donee”635. 
 
The idea that donation does not require acceptance is maintained by contemporary legal 
writers, such as Gordon, who states that donations do not require acceptance, but that donees 
retain the power to reject the benefit gratuitously received636. It may be therefore argued that 
a law of donation which does not require acceptance for the production of legal effects to a 
donation promotes security in the market – the donor cannot revoke the donation and the 
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 Stair, Institutions, I.10.4. 
631
 Bankton, Institute, I.9.9. 
632
 W Gordon, “Donation” (reissue 2011) SME, 6, para 1. 
633
 J Wark, “Donation”, Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland (1928) 6, p 54: “acceptance by the donee is 
not, in a case of pure donation, requisite to complete the donation; nor is knowledge on his part in all cases 
necessary, for donation may be made by delivery to a third party on behalf of the donee”. 
634
 As stated by Stair, Institutions, I,8,1: “the dispositive will of the owner alone, without any further, is 
sufficient to alienate his right, without delivery or possession, is evident in personal rights, wherein the 
dispositive clause of assignations or translations is sufficient; intimation or possession or possession being 
introduced for expediency in some cases, by our custom”; and followed by, among others, Bankton, Institute 
I.9.9. 
635
 Erskine, Institute, III.3.88. 
636
 G Watson (e), Bell’s Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland (7th ed, 1890) [2012]), para 11. 
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donee’s rights are protected. But it may also be argued that a donation where legal effects 
are produced to the donee without his agreement, or possibly his knowledge, gravely lacks 
on transactional clarity. However, if acceptance of the donee is presumed637, and a gratuitous 
benefit is received without any kind of acceptance from its beneficiary, the principles of 
freedom to contract and private autonomy638 are heavily restricted by Scots law donation. If 
donations based in unilateral juridical acts are able to fully produce legal effects without the 
donee´s acceptance, the donor would be able to change the donee’s patrimony without his 
knowledge; an action that would produce onerous tax and other public law consequences. 
This action of the donor collides with the most basic principle of transparency in the market. 
It also undermines the donee’s freedom to conduct his life as he wishes, limiting his right to 
choose with whom to contract (in particular, the right not to contract) and the right to decide 
on which terms and conditions he wishes to enter into a juridical/contractual relationship639. 
 
I would therefore argue that Scots law of donation would lack transparency if donations in 
the market do not need to be accepted by the donee to produce legal effects. In fact, this idea 
would conflict with the principles of private autonomy and contractual freedom. The need 
for the existence of more than one party (donor and donee) felt in Scots law of donation may 
explain why Erskine refers to donation by using the expression pactum donationis, as a pact 
between donor and donee640. Following Erskine, the donee may accept a donation in Scots 
law tacitly: by remaining in silence641. This means that Scots law considers the silence of the 
donee as acceptance. The need for some form of acceptance by the donee may also be found 
in the writings of Gloag, where he states that “no one can be forced to accept a gift. But 
where a promise is made, its acceptance is sufficiently indicated by a demand for 
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 Following Erskine, Institute, III.3.88. 
638
 Principles set out in a well-known line of authority. As examples, see Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns 
& Ammunition Company (1894) AC 535; and Agri Energy v Ian Logan McCallion (2014) CSOH 14. 
639
 The relevance of these principles in a European level has been extensively studied and explained in the 
DCFR, Intr. 13. 
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 Erskine, Institute, III.3.90. 
641
 If a unilateral juridical act performed by the donor was able to create a right to the donee, then a subsequent 
refusal of acceptance would be no more than another unilateral juridical act. This then ought to either re-transfer 
the right back to the donor or destroy the right which has been created. Two independent acts would mean that 
the benefit would have been provided to the non-accepting donor’s for a certain amount of time, which may 
produce burdensome public or private legal consequences such as the payment of taxes. That is why a 
presumption has long been settled that acceptance of the beneficiary is to be presumed in gratuitous unilateral 
juridical acts (promises). The presumption of acceptance may be, however, subsequently rebutted by a refusal 
of the donee, or confirmed (either in an express or implicit way) by the donee or someone in his behalf. See G 
Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland (4th ed 2010) 1, p 4, where the author states that in Scots law “a promise 
differs from an offer; as being a unilateral engagement, to which acceptance is presumed; while an offer is 
always and in terminis conditional, raised into an obligation only by acceptance”; and W Gloag, The Law of 
Contract (2nd ed 1929) p 25, where he declares that “where a promise is made its acceptance is sufficiently 
indicated by a demand for fulfilment”. 
139 
 
 
fulfilment”642. Therefore, both parties in the relationship established by a donation must be 
free to intervene and both wills must be aligned in order for the donation to exist and both 
parties must want the same thing: the provision of a gratuitous benefit by the donor to the 
donee. 
 
3.6. Interim conclusion 
 
Scots law of donation as a flavour of multiple juridical acts. It has been argued in this chapter 
that donation may be regarded in Scots law as a flavour of gratuitous juridical acts, a flavour 
which may be found in multiple juridical acts. In this sense, different juridical acts may 
therefore be defined as a donation under the Scots law, as long as all cardinal elements of 
donation are found. Scots law of donation is not, therefore, a law which is able to regulate 
only one juridical act, but multiple juridical acts. This means that the law of donation adds 
an extra layer of regulation, considering the particularities of donation (such as its gratuitous 
essence and liberal motivation), to the regulation of juridical acts which would, otherwise, 
be solely regulated by other laws. 
 
Scots law’s fitness for the purpose of regulating market donations. It is possible to conclude 
that Scots law of donation is fit to regulate donations made in a market context. By regarding 
donation as a quality of multiple market-operating juridical acts, Scots law has been able to 
dissociate itself from family orientated considerations which often apply to donation in other 
EU jurisdictions. This fact allows donation to be flexible and adaptable, evolving at the same 
speed as the laws regulating multiple (often otherwise onerous) juridical acts, and where 
donation only intervened to protect the special character of donation. Furthermore, Scots law 
of donation is fit for the purpose of providing security for all parties affected by a donation 
in the market context, even if the parties do not share the same culture or background.  
 
Need for clarity. Scots law of donation succeeds in promoting security for the parties, third 
parties and the market in general, but fails to fully promote transactional clarity. This 
perceived failure is due to the lack of clarity on the moment when the donation is created in 
Scots law. By presuming the acceptance of the donee, providing legal effects to a donation 
which was not explicitly accepted by the donee, Scots law of donation is able to create 
confusion in parties who are not familiar with the intricacies of this area of law. 
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 – Portugal 
 
 Introduction 
 
The present chapter aims to critically review Portuguese law of donation with the objective 
of assessing its suitability to regulate donations made in a market context. This critical 
analysis will focus primarily on the legal regulation of donation as found in the Portuguese 
Civil Code (from now on the “PCC”), complemented by a review of relevant legal writings 
on donation643, and by relevant court decisions644. As mentioned before, and bearing in mind 
the changes to the European reality brought forward by the EU645, with particular emphasis 
to the creation of the European Common Market646, it is noticeable that there is a lack of 
substantial legal literature on gratuitous relationships in market context647. In the case of 
Portuguese law, only three works stand out on the study of Portuguese law of donation in 
the past century648, reviewing and interpreting the comprehensive rules on donation, as found 
in the PCC649. This chapter is therefore relevant to the overall thesis because it investigates, 
in an innovative fashion, and for the first time, how Portuguese law of donation regulates 
donations made in a market context. 
 
 Placement of donation in Portuguese private law 
 
4.2.1. Definition and Cardinal Elements of donation 
 
 The legal definition of donation 
 
Portuguese law of donation is primarily found in the PCC650. Enacted in 1966 by the Decree-
law 47344/66 of 25th November, the PCC has been subject to 69 amendments so far651, 
                                                 
643
 Portuguese legal writers have devoted scarce attention to the study of the law of donation, when comparing 
to studies on other areas of private law. As a demonstration, in the last decade, only Carlos Ferreira de Almeida 
wrote extensively on Portuguese law of reference, being therefore the main reference of the field in Portugal. 
See C Almeida, Contratos III (2012) and C Almeida, “Contratos de liberalidade: em especial os contratos para 
o uso de coisas corpóreas e incorpóreas” (2011) Estudos em Homenagem ao Prof. Doutor J. L. Saldanha 
Sanches, p 155. In the last century, it is important to reference the works of A Ferrão, Das Doações Segundo 
o Código Civil Português (1911); J Varela, Ensaio sobre o Conceito de Modo (1955); and M Palma Ramalho, 
“Sobre a Doação Modal” (1990) O Direito, p 720 as comprehensive studies on Portuguese law of donation. 
644
 As a Civil Law country, the sources of Portuguese law are legal statutes (issued by organs with legislative 
powers under the Portuguese Constitution), corporative statues and the legal praxis, under art 1 and 3 PCC. 
645
 Art 3 TEU. 
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however, none of the amendments affected the main principles regulating the law of 
donation in Portugal. On the contrary, only the articles dealing with the formalities and 
powers of revocation granted to the donor have been amended652. Other statutory 
instruments, particularly tax instruments, may also be regarded as relevant for the study of 
Portuguese law of donation. However, these statutes mainly regulate the public law aspects 
of donation such as taxes emerging from donations and other payments to the Portuguese 
State653, and are outwit the scope of the present thesis. It is also worth mention that 
constitutional provisions must be taken into consideration, in particular those regulating the 
freedom of contract, and the freedom of disposition of rights (both, gratuitously and non-
gratuitously)654. As will be demonstrated below, the connection between donation and 
family has led to the inclusion of several provisions in the Portuguese law of donation, 
specifically regulating what happens to the donation after the death of the donor655. 
 
Different European Civil Law jurisdictions provide a definition of donation in their Civil 
Codes, but the Portuguese and Italian Civil Codes are often described as those which provide 
the most complex definitions of donation656. The similarity between the Portuguese and 
Italian Civil Codes is due to the fact that the PCC followed the definition of donation 
presented by article 769 of the Italian Civil Code657. Both, the Portuguese and the Italian 
Civil Codes, therefore list as cardinal elements of donation (i) a juridical act which takes the 
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 Beginning with the reviewing the Treaty of Rome in 1957. 
647
 One of the few noticeable cases is the essay written by M Schmidt-Kessel, “At the frontiers of contract law: 
donation in European private law” (2008) European private law beyond the common frame of reference: 
essays in honour of Reinhard Zimmermann p 77-96. 
648
 J Varela, Ensaio sobre o Conceito de Modo (1955); A Ferrão, Das Doações Segundo o Código Civil 
Português (1911); and C F Almeida, Contratos III (2012). 
649
 Found in particular in art 940 to 979 PCC, among others, which may be found when family-related subjects 
are under regulation, such as coalition, testament, marital regimes, prenuptial agreements, among others. 
650
 Its generic regulation may be found in art 940 to 979 PCC and must be interpreted in accordance with the 
provisions of the Portuguese Constitution (in particular those on the freedom to contract and legal security). 
651
 The last amendment to the PCC was made by Law 150/2015, of 10 of September 2015. 
652
 Amended by Decree-Law 496/77 of 25 November 1977, which has removed the powers of revocation 
arising from the birth of subsequent children to the donor, after the donation is made. 
653
 Those who receive a gratuitous benefit by inheritance or donation is required to declare it to the tax 
authorities and is, in principle, subject to payment of Stamp Duty (with a few exceptions for spouses, 
descendants and ascendants, under art 6 Stamp Duty Code (enacted by Decree law 287/2003of 12 November). 
654
 Art 60, 61 and 62 of the Portuguese Constitution. 
655
 In particular rules regarding the ingratitude of the heir, which by action of art 974 PCC are directly 
applicable to donation. 
656
 C F Almeida, Contratos III (2012) p 23. 
657
 Art 769 of the Italian Civil Code: “La donazione è il contratto col quale, per spirito di liberalità, una parte 
arricchisce l'altra, disponendo a favore di questa di un suo diritto o assumendo verso la stessa un'obbligazione”. 
Following P Lima, A Varela, Código Civil Anotado (4th ed 2010) II, p 236. 
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form of a contract658; (ii) entered into with a “spirit of liberality”659; (iii) where the donor 
benefits the donee at his own expenses660; (iv) by granting a right to the donee he did not 
hold before or by undertaking an obligation661. 
 
In particular, in respect of the PCC, donation is defined under article 940(1) PCC as a 
“contract by which a person, acting with a spirit of liberality, and with prejudice to his own 
patrimony, gives gratuitously an asset or a right, or undertakes an obligation, for the benefit 
of the counterparty”662. Therefore, donation is expressly defined as a contract663 under 
Portuguese law, where donor and donee agree on the legal effects to be produced by the 
contract (the provision of a gratuitous benefit to the donee at the expense of the donor’s 
patrimony). This definition thus describes donation under Portuguese law as a bilateral 
juridical act, where both parties need to agree upon the legal effects to be produced by the 
donation. These effects, which must consist of a gratuitous benefit to the donee, often 
correspond to an equivalent disadvantage of the donor664. In addition, article 940(2) PCC 
further develops the definition of donation by stating that juridical acts aiming at (i) the 
waiver of rights, (ii) the repudiation of inheritance or legacies, or (iii) any gifts given in 
accordance to social usages (donativos), are not regulated under the Portuguese law of 
donation665, therefore excluding these acts from the definition of donation. These exclusions 
will be critically reviewed below, in the subsection dealing with the object of donation in 
Portugal666. 
 
 Cardinal elements 
 
As introduced above, under the definition of donation presented by article 940(1) PCC, 
several cardinal elements must be found in order for a juridical act to be classified as a 
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 Art 940 n 1 PCC and art 769 of the Italian Civil Code. 
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 Art 940 n 1 PCC and art 769 of the Italian Civil Code. 
660
 Art 940 n 1 PCC and art 769 of the Italian Civil Code. 
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 Art 940 n 1 PCC and art 769 of the Italian Civil Code. 
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 Art 940 n 1: “Doação é o contrato pelo qual uma pessoa, por espírito de liberalidade e à custa do seu 
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outro contraente.” 
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 The definition of a donation as a non-contractual juridical act in civil law jurisdictions is supported by a 
minority of legal writers, which write against the legal definition of donation on their relevant civil codes, one 
such case being Brazilian legal writer N Diogenes, A doação não é contato (1947) or the notes on Portuguese 
law of donation, when compared to Roman law, by A Santos Justo, “A Doação no Direito Romano, Breve 
referência ao Direito Português” (2001) Estudos em Homenagem a Cunha Rodrigues, II, p 238. 
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 P Lima, A Varela, Código Civil Anotado (4th ed 2010) II, p 237. 
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 Art 940 n 2 PCC. 
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 See 4.2.2. Object of donation, p 154. 
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“contract of donation” under Portuguese law. These cardinal elements are: (i) a bilateral 
juridical act: donation is always defined as a contract under Portuguese law667; (ii) a spirit of 
liberality, which is interchangeably referred to as animus donandi by Portuguese legal 
writers668; (iii) the sacrifice of the donor, who must have his patrimony reduced669 as a 
consequence of the donation; (iv) the creation of a benefit to one of the contracting parties 
(the donee); (v) gratuity, defined by the lack of correspondent benefit being provided to the 
donor by the donee670; and (vi) the provision of a benefit inter vivos, meaning that all effects 
of the donation must be produced while both contracting parties are alive671. The different 
cardinal elements of donations under Portuguese law will be individually reviewed in order 
to better understand Portuguese law of donation, in general, and its suitability to regulate 
market donations, in particular. 
 
4.2.1.2.1. Donation as contract (a bilateral juridical act) 
 
Following the definition of donation set by the PCC, donation is expressly defined as a 
contract under Portuguese law672. By defining donation as a contract, the PCC made clear 
that the juridical act which creates a donation must be a legally binding agreement reached 
by the parties673. This means that a unilateral act of donee, where his intention to benefit the 
donee gratuitously is clearly shown, is not enough to create a donation under Portuguese 
law674: on the contrary, the reception of the benefit must be accepted by the donee for a 
donation to exist. Both, the declarations of the donor and donee, must also comply with the 
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 A Ferrão, Das Doações Segundo o Código Civil Português (1911) p 24. 
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 Patrimony will be used in this thesis as meaning any rights, with pecuniary value or not, which integrate a 
person’s patrimony and which may be disposed by its holder. This definition follows the broad definition of 
patrimony in what donations are concerned, as proposed by Professor Carlos Ferreira de Almeida in C Almeida, 
Contratos III (2012) p 17. Contrary positions, which define patrimony in what the law of donation is concerned, 
as rights with patrimonial value, are defended by P Lima, A Varela, Código Civil Anotado (4th ed 2010) II, p 
258; and M Leitão, Direito das Obrigações, Contratos em Especial (10th ed 2015) III, p 177. 
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 As clarified by the Portuguese Supreme Court, in its decision n 98A1071 of 28 November 1998: “É da 
essência do conceito de doação, e como emana do artigo 940 do Código Civil, o espírito de liberalidade, se 
integrada por natureza gratuita.” 
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 Connected with the personal character of donation, under art 949 PCC. A Santos Justo, “A Doação no 
Direito Romano (Breve referência ao Direito Português)” (2001) Estudos em Homenagem a Cunha Rodrigues, 
II, p 339. 
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 Art 940 PCC. 
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 The qualification of donation as a contract is unanimous in Portugal. See, as exemples, A Ferrão, Das 
Doações Segundo o Código Civil Português (1911); Varela, Ensaio sobre o Conceito de Modo (1955); C 
Almeida, Contratos III (2012); C Gonçalves, Dos Contratos em Especial (1953) 3; or I Galvão Telles, Manual 
dos Contratos em Geral (4th ed 2002), among others. 
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 Exceptions exists – for example, donations to non-born donees and the particular case of public promises, 
which are never to be classified as donations, but which are able to grant the beneficiary of the donation with 
a right to force the donor to enter to a contract of donation with him. 
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formal legal requirements set by the law of donation675. It is also relevant to notice that 
Portuguese legal writers agree that at least two parties, and two declarations of will (even if 
issued together in the same document676), are necessary to create a donation. These 
declarations of will come together to produce typical juridical effects677. If the intervention 
of all parties is required, it is possible to conclude that, under Portuguese law, a donation 
only exists after the acceptance of the donee678. 
 
As with many other rules, several exceptions apply to the rule that donations must be 
accepted under Portuguese law679. These exceptions have been created to care for donees 
who are regarded as needing extra protection under the law. Therefore, in the case of unborn 
children680 or persons who are not deemed mentally or physically able to conduct their own 
business681, the PCC makes provision for their protection. The law does so by waiving the 
need for acceptance, and therefore allowing such individuals to benefit automatically from 
a donation made to them. The existence of these exceptions leads to criticism of the 
contractual character of donation by a minority of legal writers682. It may be argued that none 
of the legal writers who criticises the contractual essence of donation has managed to deliver 
a full rejection of donation as a bilateral juridical act in Portugal. Furthermore, these writers 
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 The formalities to be observed by a contract of donation under Portuguese law may be found under art 947 
CPP, according to which the donation of immoveable property is only valid if made by deed or written 
document where the signatures of the parties have been notarized, while the donation of moveable property or 
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by the decision of the Portuguese Supreme Court n. 084986 of 9 June 1994, regarding a donation sub modo. 
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from a pure donation even if not accepted; and art 952 PCC, regulating donations to unborn children, to whom 
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não é contato (1947); and the notes on the Portuguese law of donation, when compared to Roman law, by A 
Santos Justo, “A Doação no Direito Romano (Breve referência ao Direito Português)” (2001) Estudos em 
Homenagem a Cunha Rodrigues, II, p 238. 
145 
 
 
have also failed to disprove that the large majority of donations in Portugal are produced by 
a bilateral juridical act (contract). 
 
In defence of the contractual character of the juridical act which creates a donation in 
Portugal, it may be further argued that the legal definition of donation, as presented by the 
PCC683 cannot be disregarded: the PCC systematically addresses donation as the outcome of 
a bilateral juridical act (a contract)684 and, in addition, it is stated under article 945 PCC that 
a donation must be accepted in order to produce legal effects685. For these reasons, article 
951(2) PCC presumes acceptance of pure donations if the donee is not deemed mentally or 
physically able to conduct their own business. This legal presumption of acceptance may, 
however, be rebuked by the donee’s legal representative. If this presumption is rebutted, the 
lack of acceptance will void a donation which would have been valid otherwise686. 
 
Following the criterion that donation in Portugal is always a bilateral juridical act (a 
contract), Portuguese law actively excludes from the concept of donation the following 
juridical acts: (i) a juridical act granting a benefit to someone who is not one of the parties 
in the agreement687; (ii) the unilateral juridical act where someone refuses to receive a legacy, 
therefore benefiting a subsequent heir688; and (iii) the unilateral waiver of a right, which by 
mere effect of the law, and without spirit of liberality, causes a benefit to someone689. In all 
three cases, a benefit is received by a beneficiary due to the acts of someone who may be 
regarded as a benefactor. However, no benefit is received due to a conveyance created by 
agreement between the benefactor and beneficiary. On the contrary, a benefit emerges 
directly from the law. Following this line of argument, acceptance, either actual or legally 
presumed690, is regarded as necessary to the validity of a (contract of) donation in Portugal. 
It is therefore possible to conclude that donation in Portugal is created by a contract (a 
bilateral juridical act), where the parties (the donor and the donee) both intervene for the 
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 Donation is expressly defined as a contract (contrato) under art 940 n 1 PCC. 
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 The PCC systematically addresses donation as the outcome of a bilateral juridical act (a contract). See art 
954 (legal effects), 963 (modo), 966 (resolution) PCC, among others. 
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 The contract for the benefit of third parties is defined under art 443 PCC. 
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 Art 940 n 2 PCC. 
689
 Art 940 n 2 PCC. 
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 C Gonçalves, Dos Contratos em Especial (1953) 3, p 224; M Baptista Lopes, Das Doações (1970) p 10. 
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production of the legal effects691. It is therefore not surprising to find that Portuguese legal 
writers state that the payment of someone’s debt without their consent cannot be defined as 
a donation692. 
 
4.2.1.2.2. Spirit of liberality 
 
Article 940(1) PCC defines donation as a contract where the donor gives a thing or a right 
(or undertakes an obligation) with “spirit of liberality” (espírito de liberalidade). In this 
sense, the assessment of the donor’s will is necessary in order to determine if a donation 
actually exists: if the donor acted with a spirit of liberality (and all other cardinal elements 
are present), then the relevant contract may be qualified as a donation. If not, this act cannot 
be considered a donation under Portuguese law. But it is also necessary to recognise that the 
PCC has not defined what “spirit of liberality” means, having instead left the clarification of 
this concept to be made by legal writers and courts. 
 
The expression “spirit of liberality” is used interchangeably with the expression animus 
donandi by legal Portuguese writers693, who define spirit of liberality by looking at two main 
elements: (i) an objective element - the lack of payment694 being demanded to the donee; 
and (ii) a subjective element - the spontaneity of the donor695, who must be willing to benefit 
the donee gratuitously. Additionally, the donor cannot be acting for the discharge of a 
previously existing obligation to give/pay based on a legal or natural obligation696. But a 
debate exists on the best way to assess the existence of the spirit of liberality. This debate is 
promoted by conflicting court decisions and opinions of legal writers, who are divided 
between those who defend that a negative assessment of liberality suffices, i.e. that the 
omission of an onerous intention by the donor, or lack of demand of payment is sufficient 
for the creation of a spirit of liberality697; and those who defend a positive assessment of 
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 L M Diogo, R J Januário, Direito dos Contratos e Institutos de Direito Privado (2007) p 79; A Ferrão, Das 
Doações Segundo o Código Civil Português (1911); J Varela, Ensaio sobre o Conceito de Modo (1955); C 
Almeida, Contratos III (2012) p 24; A Santos Justo, “A Doação no Direito Romano (Breve referência ao 
Direito Português)”, Estudos em Homenagem a Cunha Rodrigues (2001) II, p 239. 
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 C Gonçalves, Dos Contratos em Especial (1953) 3, p 204. 
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 As examples, see C Almeida, Contratos III (2012) p 32; P Lima, A Varela, Código Civil Anotado (4th ed, 
2010) II, p 258; C Gonçalves, Dos Contratos em Especial (1953) 3, p 206; among others.  
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 C Almeida, Contratos III (2012) p 30. 
695
 M Palma Ramalho, “Sobre a Doação Modal” (1990) O Direito, p 720. 
696
 A natural obligation is defined under art 402 PCC as a “moral or social duty, which discharge is not 
enforceable by court, but which corresponds to a duty of justice”. 
697
 M Andrade, Teoria Geral da Relação Jurídica (reissue 1964) II, p 192; J Oliveira Ascenção, Teoria Geral 
da Relação Jurídica (2nd ed 2003) II, p 226; C Ferreira de Almeida, Contratos III (2012) p 32; among others. 
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liberality, demanding evidence of a positive will of the donor to benefit the donee 
gratuitously698. Those who defend a negative assessment of the spirit of liberality are guided 
by the idea that animus donandi does not need to be express in the contract of donation. This 
negative perspective means that as long as all remaining cardinal elements are found, and 
legal formalities required for the validity of the donation are met, a donation is created699. 
This also means that a donation may be hidden under a contract which is wrongly or 
deceptively named700. However, such cases may still be classified as a donation if all 
donation’s cardinal elements are present, including the spirit of liberality, which is conveyed 
by a benefit which is given gratuitously and without demand for payment. 
 
In disagreement with the above negative assessment of the spirit of liberality in Portugal, it 
is possible to find several legal writers who claim that animus donandi must be clearly 
expressed by the donor, in order for the relevant contract to be classified as a donation701. 
On one side, it may be argued that by assessing the existence of the animus donandi in a 
contract in a negative fashion, any bilateral juridical act (even if not named a donation by 
the parties) which is gratuitous in its effects may potentially be classified as donation. This 
means that the cardinal elements and effects of a juridical act are assessed in order to classify 
the relevant juridical act as a donation or not. On the other side, by requesting an express 
declaration of intention in all contracts of donation (the positive way to assess the existence 
of an animus donandi), the scope of animus donandi would be restricted, therefore creating 
the need to prove its existence by requesting an extra declaration of the donor. Bearing in 
mind the above, and following Ferreira de Almeida702, it is possible to argue that the will to 
donate walks side-by-side with the intention to create certain legal effects. Therefore, if the 
                                                 
698
 M Leitão, Direito das Obrigações, Contratos em Especial (10th ed 2015) III, p 178; M Pinto, Teoria Geral 
do Direito Civil (4th ed 2012) p 401; P Lima, A Varela, Código Civil Anotado (4th ed 2010) II, p 260; J Beleza 
dos Santos, A Simulação em Direito Civil (1921) I, p 362; I Galvão Telles, Manual dos Contratos em Geral 
(4th ed 2010) p 180; L Carvalho Fernandes, “Valor do Negócio Jurídico dissimulado, Anotação”, Revista da 
Ordem dos Advogados (1997) p 139; H Horster, “Simulação. Simulação Relativa. Formalismo Legal.” (2007) 
Cadernos de Direito Privado, p 21; among others 
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 M Andrade, Teoria Geral da Relação Jurídica (reissue 1964) II, p 192; J Oliveira Ascenção, Teoria Geral 
da Relação Jurídica (2nd ed 2003) II, p 226. 
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do Direito Civil (4th ed 2012) p 401; P Lima, A Varela, Código Civil Anotado (4th ed 2010) II, p 260; J Beleza 
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intention to gratuitously benefit the donee is found in a contract, there should be no need for 
an extra declaration of will by the donor to confirm that a donation has been entered into. By 
demanding this extra proof, extra obstacles would be created to the existence of donations 
in Portugal, potentially leading to the reduction of the number of contracts of donation 
entered into in Portugal. This could also give rise to a potential misuse of this extra formality 
by a regretful donor, wishing to destroy an otherwise valid donation. 
 
In addition, it may also be argued that a negative way to assess the existence of a spirit of 
liberality, by looking at the gratuitous terms of the contract of donation, is in line with the 
generic provisions of the PCC, where it states the necessary elements for the validity of a 
juridical act. Looking in particular to article 246 PCC703, it is clear that only if the donor is 
aware that he is gratuitously benefiting the donee, and that no payment is being provided for 
the benefit, may the contract of donation be formed. Therefore, and bearing in mind that no 
donation is valid if the donor is not aware of its effects/consequences, the need for an extra 
declaration of will from the donor (even if in a market context) is small, or even irrelevant. 
The donor is protected against entering into surprise gratuitous contracts, while security is 
promoted by the law, by protecting the donee against a change of heart by the donor704. 
Finally, it may also be argued that forcing courts to distrust the form given by the parties to 
the juridical act may create a delay in the execution of justice, as well as insecurity in the 
market. This is because the parties and third parties may see what they used to regard as a 
purchase and sell agreement turned into a contract of donation by action of the courts, with 
all the repercussions this may have705. 
 
4.2.1.2.3. Sacrifice of the donor 
                                                 
703
 Art 246 PCC. 
704
 The donor is going against facto proprio – his agreement to the terms of the contract –, and that by arguing 
against the gratuitous character of donation by lack of a formality may be used against him in court by the 
donor. However, this would create instability, instead of promoting confidence and (legal) security to both 
parties. 
705
 Such as tax repercussions, consequences connected with insolvency law and/or the rules on succession, 
gratuitous transfer of property between spouses or collation rules. 
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The impoverishment (o empobrecimento) of the donor is the expression commonly used by 
Portuguese legal writers706 and courts707 when referring to the cardinal element of donation 
described under the PCC as the “cost” to the donor’s patrimony as a consequence of 
donation708. There is no unanimous agreement in Portugal regarding the boundaries of the 
concept of impoverishment in what the law of donation is concerned, but following the 
wording of the PCC, this impoverishment of the donor is created by the will of the donor 
and must have a negative impact on the donor’s patrimony709. Considering this uncertainty, 
it is possible to identify two perspectives for the definition of this concept: first, and 
following a Savignian perspective710, often found in the writings of Portuguese legal 
writers711, the “cost” of the donor is to be defined as the pecuniary impoverishment suffered 
by his patrimony712; and secondly, building on a comprehensive concept of patrimony, 
where non-patrimonial rights are included in one’s patrimony, some legal writers regard the 
cost of the donation as the release of any right previously held by the donor or the 
undertaking of an obligation. Both cases, either by releasing a right or undertaking an 
                                                 
706
 As exemples, see S Justo, “A Doação no Direito Romano (Breve referência ao Direito Português)” (2001) 
Estudos em Homenagem a Cunha Rodrigues, II, p 339; A Ferrão, Das Doações Segundo o Código Civil 
Português (1911); J Varela, Ensaio sobre o Conceito de Modo (1955); among others. 
707
 As examples, see Portuguese Supreme Court decisions n 246/12.9T2 and C1S1, of 29/04/2014; Tribunal da 
Relação de Évora n 156/05-3, of 28/04/2005; Tribunal da Relação do Porto n 82/1999.P1, of 19/09/2011; 
among others. 
708
 Art 940 n. 1 PCC. 
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 Art 940 n. 1 PCC: “por espírito de liberalidade e à custa do seu património”. 
710
 The main influence on the conceptualisation of donation in Portugal, as found in the writings of Portuguese 
legal writers is F Savigny, Traité de Droit Romain (2nd 1856), who defines a donation as any transaction with 
the following qualities: (i) a donation must be performed during the life of both parties, and cannot be have its 
effects after the death of the donor; (ii) the donation must cause an enrichment of the donee equal to the 
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transfer (usually of a real right) from the donor to the donee, creating a loss for the donor; which means that, 
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obligation, are then regarded as negative for the calculation of global patrimony of the 
donor713. 
 
It may be further argued that the second perspective is the one which most accurately follows 
the systematic approach of the PCC to the sacrifice of the donor. If only patrimonial rights 
could be given by donation, then, there would be no law in Portugal governing the gratuitous 
(definitive) transfer of non-patrimonial rights714. This perspective is further developed by 
prominent legal writers such as Pires de Lima and Antunes Verela, who state that donation 
is often defined by a transfer of a right715. However, these writers also recognise that the 
object of donation may consist of smaller real rights, which are created by the fragmentation 
of the donor’s pre-existent real right716. Bearing this in mind, it may be argued that only a 
definition of “cost” comprising both patrimonial and non-patrimonial rights suits the present 
Portuguese law of donation. 
 
4.2.1.2.4. The creation of a benefit to the donee 
 
The cardinal element which is defined as the creation of a benefit to the donee walks side by 
side with the sacrifice of the donor and with the need for acceptance, considering the bilateral 
essence of the contract of donation in Portugal. Building on the assumption that any rights 
which are capable of being disposed by the donee may be donated under Portuguese law717, 
it may be argued that the benefit received by the donor may also be defined in a broad sense, 
therefore allowing the donee to either hold a right he did not hold before, or to be free from 
an obligation or liability. 
 
With regard to the need for acceptance by the donee, and bearing in mind that donation is 
defined as a contract in Portugal718, as a rule, no benefit may be transferred without the 
donee’s consent719. Looking at the reception of the benefit from a constitutional 
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 C Almeida, “Contratos de liberalidade: em especial os contratos para o uso de coisas corpóreas e 
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perspective720, it may be further argued that, under Portuguese law, the reception of the 
benefit without previous consent of the donee deprives the donor from his right to liberty of 
contract721. The principle of liberty of contract is defined under article 405 PCC722, and 
(along with their sub-principles), is today considered vital under the Portuguese 
Constitution723. 
 
The freedom to contract allows individuals to trade and to freely and securely dispose of the 
rights they hold (this being referred to, under Portuguese law, as disposing of one’s 
patrimony)724. On one side, respecting the donor’s contractual freedom means that none of 
the parties will be subject to obligations they did not agree with, a security of particular 
relevance to the donor. On the other side, respecting the donee’s freedom of contract means 
that donees cannot be forced to receive a benefit without their previous consent. If a 
unilateral juridical act performed by the donor was able to create or transfer a right to the 
donee’s patrimony, then a subsequent refusal of acceptance would only (re-)transfer the right 
back to the donor’s patrimony. This would mean that the right would have entered into the 
non-accepting donor’s patrimony for a certain amount of time, with potentially burdensome 
public legal consequences such as the payment of taxes or others. Therefore, it may be 
argued that the refusal to recognise the freedom of contract (to enter into a contract of 
donation or not, as well as to define the terms of the relevant contract) would increase doubt 
in the legal sphere, and would create instability in the market. In extreme cases, the disrespect 
of the freedom of contract would allow the donor to unilaterally create obligations to the 
donee (such as the payment of taxes for holding rights they never wished to hold). The 
insecurity created by such a system is not allowed under the PCC, a code which is structured 
on the basis of principles of private autonomy725 and contractual freedom726. 
 
It is also worth mention that the existence of a presumption of acceptance, in Portuguese 
law, represents a judgment made by the law, where the silence of the donee equates to 
acceptance. As a rule, silence does not equal acceptance, although there are specific 
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exceptions727. By defining donation as a contract, the PCC actively encourages the principle 
of liberty of contract by denying to the donor the power to bind himself to an obligation, 
where rights and obligations would be created immediately to the donee. It may therefore be 
concluded that, under the PCC728, a donation may only occur if express acceptance is given 
by the donee. In short, either the donee accepts the donation, or the law presumes acceptance, 
leading to the formation of a contract between donor and donee. 
 
4.2.1.2.5. Gratuity 
 
Donations are created under Portuguese law by gratuitous contracts729. Gratuity is described 
as a cardinal element of donation under Portuguese law730, but the concept of gratuity is able 
to comprise three different meanings: (i) the lack of an obligation (to pay) emerging to the 
donee731; (ii) the lack of a counter performance being imposed on the donee732; or (iii) an 
intention to benefit the donee733. It may be argued that the last of the three meanings 
presented should not be part of the definition of gratuity under Portuguese law of donation 
because it is absorbed by the concept of spirit of liberality or animus donandi. Two 
definitions therefore remain to be used, which seem able to define the concept of gratuity 
under the Portuguese law of donation: (i) gratuity as the lack of obligations arising to the 
donee from the contract of donation, and (ii) gratuity as the lack of counter performance 
being imposed on the donee under the contract of donation.  
 
The first definition (no obligations arising to the donee) is more restrictive than the second 
presented (no counter performance being required of the donee). If gratuity is regarded as 
no obligations being undertaken by the donee under the contract of donation, this would 
mean that the donee’s acceptance would never create to the donee the obligation to receive 
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 Art 218 PCC. Furthermore, and as stated by F C Savigny, Traité de Droit Romain (reissue 1943) p 260: “Le 
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 C Gonçalves, Dos Contratos em Especial (1953) 3, p 205. 
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delivery of the object of donation734. It is therefore possible to argue that defining gratuity 
as the lack of obligations arising to the donee is not correct, considering that, once the 
contract of donation is concluded, the donor no longer holds the right donated, which is 
immediately transferred/held by the donee under article 954 (a)735. This line of argument is 
based on the placement of donation as one, among other contracts to be regulated under 
Book II of the PCC, which means that the generic part of Book II of the PCC is directly 
applicable to the contract of donation736. Bearing in mind the above arguments, articles 813 
to 816 PCC, regulating what happens to default of creditors, apply to contracts of donation. 
The rules found on these articles therefore regulate the refusal to accept delivery of the 
subject-matter of the donation by the donee (unless otherwise stated in the contract). By 
themselves, these articles create an obligation to the donee: to accept delivery of the subject-
matter of donation. 
 
After excluding two of the three definitions of gratuity presented, it is necessary to enquire 
if the third definition of gratuity presented is adequate to explain what gratuity means for the 
Portuguese law of donation. The definition of gratuity, as the lack of counter-performance 
by the donee, is in line with the latest writings on donation in Portugal, where gratuity is 
defined as a unilateral sacrifice737. In other words, donation is regarded as gratuitous because 
sacrifice must only be undertaken by the donor, and never by the donee, who is the 
beneficiary of the contract (of donation)738. In addition, it is important to note that under the 
PCC, obligations may be undertaken by the donee: a consideration or modo may be requested 
to the donee under article 963(1) PCC. However, the sacrifice must remain with the donor, 
and if the donee undertakes an obligation, he is only liable for payment of the modo up to 
the value of the benefit received739. Also, if the modo requested from the donee is a pecuniary 
one, such as the payment of all or some debts of the donor, the donee is only liable for the 
payment of debts existing at the time of the donation. If a consideration is imposed on the 
donee, demanding the payment of future debts, the donee is only liable if the debts’ 
pecuniary value is determined at the time of the donation, and it is specified in the contract 
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735
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of donation. Finally, and most important of all, the donee is only liable for the payment of 
the debts of the donor up to the pecuniary value of the benefit received under the contract of 
donation740. It is also worth mentioning that if a modo is requested to the donee, both the 
donor, his heirs, or any interested parties may demand the discharge of the obligations 
undertaken by the donee741. Alternatively, they may request the resolution of the donation in 
court if the donee fails to comply with the modo undertaken in the donation contract742. 
 
4.2.1.2.6. Inter vivos transactions 
 
Under Portuguese law, the legal effects of a contract of donation must be produced while all 
parties are alive. For this reason, donations where the benefit is to be received by the donee 
upon the death of the donor are forbidden, as a rule, under the PCC743. Following this idea, 
if a donation is to produce its effects upon the death of the donor and all formalities required 
by the law of testament have been followed, then the gratuitous juridical act is regarded as a 
legacy and regulated under the law of succession744. Unlike acts mortis causa, a contract of 
donation cannot be subject to a suspensive condition which delays the production of its effect 
to the moment of death of one or more parties745. Furthermore, the identity of the parties, as 
well as the production of the effects of donation while the parties are alive is so relevant that 
the offer to donate expires if not accepted while the donor is alive746. 
 
The cardinal element of the production of effects inter vivos builds on the idea that donations 
are a personal affair, and that the identity of the parties matters747. Because the identity of 
the parties in a contract of donation is essential to the validity of donation, the parties cannot 
allow a third party to designate who the donee will be, or what the object of the donation 
is748. The idea that the identity of the parties in a donation matters, follows a chain of thought 
observed in other (European) jurisdictions, as described by Richard Hyland: “the most 
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adequate notion of the gift for comparative law purposes involves the transfer of an interest 
that occurs in conjunction with four additional elements. First, the transfer is gratuitous […]. 
Second, certain subjective factors are present […]. Third, the transaction takes place inter 
vivos, which distinguishes gifts from transfers made under a will. Finally, the object of the 
transfer involves rights”749. 
 
Bearing this in mind, it is therefore possible to conclude that, under Portuguese law of 
donation, the identity of the parties matters for the validity of the contract of donation. As 
such, both parties must be alive when the legal effects of the contract are produced. If one 
of them is not alive, then the personal character of donation would be compromised, and one 
of the parties’ heirs would be forced to undertake the obligation to donate (donor) or would 
receive the benefit (donee). This would go directly against the rules created by the PCC 
prohibiting donations to take effect upon or after the death of the parties750. It would also 
undermine the personal character of donation, where the identity of the parties matters for 
the validity of the contract of donation751. 
 
4.2.2. Object of donation 
 
The object of donation under Portuguese law will be critically reviewed in order to achieve 
further clarification of the boundaries of the donation under Portuguese law. This subsection 
will define which benefits may be granted by donation in Portugal, and which may not. This 
distinction is relevant to distinguish donations from other gratuitous juridical acts in 
Portugal. It will also assist us to understand the versatility and efficiency of Portuguese law 
of donation, as a tool which can be used by players in the market to transfer or grant 
gratuitous benefits to their counterparties. 
 
The object of the contract of donation is extensively regulated under the PCC752. The first 
relevant aspect of the regulation of the object of donation under Portuguese law is stated 
under article 940 PCC, where the object of donation is positively defined as: (i) the 
disposition of a thing/asset by the donor with benefit to the donee; (ii) the disposition of a 
right by the donor with benefit to the donee; or (iii) the undertaking of an obligation by the 
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 R Hyland, Gifts, A Study in Comparative Law (2009) p 11. 
750
 Art 946 n 1 PCC. 
751
 Art 949 and 945 n 1 PCC. 
752
 The regulation of the object spans between the art 940, 863, 940, 942, 943, 956, 957 and 958 to 968 PCC. 
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donor to the benefit of the donee753. But the PCC goes beyond the positive definition of the 
object of donation, by negatively stating which objects cannot be donated. The first exclusion 
is set under article 940(2) PCC, where it is stated that the renunciation of rights, renunciation 
of legacies or the renunciation of inheritance are not regulated under Portuguese law of 
donation754. Bearing in mind the cardinal elements of donation presented above, it is 
understandable why the PCC excludes these juridical acts from the concept of donation: first 
of all, they are created by an unilateral juridical act (an act of renunciation), where its effects 
are produced without agreement, or even acceptance, of the beneficiary; secondly, there is 
no sacrifice of the person who renounces a right/legacy, and only a loss of chance occurs, 
which means that their patrimony remains the same as it was before the act of renunciation; 
and thirdly, this unilateral act does not need to be made with an animus donandi / a spirit of 
liberality, i.e. the person who renounces a right is never presumed to be doing so with the 
intention to benefit someone755. 
 
The second exclusion found under article 942(1) PCC are donations of future rights, i.e. 
rights which are not held by the donor at the time when the donation is made, cannot be 
given by donation756. Once again, it is understandable why future rights cannot be donated: 
because the donor does not hold the relevant rights, they cannot be disposed by the donor, 
and therefore, the cardinal element of sacrifice to the donor is not present. In addition, 
because future rights are not held by the donor at the moment of the donation, the donor is 
not able to gratuitously dispose of them, and he will need to acquire them in a future moment, 
only then being able to enter into a contract of donation, where the right will be 
transferred/granted to the donee757. Because some of the cardinal elements of donation are 
absent in a juridical act where future benefits are promised, the law of donation does not 
regulate these acts, which are left to be regulated under the law of promise758. For the same 
reason, if a donation of someone else’s property is made, the contract will be null and void759. 
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 Art 940 n 1: a donation is “a gratuitous disposition of a thing or a right, or the undertaking of an obligation, 
for the benefit of the counterparty”. 
754
 Art 940 n 2 PCC. The renunciation of rights which by effect of the law benefit someone is therefore excluded 
from the concept of donation under Portuguese law of donation. 
755
 For the same reasons, art 1411 n 3 PCC excludes from the concept of donation the renunciation to the right 
of property by joint owners (which benefits the remaining joint owners by effect of the law), with the intention 
of not being liable for necessary maintenance and repairs of property. 
756
 Art 942 n 1 PCC. 
757
 As a rule, under art 954 (a) PCC, the rights are transferred to the donee by the contract, and not by a future 
act of disposition of the donee. 
758
 The contract of promise is mainly regulated under art 410 to 463 PCC. 
759
 Art 956 n 1 PCC: the contract of donation is null, however, the nullity of the contract cannot be argued in 
court by the donor against a donee who has entered the contract in good faith. 
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The donor is also responsible for any damage caused to the donee if the donee has entered 
the contract in good faith and (i) the donor expressly undertook the obligation to pay him 
damages; or (ii) if the donor acted with dolus; or (iii) if the donation is a remuneratory 
donation; or (iv) if the donee undertook a correspondent obligation upon acceptance of the 
donation. In this case the donor’s liability is limited to the pecuniary value of the obligation 
undertaken by the donee760. 
 
The PCC further regulates the object761 and subject-matter762 of the donation, by providing 
that the donation of a universalidade or group of things763 includes all future assets and fruits, 
that will comprise the universalidade in the future764. The quality of the subject-matter of 
the donation is also regulated under the PCC, according to which the donor is not responsible 
for the obligations and limitations of the subject-matter of the donation (which pass to the 
donee with the object of the donation), nor is the donor responsible for a malfunction of the 
subject-matter of the donation, unless he expressly undertook responsibility for the quality 
of the gift or proceeded with dolus765. Other examples of the regulation of the object and 
subject-matter of the donation may be found in the PCC, such as article 958 PCC, which 
allows the donor to reserve the right of use of the subject-matter of the donation for himself 
or others; article 959 PCC, where the donor is allowed to reserve the right to dispose of the 
subject-matter of the donation766; article 960 PCC, where the parties may agree that if the 
donee (or his descendants) die before the donor, the object of the donation returns to the 
donor767; article 967 PCC, where the donation creates an obligation to the donor which is 
physically impossible, illegal or an offence of morality, the obligation is regulated under 
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 Art 956 n 2 PCC. Furthermore, under art 956 n 3 PCC, only the pecuniary value of the subject-matter of the 
donation will be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of damages to be paid to the donee. If 
damages are not paid to the donee, he will be assigned to all future rights to be received by the donor, and 
which are connected to the subject-matter of the donation (art 956 n 4 PCC). 
761
 Object of the donation, in the present thesis and as mentioned above, describes the benefit granted by the 
donor and received by the donee. 
762
 Subject-matter of the donation, in the present thesis, and as mentioned above, describes the physical on non-
physical reality which underlies the object of the donation. For example, if the object of the donation is a real 
right over a ring, the subject-matter of the donation is the physical ring. 
763
 An universalidade or group of things that belong together is defined under art 206 n 1 PCC as: “a composed 
thing, or universalidade de facto, the plurality of movables that belong to the same person and that are used for 
the same purpose.” Among other examples, it is possible to think of a heard of sheep or a set of dinner plates. 
764
 Art 942 n 2 PCC. 
765
 Art 957 n 2 PCC, under which the bona fide donee may request to the court the annulment of the contract 
of donation based on the lack of quality of the subject-matter of the donation. 
766
 This clause must be registered to be used against third parties’ interests or rights, and the right to dispose of 
the subject-matter of the donation cannot transferred upon the death of the donor to his descendants and/or 
heirs. 
767
 This clause must be registered to be opposed to third parties’ rights or interests. If the object of the donation 
returns to the donor, the subject-matter of the donation will return to the patrimony of the donor without any 
obligations that may have been attached to it by the donee (or his descendants/heirs) under art 961 PCC. 
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testament law; or article 942 PCC, which states that if the benefit is to be delivered to the 
donee in periodic instalments, such obligation ends upon the death of the donor768.  
 
Finally, it is also important to notice that, both the payment of a previously existent debt by 
the donor, as well as the undertaking of an obligation which causes a sacrifice to the donor, 
are defined by the Portuguese courts as valid objects of donation769. That is the reason why 
the object of donation is often described in Portugal as comprising three different 
possibilities: “in dando, in obligando, in liberando”770. In dando traditionally refers to a 
transfer of rights from donor to donee. A better example to describe this form of enrichment 
is the gratuitous transfer of real rights, where the benefit granted upon the donee corresponds 
directly to the sacrifice of the donor. In obligando refers to the undertaking of an obligation 
by the donor, aiming to benefit the donee. In liberando is associated with the provision of a 
benefit to the donee by releasing him from a payment. Under Portuguese law, the remissão 
(or release of an obligation) is regulated under article 863 PCC, where it is expressly stated 
that the release of a debt takes the form of a contract, and when made with a spirit of 
liberality, is regulated under the law of donation771. 
 
4.2.3. Confrontation with similar juridical acts 
 
Following a similar approach to the discovery of hard boundaries for the law of donation in 
Chapter 3772, the concept of donation will be confronted with similar juridical acts, which 
could be confused with donation in Portugal. This comparison aims to better understand the 
concept of donation in Portuguese law of donation, as well as to affirm hard boundaries on 
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 As an example, if the donor has donated a certain amount to the donee, to be paid in instalments of 500€ a 
month, the obligation of payment will stop with the death of the donor, and his heirs will no longer be 
responsible for the payment of the instalments. 
769
 As stated by the Tribunal da Relação do Porto n 0230205 of 27 June 2002: “No texto e no espírito do artigo 
940 n.1 do Código Civil cabe tanto a hipótese de alguém assumir a título gratuito a dívida já existente do 
devedor em face de terceiro, beneficiando o devedor, como a de alguém assumir a título gratuito uma obrigação 
inteiramente nova para com o outro contraente, como no caso de alguém se obrigar a doar (transmitir 
gratuitamente) alguma coisa ou direito ao outro contraente.” 
770
 C F Almeida, Contratos III (2012) p 25 and R Hyland, Gifts, A Study in Comparative Law (2009) p 193, 
among others. 
771
 Art 863 PCC. 
772
 See Chapter 3 – Scotland, 3.2.6. Confrontation with similar institutions, p 105. 
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the use of Portuguese law of donation, the aim of which is of particular relevance when 
regulating market donations. 
 
 Socially relevant gratuitous transfers of rights (donativos) 
 
Portuguese law of donation distinguishes between donations and gifts given according to 
social usage (donativos or social gifts) under article 940(2) PCC. While donations are 
regulated under the law of donation773, social gifts are not specifically regulated under 
Portuguese law. This separation between donations, which are regulated under the law, and 
other gratuitous acts, which are not regulated under the law, follows the idea that “acts of 
kindness” should not be regulated under the law774. Potentially, this is because they are 
already (and/or should only be) regulated under other normative orders such as moral or 
religion. 
 
The traditional examples of donativos are those related with ordinary social interaction, such 
as presents exchanged during the Christmas period, the payment of beverages to friends in 
social context, or any other gratuitous act that provides a small pecuniary benefit to a family 
member775. The exclusion of these gratuitous acts from being regulated under Portuguese 
law of donation is not, however, connected with the pecuniary value of object. The exclusion 
of social gifts from being regulated under the law of donation is set by article 940(2) PCC, 
where it is stated that “there is no donation (…) in gifts made according to social usage”. It 
is therefore necessary to analyse this concept in order to determine which gratuitous acts are 
regulated under the law of donation, and which are left to be regulated by other normative 
systems. 
 
The leading Portuguese writer on the subject, Ferreira de Almeida, lays down two tests in 
order to distinguish between donations and social gifts776. The first test is a positive one: it 
is necessary to understand if the benefit provided to the beneficiary may be considered 
typical, by looking at the moment when it was made, the identity of the parties, the pecuniary 
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 Art 940 PCC and following. 
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 F P Jorge, “Doações para casamento - Doações entre casados” (1963) Boletim do Ministério da Justiça, p 
124 and 287; C F Almeida, “Contratos de liberalidade: em especial os contratos para o uso de coisas corpóreas 
e incorpóreas” (2011) Estudos em Homenagem ao Prof. Doutor J. L. Saldanha Sanches, II, p 155. 
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 C F Almeida, “Contratos de liberalidade: em especial os contratos para o uso de coisas corpóreas e 
incorpóreas” (2011) Estudos em Homenagem ao Prof. Doutor J. L. Saldanha Sanches, II, p 155. 
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 C F Almeida, Contratos III (2012) p 23 and following. 
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value of its object, and the systematic correlation between all these criteria. After this 
preliminary test, it is necessary to run a negative test: it is necessary to determine if any legal 
provision demands the qualification of the act as a donation. In order to explain how these 
tests work, Ferreira de Almeida provides the reader with an example of social gifts which 
passes both tests: a gratuitous promise with small economic value which is made between 
family members777. In this case, both tests are satisfied and the relationship may no longer 
be defined as a donation but instead as a social gift. Thus the law of donation no longer 
applies. 
 
The Portuguese courts are yet to create a nexus between social usages and the small 
economic value of the subject-matter of the gift, as part of the definition of a social gift. 
Instead, they define social usages by linking them to “social normality”, a concept which 
often comprises small gifts for the promotion of sales, rewards to employees and gifts to 
charities778. Pari passu with the courts, legal writers have defined social usages as the rules 
of coexistence in Portuguese society, courtesy, propriety and worldly relations. Examples of 
when social gifts occur as a consequence of such rules include birthdays, weddings and other 
family celebrations779. 
 
Considering the above, it may be argued that in order to better understand what fits into the 
definition of “social usage”, it is necessary to look at the social relationship established 
between the beneficiary and the provider of the benefit, as well as the social context where 
the benefit is being provided. For example, if we are looking at two friends exchanging 
presents during Christmas time, this gift is not regulated under Portuguese law of donation. 
Rather it is considered a social gift, which was gifted according to social usages. This is 
because the gifting was based on the relationship maintained between the parties involved, 
the time of the year when it was performed, and the rules of courtesy and life in the 
Portuguese society. 
 
Bearing in mind that these exchanges are not regulated under Portuguese law of donation, it 
is unclear what the legal implications of social gifts are. In my opinion, these gifts are to be 
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 C F Almeida, Contratos III (2012) p 17. 
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 Decision of the Portuguese Supreme Court n 2380/05.2TBOER.S1, 6th Camber, of 27/01/2010. This view 
will be challenged in the next chapter, when analysing the evolution of European Law of Donation, as well as 
its impact the Member States’ concept of donation.  
779
 F P Lima, J A Varela, Código Civil Anotado (reissue 4th ed 2010) II, p 261. 
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classified as natural obligations, considering that they fulfil the legal definition of natural 
obligation, as stated by article 402 PCC: “the obligation is said to be natural, when it is based 
on a mere moral or social duty, whose fulfilment of which is not judicially enforceable, but 
which corresponds to a duty of justice”. Following this approach, the social gifts are to be 
“subject to the regime followed by civil obligations in everything that is not connected with 
the enforcement of the benefit”780. In other words, by declaring social gifts to be natural 
obligations, they will produce legal effects. As a demonstration, if the property of a pen is 
given away by social gift, the relevant real right will be legally transferred from the 
benefactor to the beneficiary, and the beneficiary will hold a right he did not hold before 
which cannot be disturbed by the benefactor or by third parties. 
 
 Promise 
 
Promises are defined under Portuguese law as contract by which “someone undertakes the 
obligation to celebrate a contract”781. A promise may be either gratuitous782, where only the 
promisor undertakes the obligation to enter into a new contract, or onerous783, where the 
obligation to celebrate a future contract emerges to both/all parties. Under Portuguese law, 
and similarly to what happens with donation, promises are typified bilateral juridical acts 
(contracts), particularly regulated under the PCC784. Because promises are defined as 
bilateral juridical acts (contracts) under Portuguese law785, one of the parties cannot 
unilaterally revoke the promise. But this is not the only common thread between promises 
and donations under Portuguese law786. 
 
First, it is clearly stated under the PCC that promises and donations are two independent 
contracts, due to the fact that they are regulated autonomously as independent contracts, with 
their regulation appearing in different parts of Book 2 of the PCC787. Secondly, only 
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 Art 404 PCC. 
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 The legal definition of promise is found under art 410 n 1 PCC. 
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 Art 411 PCC. 
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 Art 410 n 3 PCC. 
784
 With the exception to promises made to the public, which are unilateral juridical acts and bind the promisee, 
in view of the protection of the expectations created by a widely advertised declaration of the promisor, under 
art 459 PCC. 
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 Art 410 PCC. 
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 Note: I have not entered into the debate regarding the contradiction of a promise to donate: if a promise to 
donate exists, that means that the donor will enter the contract of donation because a previous-existing 
obligation to give exists. Because the donor is merely discharging the obligation to donate, he is not acting 
with a true spirit of liberality (animus donandi). 
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 Promises are regulated under 401 PCC, while donations are regulated under art 940 PCC and following. 
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donations must be entered with a spirit of liberality (or animus donandi)788, while promises, 
on the contrary, may be entered with a spirit of liberality (when gratuitous – the sacrifice is 
only made by one of the parties)789 or not (when both parties undertake the obligation to 
celebrate a future contract and sacrifice is undertaken by both parties)790. Thirdly, the 
production of the legal effects happens in a different moment in promises and donations. 
While the constitutive effect of donations791 means that the relevant right (real or personal) 
is transferred/held immediately by the donee, by mere effect of the contract, a promise only 
grants the promisee the right to demand a future action of the promisor (corresponding to 
the promisor’s obligation to enter into a new contract). In other words, donations 
immediately grant access to the subject-matter of the contract, while promises provide the 
donee with the necessary tools to access the subject-matter of the promise in the future, but 
are not able, by themselves, to vest in the promisee the subject-matter of the promise. 
Subsequent action by the promisor is needed to achieve this objective792. 
 
This clear distinction between donations and promises is disputed by legal writers who state 
that the “promise to donate, as accepted by the beneficiary, constitutes therefore a real 
donation, where it creates, from the beginning, a right of credit for the benefit of the 
promisee, at the expenses of the promisor’s patrimony” 793. Against this perspective, it may 
be argued that the object (and goal) of both contracts is distinct. On one hand we may find 
the gratuitous promise, where the object of the contract is the celebration of a future contract, 
according to which the promisee will be granted with a gratuitous benefit; on the other hand, 
we may find donation, where the object of the contract is the actual benefit of the donee, 
without need for a subsequent act of either party. Even if the contract of promise provides 
the promisee with a right of credit he did not hold before794 (the right to demand the 
celebration of a subsequent contract to the promisor), a promise never grants its beneficiary 
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 Art 940 n 1 PCC. 
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 Art 411 PCC. 
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 One such case being the contract of promise to buy and sell, art 441 PCC and following. 
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 Art 954 (a) PCC. 
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 As a demonstration, if the subject-matter of a donation is the ownership (real right) of a car, ownership of 
the relevant car is vested in the donee immediately, by effect of the contract, on the contrary, if the subject-
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contract is entered into by the promisor, therefore vesting the promisee in the ownership (real right) of the car. 
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 P Lima, A Varela, Código Civil Anotado (reissue 4th ed 2010) II, p 238, following Vaz Serra, “Anotação ao 
Acórdão do Supremo Tribunal de Justiça de 18 de Maio de 1976” (110th year) Revista Leg. Jur., p 213; and 
Eckstein, Das Schenkungsversprechen (1904) p 384. 
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 P Lima, A Varela, Código Civil Anotado (reissue 4th ed 2010) II, p 238. 
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with direct access to the subject-matter of the contract. Donation, on the other hand, grants 
the donee, in principle, direct and irrevocable access to the subject-matter of the contract795. 
 
In conclusion, despite the fact that both promises and donations are bilateral juridical acts 
(contracts) under Portuguese law, and are both able to create benefits (and create a 
correspondent sacrifice) to only one of their parties, or be entered into with a spirit of 
liberality (animus donandi), they are different juridical acts, which are regulated under 
different laws – one is regulated under the law of promise, the other is regulated under the 
law of donation796. The distinction between both contracts is explained by the fact that 
promises may be onerous (creating sacrifices and benefits to both parties), may be entered 
into without a spirit of liberality and, while donation’s legal effects are produced 
immediately upon completion of the contract, promises need a subsequent juridical act of 
the promisor to vest in the promisee the benefit/subject-matter of the contract797. 
 
 Testament and legacies 
 
Testament is defined under the PCC as the “unilateral and revocable act by which people 
dispose, for after their death, of all or part of their goods”798. Because testament is a unilateral 
act, it does not require acceptance from its beneficiary(ies) to produce legal effects. 
Testament may therefore be defined as a unilateral gratuitous disposition of part or all the de 
cujus’ patrimony799. If the de cujus identifies which goods are to be received by one (or each) 
beneficiary of the testament, he is creating legacies, which may be defined as identified 
goods to be received by nominated parties upon the death of the de cujus800. 
 
Bearing in mind the above, both donation and testament (or legacies) are gratuitous juridical 
acts which, in principle, do not oblige their beneficiaries to counter-performance. In other 
words, no sacrifice is demanded, as a rule, from donees or legatees. The similarities between 
donation and testament/legacy end here, considering that donation is a contract (a bilateral 
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 Under art 954 PCC are “essential effects” of donations the immediate transfer of the (property) right or the 
undertaking of the obligations if that is the object of the contract of donation. 
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 Both are regulated under the PCC as separated typical contractual forms. Promise is regulated under art 410 
PCC and following and donation is regulated under art 940 and following. 
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 As a demonstration, if the promissor promises to buy a house, he only undertook the obligation to enter into 
a future contract of sale with the promisee.  
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 Art 2179 n 1 PCC. It is worth mentioning that under art 2179 n. 1 PCC testaments may be comprised solely 
of non-patrimonial rights, as long as they are adopted under the formalities set by the PCC. 
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 Art 2183 PCC. 
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juridical act)801, while testament is a unilateral juridical act802. Because donations are 
contracts they cannot be revoked unilaterally by one of the parties803. On the contrary, one 
of testaments (or legacies)’ cardinal elements under Portuguese succession law is their free 
revocability804 – the testator-benefactor is free to revoke the testament (legacy) at all times 
and cannot renounce his right to revoke a testament (or legacy) in the future805. Furthermore, 
testaments (or legacies) do not need to be made with a spirit of liberality (animus donandi), 
contrary to what happens with donation806, and they produce their effects upon (and because 
of) the death of the benefactor (the de cujus)807. Because testaments produce their effects 
upon the death of the de cujus, they are classified as juridical acts which produce their effects 
mortis causa808. 
 
In addition, while the production of effects mortis causa is one of testament’s cardinal 
elements809, a contract of donation may only benefit the donee while both parties are alive. 
Portuguese law of donation is clear on this point, expressly forbidding, as a rule, donations 
the effects of which are to be produced mortis causa810. The legal effects of a donation are 
to be produced while all parties are alive. One example of this is when a donor decides to 
donate all or part of his patrimony to his presumed heirs (but reserving the real right of use 
the goods for himself while alive). In this case, the contract entered into by the parties is not 
regarded as testament, but as a donation if the legal effects are produced immediately (inter 
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 Art 940 n 1 PCC. 
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 Art 2179 n 1 PCC. 
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 Art 406 n 1 PCC. 
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 A Ferrão, Das doações segundo o Código Civil Português (1911) p 4. 
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 Art 946 PCC. 
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vivos)811. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that testament (or legacies) and donations are 
different juridical acts, therefore being regulated under different laws812. 
 
 Pact of succession 
 
Pacts of succession are defined under article 1701 PCC813 as “the contractual nomination of 
an heir or legatee”814, which are made in the prenuptial agreement, for the benefit of one or 
both spouses. Pacts of succession share cardinal elements with donations such as gratuity – 
an agreement on the effects to be produced is essential, while only one of the parties bears 
the sacrifice. Both emerge from contracts and, for this reason, pacts of succession cannot be 
revoked unilaterally by the benefactor815. The benefactor cannot also prejudice the 
expectations created by the beneficiary by gratuitously disposing of the benefits to be granted 
under the pact (unless this right has been reserved by the benefactor or so is determined by 
court)816. But while the parties in a pact of succession are referred to as “donor” and “donee” 
under the PCC817, it may be argued that the use of this terminology is incorrect. Indeed, it 
ought to be changed, considering that not all cardinal elements of donations are present in a 
pact of succession. As a demonstration, a pact of succession never produces its effects while 
the parties are alive. On the contrary, they always produce their effects mortis causa. 
 
 Comodatus and Mutuum (free loan of unfungible / fungible 
goods) 
 
Comodato (comodatus or free loan of unfungible goods) is defined under the PCC as “the 
gratuitous contract by which one of the parties delivers to another a good, movable or 
immovable, so that can be used, with the obligation to return”818. Mútuo (mutuum or loan of 
fungible goods) is defined under article 1142 PCC as “the contract by which one party loans 
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 Art 2029 n 1 PCC. 
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 As stated by the PCC, where donations are regulated in Book II PCC – Law of Obligations, as a typical 
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money or another fungible good to another party, where the second party is obliged to return 
the same amount of the same kind and quality”, and this contract may be gratuitous or 
onerous (although it is presumed onerous under the PCC819). Both contracts mentioned 
above share similarities with the contract of donation, considering that all of them are 
bilateral in nature: they are formed by agreement reached by the parties; they are gratuitous: 
they are able to produce a benefit without correspondent sacrifice to the beneficiary820; and 
they produce their effects inter vivos. However, contracts of comodatus and mutuum are 
different from contracts of donation because they lack some of donation’s cardinal elements, 
and are not, therefore, regulated by the PCC under the law of donation821. 
 
When gratuitous, both the contracts of free loan and donation lead to the sacrifice of only 
one of the parties of the contract (the benefactor/donor). But only in a contract of donation 
may the benefactor’s sacrifice be defined as permanent and irrevocable822, considering that 
in the case of free loan, the benefactor is deprived of the enjoyment of a right for a certain 
period of time, however, he always regains full access to and/or use of the subject-matter of 
the contract in the future823. Furthermore, it should also be noticed that one of donation’s 
cardinal elements is the spirit of liberality (or animus donandi)824. This element is not 
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 Art 1145 n 1 PCC. 
820
 Under art 1135 PCC (comodatus) and art 1142 PCC (mutuum), both the comodatus and the gratuitous 
mutuum impose obligations to the beneficiary, however, and as a rule, none of these contracts demands a 
sacrifice to be sustained by the beneficiary (he will not be deprived of a right or any benefits which he held 
before the celebration of the contracts or as consequence of the contract(s). On the contrary, he will benefit 
from both contracts by holding a new right he did not hold before (as consequence of the relevant contract). 
821
 While the contract of donation is regulated under art 940 PCC, the contract of comodatus is regulated under 
art 1135 PCC and following, and the contract of mutuum is regulated under art 1142 PCC and following. 
Another argument in favour of the distinction between contracts of comodatus and mutuum and donation is 
that the PCC distinguishes between the three contracts, providing each one of them with particular rules, which 
only apply to the relevant contract. 
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 Because the benefit is granted or transferred in a permanent basis to the donee under art 940 PCC. 
823
 Being the beneficiary obliged to the care for the subject-matter of the contract, as well as to return it (or the 
same kind and number) by the end of the agreed period under art 1135 PCC in what the contract of comodatus 
is concerned and art 1142 PCC in what mutuum is concerned. 
824
 Art 940 n 1 PCC. 
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necessarily present in a contract of loan, where both parties may act following a previously 
existent obligation to enter into the contract of loan825. 
 
 Public subsidies and the creation of foundations 
 
Public subsidies may be defined as economic benefits granted by a legal person, who has 
been created and/or acts under public law provisions826, such as the government, the 
municipalities, public foundations, and public companies, among others827. Both in the case 
of subsidies and donations, the juridical acts creating the benefit may be classified as bilateral 
in nature, inter vivos, and gratuitous because both create a benefice (and corresponding 
sacrifice) only to one of the parties in the relationship: the benefactor. However, only 
donations are made with a spirit of liberality (animus donandi). This happens because public 
organisations’ actions (such as the state or municipalities) are guided by the duty to benefit 
the society. By providing their habitants with subsidies, these public organisations are doing 
nothing more than discharging the duties imposed on them by law828. 
 
Foundations are legal persons which are created to pursue a socially relevant purpose by a 
unilateral juridical act of the founder (either inter vivos or mortis causa829). The foundation 
only gains legal personality (and consequently holds the rights granted by the founder) by 
an act of recognition830 which has been issued by the relevant ministry831. Following the 
same line of argument found above, it is necessary to recognise that both the setting up of 
foundations and contracts of donation are juridical acts which are gratuitous in their effects. 
However, only donations are bilateral juridical (or contracts). The creation of a foundation 
is made by a unilateral juridical act, which separates rights and obligations from the 
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 A previous obligation to enter into the contract may exist, under art 1142 and art 1129 PCC. 
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 L Cabral de Moncada, Direito Económico (5th ed 2007) p 41. 
827
 L Cabral de Moncada, Direito Económico (5th ed 2007) p 41. 
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 Art 63 to 79 of the Portuguese Constitution. 
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 Art 185 n 1 PCC. 
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 Art 188 PCC. 
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 The foundations of social solidarity are recognized by the Ministry of Work and Social Affairs or by the 
Ministry of Education, depending on the area of operation, while the foundations aiming the creation of a 
Higher Education Establishment fall within the competence of the Ministry of Science, Technology and High 
Education. Under art 188 n 1 PCC the recognition of the social character of the foundation must be requested 
by the founder or his heirs (or be unofficially promoted by the competent authority) in the 180 days after the 
creation of the foundation. 
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founder’s patrimony, and transfers them to an autonomous patrimony. This autonomous 
patrimony is then granted with legal personality by a ministerial act of recognition832. 
 
 Volunteering (giving “time”) 
 
Volunteering is defined under Law 71/98 of 3 November as “the set of actions of social and 
communal interest, performed selflessly”833, with the exclusion of any actions which are 
“isolated and sporadic in nature or which are determined by family reasons, friendship or 
good neighbourhood interests”834. In addition, a volunteer is defined as the “individual who 
in a free, uninterested and responsible fashion, undertakes the obligation to, according to his 
own skills and his free time, volunteer for a promoting organisation”835. Both volunteering 
and donations are bilateral juridical acts, and yet they benefit the beneficiary in a different 
way. The benefit created by a donation is based on the sacrifice of the donor, which will 
benefit the donee by resulting in him holding a right he did not hold before (or by being 
released from a debt/obligation). Conversely, the benefit created by volunteering is granted 
without a sacrifice of the volunteer: the volunteer is never deprived from a right he held, and 
no actual obligation to volunteer (work for free) is undertaken by the volunteer under 
Portuguese law836. The volunteer remains responsible only for the observance of 
deontological duties of care and safety, among others837. It may therefore be argued that no 
sacrifice exists for the volunteer, considering that his patrimony remains the same as before 
(no right was lost and no obligation was undertaken by him). The sacrifice must be present, 
as it is one of donation’s cardinal elements. 
 
 Placement of the law of donation 
 
4.3.1. Taxonomy 
 
Donation is a typified contract under the PCC838. Because it is defined as a contract, donation 
may only be created by a bilateral juridical act under Portuguese law. The placement of the 
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 Regulated under Law 150/2015, of 10 September. 
833
 Art 2 n 1 of the Law 71/98, of 3 November. 
834
 Art 2 n 2 of the Law 71/98, of 3 November. 
835
 Art 3 n 1 of the Law 71/98, of 3 November. 
836
 Art 3 of the Law 71/98, of 3 November. 
837
 Art 3 n 1 of the Law 71/98, of 3 November. 
838
 Placed under Book II (Obligations), Title II (Of the contracts in particular) of the PCC. 
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regulation of the Portuguese law of donation in the PCC839 is in line with the treatment given 
to donation by most European civil law jurisdictions, which also place their laws of donation 
within the relevant national civil codes840. In the Portuguese case, the generic regulation of 
donations is found within Book 2 of the PCC, the book dealing with the Law of Obligations 
(Direito das Obrigações), and under Title 2 – Of the Contracts in Particular (Dos Contratos 
em Especial). The placement of the law of donation within the PCC as a typical contract 
leads to the conclusion that the principles and rules governing contract law apply to donation 
if the event is not particularly regulated under the law of donation841. 
 
Donation is also defined as a liberality842 under the PCC and by contemporary Portuguese 
legal writers843. The word liberality (liberalidade) is expressly used in 25 articles of PCC, 
however, none of those articles defines the concept of liberality. Following a systematic 
interpretation of the PCC844, it is possible to argue that liberalities are a macro category, used 
by the PCC when referring to gratuitous juridical acts. As examples of juridical acts defined 
as a “liberality” under the PCC, it is possible to find, among others: donation845; gratuitous 
promises for the benefit of a third party846; testament provisions847; the gratuitous 
forgiveness/waiver of a debt848; remuneratory donations849; succession pacts for the benefit 
of one of the parties850; and succession pacts for the benefit of a third party851. Furthermore, 
it is relevant to notice that the classification of donation as a liberality is a trend in southern 
                                                 
839
 The generic regulation of the law of donation is found in art 940 to 979 PCC. 
840
 As an example, see Art 618 of the Spanish Civil Code, art 931 of the French Civil Code, art 769 of the 
Italian Civil Code, art 475 of the Swiss Civil Code, art 628 of the Czech Civil Code, among others, while other 
countries decided to regulate donation in comprehensive statutes which perform the same function as a Civil 
Code, as a demonstration, see art 225 of the Bulgarian Obligations and Contracts Act, and art 479 of the 
Croatian Civil Obligations Act. 
841
 Art 9 n 1 PCC. 
842
 For more on the study of liberality in Portugal, see C F Almeida, Contratos III (2012) p 17; and C F Almeida, 
“Contratos de liberalidade: em especial os contratos para o uso de coisas corpóreas e incorpóreas” (2011) 
Estudos em Homenagem ao Prof. Doutor J. L. Saldanha Sanches, II, p 155. 
843
 C Almeida, Contratos III (2012). 
844
 In line with art 9 PCC. 
845
 Art 603 PCC and art 722 PCC. 
846
 Art 450 PCC. 
847
 Art 603 PCC. 
848
 Art 863 PCC. 
849
 Art 941 PCC. 
850
 Art 1701 PCC. 
851
 Art 1705 PCC. 
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European jurisdictions, where legal writers, with particular emphasis on those based in the 
French852 and Italian853 jurisdictions, place donation within this macro category as well. 
 
Liberalities may therefore be described as any juridical acts able to produce a gratuitous 
benefit (such as a gift or a legacy), which is legally protected and enforced under the law854, 
producing its effects either between living persons (inter vivos) or on the death of the granter 
of the benefit (mortis causa). Under the definition of donation presented above, as well as 
the express wording of the PCC, it may be argued that donation is one liberality among 
others in Portuguese law. The classification of donation as a liberality is important for 
interpretation purposes, considering that under Portuguese law, legal gaps in private law are 
filled by systematic interpretation of the law and by analogy855. Therefore, if a legal gap is 
found in the Portuguese law of donation, the rules which regulate other liberalities may be 
used by the courts to fill the relevant gap in the law of donation. 
 
4.3.2. Types of donation 
 
Different types of donation may be identified under Portuguese law of donation. This 
subsection is able to demonstrate that some of the types of donations, as identified through 
critical analysis of the PCC, exist with the primary scope of regulating family relationships. 
With regard to their primary concern with the regulation of donations made in a family 
context, the use of such rules in a market context must be subject to review, in order to assess 
if these family-orientated rules are fit to the purpose of also regulating donations in a market 
context. Different legal writers have grouped donations in different categories and times856. 
However, after a critical systematic review of the PCC, it is possible to argue that five types 
of donations exist under the PCC, and therefore will be subject to critical review below. 
These types are: (i) pure donations; (ii) conditional donations; (iii) remuneratory donations; 
(iv) donations in view of the wedding; and (v) donations between married parties/spouses. 
 
4.3.2.1.1. Pure donations 
                                                 
852
 M Planiol, G Ripert, Traité Théorique et pratique de droit civil français (2nd ed 1957) V, p 21. 
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 F Angeloni, Liberalità e solidarietà, contributo allo studio del volontariato (1994) p 16. 
854
 M Planiol, G Ripert, Traité Théorique et pratique de droit civil français (2nd ed 1957) V, p 21-22. 
855
 Art 10 PCC. 
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 C Goncalves, Dos Contratos em Especial (1953) p 203, among others. 
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Pure donations are those which are made with no conditions (or modo) being imposed on 
the donee. The purity of donation is a topic which has been regularly addressed by European 
legal writers857. The definition of a pure donation is closely followed by the definition of 
gratuity, and two main chains of thought are followed by Portuguese legal writers: (i) on one 
side are those who defend a “purity of principles”, and do not accept the classification of a 
juridical act as a donation if the donee is obliged to perform a counter performance to the 
benefit received858; (ii) on the other side are those who postulate that a donation does not 
lose its gratuitous essence if obligations are undertaken by the donee. One such case is Cunha 
Gonçalves859, according to whom a donation is pure when no recompense is requested from 
the donee, but other types of donation are also allowed under Portuguese law of donation860. 
These non-pure donations being those where the obligation emerging to the donee is not able 
to transform the contract of donation into an onerous contract, where (equal or similar) 
sacrifice is demanded to both parties. 
 
The debate on the level of purity required for a juridical act to be classified as a donation in 
Portugal is expressly resolved under article 963(1) PCC, where it is declared that obligations 
may arise to the donee from the contract of donation861. Due to the gratuitous essence of the 
contract of donation under Portuguese law, however, the donee will only be liable for the 
discharge of obligations up to the value of the benefit received862. Therefore, this “obligation 
imposed on the beneficiary”863, as it is defined under Portuguese law, must still be able to 
create a measurable benefit for the donee, i.e. it must still increase the donee’s patrimony by 
holding a right he did not hold before, or by being released from an obligation. If the 
obligation imposed on the donee has the same or higher value than the benefit received, then 
                                                 
857
 A Ferrão, Das doações segundo o Código Civil Português (1911) p 219; A Ascoli, Il Concetto della 
Donazione nel Diritto Romano con Richiami al Diritto Civile Italiano (1893) p 22; F C Savigny, Traité de 
Droit Romain (1943) p 290; M B Lopes, Das Doações (1970) p 18; M R P Ramalho, Sobre a Doação Modal 
(1990) O Direito, p 673-744; and J Varela, Ensaio sobre o Conceito de Modo (1955). 
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 G Moreira, Instituições do direito civil português (1925) II, p 579. 
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 C Goncalves, Dos Contratos em Especial (1953) p 203, who classifies donations under Portuguese law as: 
(i) pure, (ii) restricted, (iii) onerous, or (iv) remuneratory. 
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 C Goncalves, Dos Contratos em Especial (1953) p 203. 
861
 As may be observed in the following court decisions: Tribunal da Relação do Porto n 0633771 of 
14/09/2006; and Tribunal da Relação do Porto n 0230783 of 14/06/2002. 
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 Art 963 n 2 PCC. 
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 J Varela, Ensaio Sobre o Conceito de Modo (1955) p 4. 
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no real benefit is provided to the donee – on the contrary, the value of his patrimony remains 
unchanged or could even be decreased as result of the donation864.  
 
In addition, the principle of the freedom to contract865 allows the parties to agree on the 
creation of an obligation to the donee with no (economic/pecuniary) value, as long as this 
recompense corresponds to a legitimate and serious interest of the donor866. The serious 
interest of the donor is also protected under the law if it also corresponds to an interest of the 
donee. For example, if an uncle donates £1,000 to his 18-year-old nephew, where the 
contract of donation imposes an obligation to the nephew-donee to use the money to pay his 
tuition fees, this obligation pursues the interests of both: the uncle-donor (who wishes to pay 
a moral debt to his brother) and the nephew-donee (who wishes to graduate). 
 
 Conditional donations 
 
As mentioned above, obligations may be created for the donee under article 963(1) PCC, but 
the donee is only liable for their discharge up to the value of the benefit received867. 
Following this principle, if the obligation created to the donee consists in the payment of all 
or some of the donor’s debts, then the donee is only liable for the payment of debts existing 
at the moment when the donation was made. In the case of future debts, the donee is only 
liable for their payment if their pecuniary value is determined under the contract of 
donation868. The donor, his heirs, or any interested parties may demand the discharge of 
obligations undertaken by the donee in the contract of donation869. As an option, the donor 
or his heirs may request the resolution of the donation in court due to the failure of the donee 
to comply with the obligation undertaken in the contract of donation870. But it is also 
necessary to investigate what happens if a donation is given for a particular reason or motive, 
even if this donation does not impose a modo to the donee. The question then arises of 
whether the motive for donating should be taken into consideration, to assess the validity, or 
if the motivation is of little value after the contract has been concluded. In order to answer 
this question, it is necessary to separate (i) the motives why the contract was celebrated – or, 
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 Following A Ferrão, Das Doações segundo o Código Civil Português (1911) I, p 255. 
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 Art 396 PCC. 
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 M Palma Ramalho, “Sobre a Doação Modal” (1990) O Direito, p 689. 
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 Art 963 n 2 PCC. 
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in other words, what motivated the parties to enter into the contract and what the expected 
outcome was; from (ii) modo, or any duties imposed on the donee under the contract871. 
 
4.3.2.2.1. Relevance of the motive 
 
If the donee refuses to discharge the obligations undertaken in the contract of donation, it is 
clear under Portuguese law of donation that either the donor or his heirs may submit a claim 
to court, compelling the donee to discharge the obligation872. On the contrary, the frustration 
of the motives why the donation was entered into is not particularly regulated under 
Portuguese law of donation. It is therefore necessary to find the generic principle, applicable 
to all contracts including those of donation, to answer this question. Under the general 
principle set by article 251 PCC, mistake regarding the parties or the object of contracts 
allows the parties to request the court to declare the contract as void (anulável). However, 
under article 252 PCC, if the error refers to the motives which have contributed to the will 
of the parties to enter into the contract, then the contract may only be declared void if these 
motives have been expressly recognised as essential in the letter of the contract. 
 
In addition, because donation was classified as a liberality above, it may be argued that the 
rules applicable to other liberalities may be called, by analogy, to regulate the non-fulfilment 
of the motives/reason why the donation was made. This rule is found in article 1131 PCC, 
where it is stated that if a contract of comodatum does not specify how the benefit should be 
used, then the beneficiary may use it to any “lawful purposes within the normal function of 
things of the same nature”. It is easy to understand why the PCC has decided that motives 
are not, as a rule, relevant for the validity of contracts under Portuguese law: it aims to 
provide confidence to the contracting parties, in the sense that only essential motives, 
expressly recognised as such by all parties, are relevant for the unilateral revocability of the 
contract. Finally, it may be argued that this solution is useful, and one which is able to 
provide security to donations made in a market context. This is because of the security 
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provided to the parties, in that no hidden motives will compromise the validity of the contract 
of donation. 
 
In conclusion, only non-compliance with the obligations undertaken by the donee (modo) is 
expressly defined as a cause for unilateral revocability of the donation in the PCC873, a set 
of rules which will be reviewed in detail below. On the contrary, if the objective of the 
contract of donation is frustrated based on the motives why it was entered into by the donor, 
then it may only be declared void by the courts if the essentiality of the motive was expressly 
recognised by all parties874. The answer to this case would have been different if the error of 
the donor had related to the person of the donee or on the object of the donation, in which 
case, the contract of donation could be declared void by the courts875. 
 
4.3.2.2.2. Non-compliance of the donee with the modo 
 
As mentioned above, the PCC states that obligations may be imposed on the donee under 
the contract of donation876, allowing the donor to request from the donee a counter 
performance. The only limits to the counter performance (modo), are that it cannot be 
physically impossible, against the law or morally offensive877. But due to the fact that a 
donation aims to generate a gratuitous benefit to the donee, and that the modo only has an 
accessory position in the contract of donation878, the donee may only be compelled to 
discharge his obligations up to the value of the thing or right received879. For this reason, 
modo is often defined by legal writers in simple terms: as “an obligation imposed upon the 
beneficiary” of the donation880; or as a subtype of contract of donation which “is defined by 
imposing an accessory burden to the liberality received by the donee which, without being 
regarded as a counter performance, limits its value”881. 
 
Because article 963(2) PCC defines that the donee is only liable for a modo up to the value 
of the benefit received, it would be possible to argue for the need for a pecuniary value 
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attached to both, the benefits granted by a donation, and the modo given in return by the 
donee. This line of argument fails, however, considering that it collides with the principle of 
freedom of the parties to agree on the content of obligations (i.e. freedom of contract)882. For 
this reason, any “serious intent” of the donor may be imposed as a modo to the donee under 
Portuguese law of donation883, only limited by physical impossibility, illegality of the object 
or immorality884. 
 
It is important to mention at this stage that if the donee does not comply with the modo, the 
donor (his heirs or interested third parties885) may only enforce the obligation of the donee, 
and not revoke the donation based on this fact, unless otherwise expressly stated in the 
contract886. It is possible to argue that, by not granting the donee the right to revoke the 
donation based on the lack of compliance of the donee with the modo, the PCC respects the 
spirit of liberality of the donor. This is one of the cardinal elements of the contract of 
donation. Because the donor gave animus donandi, entering into a contract of donation for 
the benefit of the donee, he should not be allowed to go against his own actions by revoking 
the donation based on the future behaviour of the donee, unless this right is reserved by the 
donor. 
 
 Remuneratory donations 
 
A remuneratory donation is defined under the PCC as a donation which is motivated by 
“services received by the donor” for which payment cannot be enforced under the law887. 
This type of donation is further defined by legal writers as a donation entered into by a donor 
with no previous legal obligation to do so, but which is motivated by the moral duty of 
repayment of something granted to him in the past888. The motivation for these donations is 
therefore typical – they are motivated by a benefit received in the past by the donor, provided 
to him by the donee, which payment is not enforced under the law. But because no legal 
obligation exists, compelling the donor to give, the donor’s spirit of liberality (animus 
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donandi) is not deemed as tainted under Portuguese law of donation889. The classification of 
a donation as remuneratory has relevant legal consequences. As preliminary examples of 
these consequences, it is possible to find exceptions to the rules preventing doctors, nurses 
or priests from accepting donations from sick patients. These rules are disregarded if the 
donations are classified as “remuneratory donations for the payment of medical care or 
spiritual aid services”890. Another example is the rules on the revocation of donations, which 
are deemed as non-applicable if the relevant donation is defined as a remuneratory 
donation891. 
 
It is important to clarify that remuneratory donations are full donations under Portuguese 
law, and should not be confused with social gifts. The boundaries between the two concepts 
are elusive, but it is possible to argue that social gifts are never regulated under the law of 
donation, while remuneratory donations are true donations, motivated by a benefit received 
by the donor in the past, such as a donation. While social gifts are not motivated by a past 
enrichment of the donor, caused by the donee, remuneratory donations are always motivated 
by a past enrichment of the donor. Furthermore, and because the benefit received by the 
donor in the past did not generate any legal obligation to give, the donor now acts with an 
untainted animus donandi892. For this reason, a remuneratory donation may be described as 
a donation motivated by a past enrichment of the donor, caused by the donee, a motivation 
which is acknowledged as relevant by the law. 
 
 Donations in view of the wedding 
 
Donations “made to one of the partners, or both, in view of their wedding”893 are defined by 
the PCC as a separate type of donation. These donations are regulated, in particular, under 
articles 1753 and 1760 PCC and may be made by one of the spouses to the other, or by a 
third party, where one or both spouses receives a benefit under the contract of donation894. 
Donations in view of the wedding are therefore defined by a future event: the wedding of 
the donee. Unlike what happens to donations where other motives are essential for the 
formation of the will of the donor to donate, the effects of these donations are only produced 
                                                 
889
 M Palma Ramalho, “Sobre a Doação Modal” (1990) O Direito, p 689. 
890
 Art 953 PCC. 
891
 Art 970 and art 975 b) PCC. 
892
 M Palma Ramalho, “Sobre a Doação Modal” (1990) O Direito, p 689. 
893
 Art 1753 n 1 PCC. 
894
 Art 1754 PCC. 
177 
 
 
when wedding has occurred, unless expressly stated otherwise895. Donations in view of the 
wedding are therefore regulated by special rules, which have been introduced for historical 
reasons. These rules operate to protect the donor against a future frustration of the objectives 
of the donation: a benefit which is granted to the donee(s) in view of a new family being 
created. 
 
Furthermore, and due to the family-orientated considerations followed by the rules on 
donations in view of the wedding, an extra protection is given to the donor against the 
cancellation of the wedding (frustration of expectations), where the legal effects of these 
donations may also be suspended until the death of the donor896. The special regime followed 
by donations in view of the wedding also includes particular rules on the formalities to be 
followed for the validity of the donation: donations for the wedding must be included in the 
prenuptial agreement897. If this formality is not followed, the contract is deemed null and 
void if the effects are to be produced after the death of the donor, or fall under the generic 
category of donation898, if the effects are to be produced inter vivos899. 
 
Unless stated otherwise, the subject-matter of the donation between married parties always 
belongs to the donee alone, with disregard to the matrimonial regime of the couple900. They 
cannot be revoked by agreement of the parties – a reduction of the right to contract, created 
for the protection of a perceived weaker donee-spouse, who would otherwise agree to return 
what had been received by donation in view of the wedding901. Following a different 
objective of protecting a donee who donated in view of a marriage that never happened, and 
still in the pursuit of family-orientated policies, article 1760 PCC states that donations in 
view of the wedding expire within a year from the day when they were made if the marriage 
never occurs or has been declared void. The same occurs if the couple decides to separate or 
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wedding, where their effects are to be produced inter vivos, if they fail to comply with the formalities set under 
art 1756 n 1 PCC. 
900
 Art 1757 PCC. 
901
 Art 1758 PCC. 
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divorce and the donee is found as having the sole or main responsibility for the dissolution 
of the marriage902. 
 
 Donations between married parties/spouses903 
 
Donations between married parties (or spouses) are regulated under articles 1761 to 1766 
PCC. It may be argued that this type of donation is to be regarded as separate from donations 
in view of the marriage because (i) these donations occur after the wedding; (ii) they do not 
need to follow the formalities set under article 1756 PCC; and (iii) they are regulated 
separately in the PCC. The existence of this type of donation is also particularly relevant to 
the argument that Portuguese law of donation is still heavily influenced by family-related 
considerations. 
 
Particular rules apply to donations between spouses, with particular relevance to article 1762 
PCC, which declares void all donations between spouses married under a marital regime 
where their property is imperatively separated. All other donations between spouses are 
allowed if contracted by written document904 and reciprocal donations are forbidden when 
made in the same contract905. Again, aiming at protection of the weakest party, only rights 
solely held by the donor may be donated between spouses906, and the donor is permanently 
deprived of the benefit donated, with disregard to the matrimonial regime applicable907. 
 
As another example of how family-orientated policies have influenced Portuguese law of 
donation, special powers of revocation exist in the context of donations between spouses: 
the donor may revoke donations between married parties at any time and he may not abdicate 
this right908. Furthermore, only the donor is able to revoke the donation and no revocation 
rights are transferred to his heirs upon his death909. In addition to special powers of 
                                                 
902
 Art 1760 PCC. 
903
 Note: Doações entre casados are traditionally referred to in English as “donations between husband and 
wife”. Considering that the concept of marriage has been re-defined to comprise marriage between two people 
of the same sex, I have decided to translate doações entre casados as “donations between married parties” or 
“donations between spouses” instead. This name is also in line with the terminology adopted by the Marriage 
and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014. 
904
 The donation of moveable goods between married parties must adopt the written form even if possession of 
the good is immediately transferred to the donee (art 1763 n 1 PCC). 
905
 Art 1763 n 2 PCC, with the exceptions listed in art 1763 n 3 PCC. 
906
 Art 1764 n 1 PCC. 
907
 Art 1764 n 2 PCC. 
908
 Art 1765 n 1 PCC. 
909
 Art 1766 n 2 PCC. 
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revocation, donations between spouses expire in the following circumstances: (i) if the donee 
dies before the donor, except if the donation is confirmed by the donor in the three months 
following the death of the donee following the same formalities adopted by the donation910; 
(ii) if the marriage is declared null and void911; and (iii) if the donee is declared solely or 
mainly responsible for the divorce912. 
 
 Other accessory clauses 
 
Bearing in mind that the principle of freedom to contract allows the parties to change the 
contract of donation to better reflect their interests, they are granted the power to include 
accessory clauses to a contract of donation913. Some of these clauses are even listed under 
the PCC, due to their expected high use, but none of them exempts the contract of donation 
from being regulated under the law of donation. One such case is the reservation, by the 
donor, of the real right to use the subject-matter of the donation for himself or others914. 
Other examples include reservation of the right to dispose of the subject-matter of the 
donation. This clause must be registered at the public registrar, in order to produce effects to 
third parties, and cannot be transferred upon the death of the donor to his heirs915. This may 
also include the return of the object of donation to the donor where he survives the donee916. 
 
 Effects 
 
The critical review of the cardinal elements of donation above917 provided us with 
knowledge on the definition and boundaries of the juridical act qualified as a “donation” 
under Portuguese law. Based on this knowledge it is now necessary to consider what the 
consequences are of defining a juridical act as a “donation”, in order to understand the 
repercussions of qualifying a juridical act in the market as a “donation” in Portugal. Bearing 
                                                 
910
 Art 1766 n 1 (a) PCC and art 1766 n 2 PCC. 
911
 Art 1766 n 1 (b) PCC. 
912
 Art 1766 n 1 (c) PCC. 
913
 Following the principle of the freedom to contract, under art 405 PCC. 
914
 Under art 958 PCC, the donor is allowed to fragment the right of property, and to only transfer some of its 
components. 
915
 Art 959 PCC. 
916
 Art 960 PCC: the parties may agree that if the donee (or the donee and all his descendants) dies before the 
donor, what was donated returns to the donor. This clause must be registered to be used against third parties. 
If this happens, the subject-matter of the donation will return to the patrimony of the donor without any 
obligations that may have been attached to it by the donee (or his descendants) under art 961 PCC. 
917
 See above 4.2.1. Definition and cardinal elements of donation, p 139. 
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in mind the above, an investigation will be conducted in the present subsection of this 
chapter, in order to determine: (i) the legal effects produced by an act of donation in Portugal; 
(ii) the specific legal consequences for the parties brought by the law of donation; and (iii) 
the specific regulation brought by the law of donation for regulating a gratuitous relationship 
between the parties, which differs from the generic regulation of onerous contracts. 
 
4.4.1. Legal effects 
 
The essential legal effects of a contract of donation in Portugal are defined under article 954 
PCC as: (i) the transfer of the property, or otherwise transfer of the right/creation of the 
benefit to the donee; (ii) the creation of the obligation to deliver the subject-matter of the 
donation; and/or (iii)) the undertaking of an obligation by the donor, if this is the object of 
the contract of donation. Furthermore, the legal effects of a donation are produced 
immediately and upon completion of the contract918, creating a personal relationship 
between the parties, where the identity of the parties matters919. Bearing in mind that 
donation is a unilateral contract under Portuguese law of donation920, the relationship created 
between donor and donee may be conceptualised as two parties playing different roles. The 
donor is considered to be the active party, by granting a benefit or by undertaking an 
obligation, and the donee acts as the passive party, receiving the benefit without being 
obliged to correspondent payment. The consequences of these legal effects will be discussed 
below from each party’s perspective, considering that despite all the parties agreeing to the 
                                                 
918
 Art 949 n 2 PCC. 
919
 A Santos Justo, “A Doação no Direito Romano (Breve referência ao Direito Português)” (2001) Estudos em 
Homenagem a Cunha Rodrigues II, p 239. 
920
 C F Almeida, Contratos III (2012) p 23. 
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result and legal consequences of the contract of donation, each party assumes different 
positions and risks under the contract921. 
 
4.4.2. Legal consequences 
 
 Consequences to the donor 
 
The essential consequence to the donor under the contract of donation is the sacrifice of a 
portion or all of his patrimony922. Under article 948 PCC, which regulates the capacity of 
the donor, this sacrifice may be produced in all persons’ (legal or physical) patrimonies, 
because all persons are free to donate as long as they have the capacity to enter into contracts 
and to dispose of their rights923. Furthermore, the capacity of the donor to donate is 
determined at the time of the donation924 and legal representatives of persons deemed 
incapable of conducting their own business cannot donate on their behalf925. It is also worth 
mention that parents cannot donate on behalf of their children without consent of the court926. 
Beyond the capacity to donate, Portuguese law of donation aims to protect the personal 
connection established between donor and donee, as created by the contract of donation927. 
Following this objective, only the donor has the power to choose the donee, and he cannot 
allow other people to choose on his behalf or to determine the object of the donation928. Only 
one exception exists to this rule, where the donor may allow a third party to select, among a 
                                                 
921
 C F Almeida, Contratos III (2012); C F Almeida, “Contratos de liberalidade: em especial os contratos para 
o uso de coisas corpóreas e incorpóreas” (2011) in Estudos em Homenagem ao Prof. Doutor J. L. Saldanha 
Sanches, II. 
922
 As mentioned before, under art 940 PCC, one of donation’s cardinal elements in Portugal is the decrease of 
the donor’s patrimony, by disposing of one of his rights or by undertaking an obligation. 
923
 In what legal persons is concerned, they may only act, either gratuitously or in view of profit, within the 
boundaries set by their articles of incorporation (their “objecto social” or social object of the company) under 
art 6 of the Business Organisations Code, enacted by Decree Law n. 262/86 of 2 Septembe. 
924
 Art 949 n 1 PCC.  
925
 Art 949 n 2 PCC. 
926
 Art 1889 n 1 (a) PCC. However, parents represent their children when accepting donations on their behalf 
(art 1890 n 1 PCC). If they do not do so 30 days after receiving the offer, the children, their relatives, the public 
prosecutor or the donor may request to the court issue a deadline for the parents to accept the donation (art 
1890 n 2 PCC). If this deadline is not met by the parents, the donation is presumed accepted unless the court 
rules otherwise (art 1890 n 3 PCC). 
927
 For this reason, if the donee is the receiver of child/adult support (or any other maintenance obligations) 
and donates, the persons obliged to maintain the donee may refrain from doing so (art 2011 n 1 PCC). If this 
is the case, the obligation to provide support will, in some cases, be transferred to the donee and his heirs up to 
the value of the rights received by donation (art 2011 n 2 PCC). 
928
 Art 949 n 1 PCC. 
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previously determined group of people, who will be the donee, or how the object of donation 
will be distributed929. 
 
Under article 954 PCC, an obligation to deliver the subject-matter of the donation is imposed 
on the donor by the contract of donation. The discharge of this obligation is further regulated 
under the PCC, where it is defined that the subject-matter of the donation must be delivered 
in the state it was at the moment of the celebration of the contract of donation, and that all 
relevant parts, fruits and documents of the subject-matter of the donation (thing or a right) 
are comprised within the obligation to deliver930. Furthermore, and bearing in mind that a 
contract of donation immediately transfers/creates the rights to the donee or creates an 
obligation to the donor, delivery is perceived as of crucial relevance by the PCC. That is why 
the donor’s heirs cannot refuse to deliver the subject-matter of an otherwise void donation if 
the donation was confirmed by the donor or by them931. 
 
 Consequences to the donee 
 
The donation may benefit one or multiple donees. When a donation is made to more than 
one donee, the PCC presumes that the donation is made in the same proportion to all donees, 
and that they cannot benefit from the refusal of one or more of them to receive the benefit 
(unless stated otherwise)932. All (legal and physical) persons may receive benefits under a 
contract of donation, except when the law expressly forbids them to do so933. Acceptance is 
presumed of persons who are declared unfit to conduct their own business by the courts934. 
It is also worth mentioning that, in the case of unborn donees, acceptance is presumed under 
article 952 PCC if they are descendants of an identified person, who is alive at the moment 
of the offer, and the legal effects are produced immediately935. 
 
Aiming to protect vulnerable donors, the PCC provides that certain persons (such as doctors, 
nurses, priests or legal representatives) are forbidden from receiving donations based on their 
                                                 
929
 Art 949 n 1 PCC and art 2182 n 2 PCC. 
930
 Art 955 PCC. 
931
 Art 968 PCC. 
932
 Art 944 PCC and with the exception for the donation of the real right to use (usofruto). 
933
 Art 950 PCC. 
934
 Art 951 PCC. It is worth mention that non-pure donations (i.e. where a modo is demanded to the donee) are 
not presumed accepted, and must, therefore, be accepted by their legal representatives in order to produce legal 
effects. 
935
 Art 952 PCC is odd in its effects, considering that the effects of the donation are produced at the moment 
of the offer, i.e. the right is immediately transferred/given to the donee. However, the donee only received 
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personal relationship with the donor936. Other considerations connected with the family may 
also be found in the PCC, where if a donee marries a new person without respecting the 
waiting period, he or she loses all donations received from the previous partner937; or if the 
donation is made to a married person, only that person benefits from the donation938. In 
addition, and bearing in mind the protection of the donee, if a donation is made to an 
underage person, their parents cannot administer any benefits received by donation against 
the donor’s will or the donation may be made excluding the parents from administering the 
benefit received by donation939. 
 
4.4.3. Effects of a donating relationship 
 
The declaration of a bilateral juridical act as a donation in Portugal attracts different laws, 
such as the law of collation940, particular insolvency provisions941, and tax law942. However, 
because the present study aims to review the impact on the private relationship reached 
between parties by the declaration of a juridical act as a donation, only the contractual 
consequences of donation will be subject to critical review. The qualification of a bilateral 
juridical act as a donation bears three specific consequences: (i) the quality of the object is 
not as protected by the law as it is in respect of other juridical acts; (ii) specific rules regulate 
the non-compliance of the donee with the modo or any obligations undertaken by the donee; 
and (iii) revocation rights are provided to the donor, allowing, in some cases, one of the 
                                                 
juridical personality at the time of his birth (art 66 n 1 PCC). This means that the rights which are the object of 
the donation remain in limbo until the birth of the donee – they no longer belong to the donor, but have not yet 
been received by the donee either because he is still to acquire juridical personality. 
936
 Art 953 PCC. With the exception of remuneratory donations, able to be regarded as non-mandatory payment 
for services gratuitously received by the donor, under art 970 and art 975 b) PCC. 
937
 Art 1650 n 1 PCC. 
938
 Art 1729 n 1, art 1730 and art 1733 PCC. 
939
 Art 1888 n 1 (b) and (c) PCC. 
940
 Regulated under art 2104 to 2120 PCC. 
941
 Regulated under the Portuguese Code of Insolvency and Recuperation of Companies (Código da Insolvência 
e Recuperação de Empresas), enacted by Decree Law 53/2004 of 18 March. 
942
 As mentioned above, those who receive a gratuitous benefit under a contract of donation is required to 
declare it to the tax authorities and is, in principle, subject to payment of Stamp Duty (with the exceptions 
listed under art 6 Stamp Duty Code (enacted by Decree law 287/2003of 12 November). 
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parties unilaterally to revoke the contract. These three consequences will be critically 
reviewed below. 
 
 Quality of the object 
 
As mentioned above, the donor is not responsible for the obligations and limitations of the 
object of the donation, nor is the donor responsible for the malfunction of the subject-matter 
of the donation, unless he expressly undertook responsibility for the quality of the thing 
given to the donee or has proceeded with the intention to cause harm (dolus)943. On the 
contrary, after the contract of donation is concluded, the donor is only responsible for 
delivering the subject-matter of the donation in the same state as it was when the donation 
was accepted944. The burden of being liable for the malfunctioning or lack of quality of the 
subject-matter of the donation is therefore lifted from the donor and placed on the donee. To 
the donee a choice is given: he may either keep the object (and corresponding subject-matter) 
of the donation as it is, answering for any debts or liabilities it may bring attached to it, or 
he may request the annulment of the donation, motivated by the lack of quality of the 
object945. 
 
The low protection of the donee’s expectations on the quality of the object of donation may 
be explained by the gratuitous essence of donation: because donation is a gratuitous contract, 
where the donor is the only party withstanding a sacrifice, it would be unfair for the law to 
further extend such sacrifice. This can be compared with onerous contracts, regulated under 
the same section of the PCC946, with one such case being the contract of sale947. It is easy to 
argue that the protection conferred upon the quality of the object in a contract of sale is more 
comprehensive than the protection conferred upon a contract of donation948. On one side, 
while under a contract of donation the donee must receive the object of the contract as it was 
                                                 
943
 Art 957 n 2 PCC, under which the bona fide donee may request to the court the annulment of the contract 
of donation based on the lack of quality of the subject-matter of the donation. 
944
 Art 955 n 1 PCC. 
945
 Art 957 n 2 PCC. 
946
 Under Book II – The Law of Obligations, PCC. 
947
 Regulated in the same section of the PCC as donation, under art 874 to 930 PCC. 
948
 This comparison is conducted taking into consideration the regulation of private contracts under the PCC, 
and excludes contracts which may be classified as consumer contracts (regulated, among others, under Decree 
Law 84/2008 of 21 May, amending Decree Law 67/2003 of 8 April, which gives effect to Directive 1999/44/CE 
of 25 May regarding the sale of consumer goods) or commercial contracts (regulated under art 270, 367, 368, 
370, 469, 470, and 471 of the Portuguese Commercial Code (Código Comercial Português), enacted by the 
Letter of Law of 28 June 1888 and last amended by the Decree Law n. 62/2013 of 10 May. 
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at the time when the contract was entered into949, in a contract of sale, if no other guarantee 
is agreed in the contract, the buyer may request the repair or replacement of the purchased 
good within six months from purchase950. Furthermore, if the defect of the good is known 
after purchase but before delivery, the responsibility for the defect falls on the seller951. On 
the other side, in a contract of donation, the donor does not answer for the defects or 
limitations of the thing or right given by the donation, except if he has undertaken such 
responsibility or acted with dolus952. If any of these cases happen, the donee is only granted 
the right to require the annulment of the contact of donation to the courts953. It is therefore 
possible to argue that while the expectations of the buyer are protected by rights to 
replacement or reparation of the defaulted item, among others, the donee only holds the right 
to request the court to annul the donation. These differences, allow the conclusion that 
donation curbs the rights of the beneficiary in respect of the quality of the object concerned, 
when compared to onerous contracts under the PCC. 
 
 Limitation to the obligations undertaken by the donee 
 
A consideration or modo may be requested from the donee under article 963(1) PCC, 
however, and as stated above, in order for the contract of donation to remain “gratuitous”, 
the sacrifice must remain with the donor. The qualification of a juridical act as a donation in 
Portugal further demands the existence of a spirit of liberality, where the donor gives with 
the intention to benefit the donee, and not to benefit himself. Due to the accessory position 
of the modo in the contract of donation954, Portuguese law of donation has imposed a 
limitation on the discharge of obligations undertaken by the donee. The limitation is placed 
upon the discharge of the obligation, and not upon the undertaking of the obligation itself. 
In this sense, the donee may oblige himself to pay more than he is receiving, but the donee 
is never liable for the discharge of an obligation of a pecuniary value greater than the 
pecuniary value of the benefit received955. For the same reason, if the modo requested from 
the donee is the payment of all or some debts of the donor, the donee is only liable for the 
payment of debts existing at the time when the donation was made or up to a pre-determined 
                                                 
949
 Art 955 n 1 PCC. 
950
 Art 921 n 2 PCC. For sales under the PCC, and with disregard, for comparative purposes, of particular rules 
applicable to consumer contracts of sale or mercantile contract of sale, which are regulated outside of the PCC. 
951
 Art 918 PCC. 
952
 Art 957 n 1 PCC. 
953
 Art 957 n 2 PCC. 
954
 A Vaz Serra, “Responsabilidade patrimonial” (1958) Boletim do Ministério da Justiça, p 271. 
955
 Art 963 n 2 PCC. 
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pecuniary value for future debts956. It is therefore possible to conclude that the qualification 
of a juridical act as a donation limits the sacrifice asked from the donee. Because the donee 
is the only party regarded as the “beneficiary” of a contract of donation, his sacrifice can 
never be equal or superior to the sacrifice undertaken by the donor. On the contrary, he must 
always receive a benefit (by holding a right he did not hold before or by the removal of an 
obligation from his patrimony), which is more valuable or otherwise greater than any 
obligation undertaken by him. 
 
 Revocation 
 
The definition of a juridical act as a contract of donation under Portuguese law also provides 
revocation rights957 to the donee in case of ingratitude of the donee958. Article 974 PCC, and 
following, define the cases when a contract of donation may be revoked by the donor959 due 
to ingratitude of the donee960. With regard to the legal effects of revocation, the PCC defines 
                                                 
956
 Art 964 PCC. 
957
 The unilateral revocation by the donor used to be found, in the past, in other reasons, such as birth of new 
children of the donor, however, these rights were revoked in 1977 by Decree-law 496/77, of 25th November, 
which revoked art 971 PCC. 
958
 Art 970 PCC. Under art 975 PCC donation cannot be revoked by the donor (or his heirs) if it was made to 
in a wedding context (art 975 a PCC), if the donation is a remuneratory donation (art 975 (b) PCC) or of the 
donor has expressly forgiven the donee (art 975 (c) PCC). Under art 976 PCC revocation by the donor must be 
requested to court while the donee is alive. The donor’s heirs cannot start revocation proceedings, unless the 
donee has murdered the donor, in which case the donor’s heirs may start revocation proceedings up to one year 
after the death of the donor (art 976 n 3 PCC). The revocation proceedings must be brought to court within a 
year from the fact that legitimizes the revocation, or within a year from the moment when the donor has gained 
knowledge of this fact (art 976 n 1 PCC). In case of a court procedure started while the relevant party was 
alive, it continues and it is transferred to his heirs (art 976 n 2 PCC). 
959
 For comparison, please see the discussion on revocation above, at 3.2.5.1. 
960
 Under art 974 PCC, a right of revocation is granted to the donor when the donee becomes unable to inherit 
from the donor due to acts committed against him or when the donee has committed any acts justifying the 
disinheritance of the donee. Ingratitude of the donee is further defined under the Portuguese law of succession 
(art 2034 PCC, art 2036 PCC, art 2037 PCC, art 2038 PCC, and art 2166 PCC). Furthermore, under art 977 
PCC the donor cannot renounce the right of revocation emerging from ingratitude of the donee. Furthermore, 
under art 2034 PCC: “a) The condemned as author or accomplice to murder, even if not against the person 
whose estate or against your spouse, descendant, parent, adopter or adopted; b) convicted of slanderous 
denunciation or false testimony against the same people, for the crime that corresponds imprisonment of more 
than two years, whatever their nature; c) that through fraud or coercion induced the person whose estate to 
make, revoke or amend the will, or that stopped him; d) What fraudulently subtracted, hidden, crippled, he 
falsified or suppressed the will, before or after the death of the person whose estate or took advantage of some 
of these facts”; Art 2036 PCC: “The action for the indignity statement can be brought within two years from 
the opening of the succession, or within one year after either of condemnation for crimes that determine whether 
knowledge of the indignity of causes provided in c) and d) of Article 2034”; Art 2037 PCC: “After the 
declaration of indignity, the donation is regarded as non-existent, and the donee is regarded as a bad faith 
possessor of the subject-matter of the donation”; Art 2038 PCC: “1. The donor may expressly rehabilitate the 
donee by testament or deed. 2. Non-express rehabilitation is possible if at the time when the donation is made, 
the donation knows the fact leading to the declaration of indignity and still proceeds with the donation”; and 
art 2166 PCC: “Disinheritance happens when a) the donee has been convicted of a felony committed against 
the person, property or honour of the donor, or his spouse, or a descendant, parent, adopter or adopted, if the 
crime is punishable with six months or more of imprisonment; b) the donee is convicted of false testimony 
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that all effects produced by a donation will revert to the moment when the donor started 
court proceedings, aiming to revoke the donation961 and all goods must be returned to the 
donor (or his heirs) as they are in the present962. In this case, if the subject-matter of the 
donation is alienated by the donee or his heirs, the donor must be compensated in the same 
amount as the pecuniary value of the subject-matter at the moment when it was alienated 
(plus legal interests counting from the moment when court proceeding started)963. The rights 
acquired/held by third parties before the starting of the court proceedings are protected and 
will not be affected by the declaration of revocation of the donation964.  
 
 Regulation of market donations 
 
Donation is legally defined in Portugal as “contract by which a person, acting with a spirit 
of liberality, and with prejudice to his own patrimony, gives gratuitously an asset or a right, 
or undertakes an obligation, for the benefit of the counterparty”965. Therefore, donation may 
only emerge from one specific juridical act – contract of donation966 - where one of the 
parties benefits at the expense of the other. When this contract is entered into between family 
members, often motivated by strong feelings such as love or devotion, donation has the 
potential to impoverish the donor to a degree often unacceptable by the community. On the 
contrary, because the donee receives a benefit gratuitously, there is a chance of abuse by the 
donor, who may take advantage of a thankful donee. For this reason, Portuguese law of 
donation regulates the donating relationship with particular emphasis on donations 
motivated by strong feelings: those entered into between family members. As a 
demonstration, several provisions have been included in the law of donation in order to 
protect the family (as a whole, or family members in particular), such as those forbidding 
donations mortis causa967, which protect the heirs’ expectations against acts of the de cujus; 
                                                 
against the donor; and c) the donee has, without a good cause, refused to provide assistance to the donor or his 
spouse”. 
961
 Art 978 n 1 PCC. 
962
 Art 978 n 2 PCC. 
963
 Art 978 n 3 PCC. 
964
 Art 978 PCC. 
965
 Art 940 n 1. 
966
 The definition of a donation as a non-contractual juridical act in civil law jurisdictions is supported by a 
minority of legal writers, which write against the legal definition of donation on their relevant civil codes, one 
such case being Brazilian legal writer N Diogenes, A doação não é contato (1947) or the notes on Portuguese 
law of donation, when compared to Roman law, by A Santos Justo, “A Doação no Direito Romano, Breve 
referência ao Direito Português” (2001) Estudos em Homenagem a Cunha Rodrigues, II, p 238. 
967
 In particular rules regarding the ingratitude of the heir, which by action of art 974 of the PCC are directly 
applicable to donation. 
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the protection of vulnerable donors against those who may abuse a personal relationship with 
the donor968; the existence of a waiting period, which if not respected causes the loss of all 
donations received from their previous partner969; or the protection of the more vulnerable 
partner, by stating that if a donation is made to a married person, only that person benefits 
from the donation970. The existence of a special regime applicable to donations in view of 
the wedding971, or donations between married parties972, as well as the exclusion of socially 
relevant donations from being regulated under the law of donation973, demonstrates the 
interference of family-related considerations in the law of donation. 
 
These family-related considerations softened somewhat in 1977, when the provisions 
regulating the revocation of donation based on the birth of a new child to the donor were 
repealed974. In other words, Portuguese law of donation has taken a step towards the 
promotion of security in 1977 by making clear that no donations will be unilaterally revoked 
by the donor based on the birth of a new child975. But other rules, which may conflict with 
principles of security and confidence, still exist in Portuguese law of donation. These rules 
will be critically reviewed below in order to assess their suitability to regulate donations 
made in multiple contexts and in particular in a market context. This critical review will be 
conducted with the aim of assessing the security and confidence provided by Portuguese law 
of donation. It will begin by looking at the formalities demanded by Portuguese law of 
donation for the creation of a donation in Portugal, to be followed by assessment of the 
                                                 
968
 Art 953 PCC. 
969
 Art 1650 n 1 PCC. 
970
 Art 1729 n 1, art 1730 and art 1733 PCC. 
971
 Art 1753 PCC. 
972
 Art 1761 to 1766 PCC. 
973
 As mentioned before, Portuguese law of donation distinguishes between donations and gifts given following 
a social usage (donativos) under art 940 n 2 PCC. The firsts are regulated under the law of donation, while the 
second are not regulated under the law. This separation between what donations, which are regulated under the 
Law, and other gratuitous acts, which are not follows the idea that “acts of kindness” should not be regulated 
under the law because they are already (and/or should only be) regulated under other normative orders such as 
moral or religion. 
974
 Under Decree-Law n. 469/77 of 25th November, art 971, 972 and 973 PCC were revoked, and art 970 PCC 
was amended, in order to only allow the revocation of donation by unilateral act of the donor founded in the 
ingratitude of the donee. 
975
 A topic which is also covered in Chapter 3 Scotland, at 3.2.5. Pure donations and donations sub modo; and 
Chapter 5 France, at 5.5.1.2. Revocation. 
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protection of security and the expectations of the three parties affected by a donation: the 
donor, the donee and third parties. 
 
4.5.1. Formalities 
 
Article 947 PCC distinguishes between formalities to be followed by donations which 
transfer immoveable property rights and other donations. If the donation aims to transfer the 
property of an immoveable to the donee, this donation must take the form of a deed or be 
made in writing and the parties’ signatures must be authenticated976. If, however, the contract 
of donation aims to transfer the ownership of moveable goods, create or transfer any other 
rights or create an obligation on the donor, these donations may be adopted by 
physical/manual delivery and acceptance alone – as long as possession of the subject-matter 
of the donation passes to the donee - or, as an option977, may be adopted by private written 
document978. With regard to legal persons, they may donate and receive donations under 
Portuguese law, within the boundaries set by their articles of association979. However, if a 
donation is made to an association without legal personality, the donation is made to all the 
members of the association. The only exception is where the donor has decided that the 
donation will only produce effects if the association gains legal personality980. 
 
These formalities for the creation of a contract of donation are essential to the promotion of 
security, not only for the parties, who relied on the formalities followed by their counterparty 
to convey their will to donate/accept the donation, but also for the community at large, where 
third parties are able to trust that relevant rights were lawfully and definitively transferred or 
granted to the donee. Because formalities are able to create security and to demonstrate that 
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 Art 947 n 1 PCC. 
977
 Art 947 n 2 PCC. 
978
 Or when taking the form of a certified private document (under Decree-law 116/2008, of 4th July). 
979
 As mentioned above, companies may only act, either gratuitously or in view of profit, within the boundaries 
set by their articles of incorporation (their “objecto social” or social object of the company), as defined by art 
6 of the Business Organisations Code (Código das Sociedades Comerciais). 
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 Art 197 PCC. 
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the donee now holds a relevant right, third parties are able to enter securely into transactions 
connected to the right received by the donee without fear of future acts of the donor. 
 
4.5.2. Protection of the parties 
 
 Need for acceptance 
 
As mentioned before, donation is defined as a bilateral juridical act (a contract) under 
Portuguese law981, which means that the wills of both parties need to come together in order 
for a donation to be created. This also means that the celebration of a contract of donation is 
often regarded as the outcome of an offer made by the donor, followed by an acceptance of 
the donee, which combine to create a contract of donation982. The definition under 
Portuguese law of the formation of a contract, as an offer followed by an acceptance, has 
long been disputed by Portuguese legal writers983. These writers regard contracts as any 
agreement where the wills of the parties converge for the production of a relevant juridical 
effect984. Nevertheless, the PCC regards the formation of contracts as offer plus acceptance, 
and in the case of contracts of donation, the donor is free to revoke the offer to donate at any 
time985, as long as this revocation occurs before acceptance986. Bearing in mind that the offer 
made by the donor does not expire if no deadline for acceptance is set, acceptance is still 
needed for the creation of a contract of donation. It may be argued that the rule of need for 
acceptance is only tempered by a few exceptions, where acceptance is presumed by the 
law987, therefore creating a valid donation at the moment when the offer is known (or 
                                                 
981
 Art 940 n 1 PCC. 
982
 Following the wording of art 969 PCC and others in the PCC. 
983
 C Almeida, Contratos I (2015) Chap II. 
984
 For example, when a contract is entered into by a single act, where both parties participate, issuing only one 
join declaration, as happens in deeds and other written documents. 
985
 Art 969 PCC. 
986
 This particular rule is only applicable to contracts of donation, and goes against the generic rule on offers, 
comprised under art 230 n 1 PCC, where it is stated that “except if stated otherwise, the offer to contract is 
irrevocable after being received by the counterparty or after he gains knowledge of it”. 
987
 C Gonçalves, Dos Contratos em Especial (1953) 3, p 224; M Baptista Lopes, Das Doações (1970) p 10. 
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received) by the donee or his representatives. For example, it is possible to find donations 
made to adults lacking the capacity to contract988 or to unborn donees989. 
 
With regard to donations in a market context, and despite exceptions, the need for acceptance 
of the donee protects the donee from receiving benefits (or holding rights) without his 
consent. This protection is essential for the protection of donees against any responsibility 
created by the transfer of real rights to them (which include liability for damages caused by 
property, taxes or fees to be paid, among others). The need for acceptance is also relevant in 
respect of donations sub modo. Under Portuguese law of donation, a modo may be requested 
to the donee990, but the donee is only liable for the fulfilment of the consideration or modo 
up to the pecuniary value of the benefit received991. Furthermore, if the requested modo is 
the payment of all or some debts of the donor, the donee is only liable for the payment of 
debts existing at the time when the donation was made and the donee is only liable for the 
payment of future debts if its pecuniary value is determined at the time of the donation and 
it is specified in the contract of donation992. 
 
It is therefore possible to conclude that, in respect of donations in a market context, it is 
important for the donee to have the right to accept or refuse a donation, in particular those 
with a modo, and that this right is granted to the donee by Portuguese law of donation. This 
right is particularly relevant in donations which create obligations on the donee, considering 
that the donor, his heirs, or any interested parties may demand payment or discharge of any 
obligations undertaken by the donee in a contract of donation993. As an option, and only 
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 Art 951 PCC, where pure donations are presumed accepted and donations sub modo may only be accepted 
by their legal representatives. 
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 Under art 952 PCC, donations made to unborn donee are valid and presumed accepted if their parents are 
alive and determined at the time of the offer made by the donor.  
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 Art 963 n 1 PCC. 
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 Art 963 n 2 PCC. 
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 Art 964 PCC. 
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 Art 965 PCC. 
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when this right emerges from the contract of donation, the donor or his heirs may refer the 
resolution of the donation to court if the donee fails to comply with the modo994. 
 
 Revocation 
 
The rules on the revocation of donations are based on a personal relationship created between 
donor and donee995. It is therefore necessary to enquire if these rules, which apply to all 
contexts where donation is made, are fit for the regulation of a donation which is made in a 
market context. As mentioned above, article 974 PCC, and following, define the cases when 
a contract of donation may be revoked by the donor, due to the ingratitude of the donee996. 
When used by the donor, the donation will revert to the moment when the donor started court 
proceedings, aimed at revoking the donation997 and all goods must be returned to the donor 
(or his heirs) as they are in the present998. The uncertainty caused by granting unilateral rights 
of revocation to the donor is, however, tempered by the rules on remuneratory donations. 
The definition of a donation as remuneratory has consequences for the parties, one such case 
being donations made to doctors, nurses or priests by their patients, which may be validly 
accepted when classified as remuneratory for the payment of medical care or spiritual aid 
services999.  
 
As an example, when a donation is defined as remuneratory, and the object of the donation 
is the transfer of real rights that did not belong to the donor, the donation is not valid as a 
rule1000. It does, however, remain valid for a bona fides donee who received a remuneratory 
donation, meaning that the donor has the obligation to compensate the donee1001. The 
pecuniary value of the subject-matter of the donation will be taken into consideration when 
calculating the amount of damages to be paid to the donee when the donation is 
remuneratory1002. Remuneratory donations also have consequences for the parties in the case 
                                                 
994
 Art 966 PCC. 
995
 Art 949 PCC. 
996
 Under art 974 PCC, a right of revocation is granted to the donor when the donee becomes unable to inherit 
from the donor due to acts committed against him or when the donee has committed any acts justifying the 
disinheritance of the donee. Ingratitude of the donee is further defined under the Portuguese law of succession 
(art 2034 PCC, art 2036 PCC, art 2037 PCC, art 2038 PCC, and art 2166 PCC). Under art 977 PCC the donor 
cannot renounce the right of revocation emerging from ingratitude of the donee. 
997
 Art 978 n 1 PCC. 
998
 Art 978 n 2 PCC. 
999
 Art 953 PCC. 
1000
 Art 956 n 1 PCC. 
1001
 Art 956 n 2 (c) PCC. 
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 Art 956 n 3 PCC. 
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of revocation based on the ingratitude of the donee1003, where donations cannot be revoked 
by the donor (or his heirs) if classified as remuneratory1004. It may be argued that, in a market 
context, donations may often be considered to be remuneratory donations, in particular when 
donors thank the provision of gratuitous services with a donation. These donations are not 
based on a pre-existent obligation emerging from the gratuitous service received by the 
donor. On the contrary, it is freely made and, because it is classified as remuneratory1005, the 
donee has greater protection against unilateral revocation acts of the donor than he would 
have under another type of donation. 
 
 The value of the object 
 
Gino Gorla’s method provides a useful means of remaining within the boundaries of legal 
debate: “we must seek to ascertain whether the intent to obligate oneself (civil law) or that 
of giving a consideration (common law) in exchange for an impossible thing may be 
considered a serious intent, and if the interest of the creditor is worthy of legal 
protection”1006. The link between the economic value of the object and the legal protection 
given to the transaction (where transactions with a small economic value are often 
disregarded by the law, and labelled as legal bargains1007) does not have a direct impact on 
Portuguese law of donation. Donations are, in principle, protected under Portuguese law as 
long as they represent a legitimate interest of the parties1008. It may be argued that the 
protection conferred upon the parties in a market context must not be linked to the pecuniary 
or economic value of the benefit received by the donee and if a modo is required from the 
                                                 
1003
 Art 970 PCC. Ingratitude is defined under art 974 PCC as all cases when “the donee becomes unable to 
inherit from the donor due to acts committed against him or he has committed other acts justifying the 
disinheritance of the donee”. Under art 975 PCC, donation cannot be revoked by the donor (or his heirs) if it 
was made to in a wedding context (art 975 (a) PCC), if the donation is a remuneratory donation (art 975 (b) 
PCC) or of the donor has expressly forgiven the donee (art 975 (c) PCC). Under art 976 PCC, revocation by 
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977 PCC, the donor cannot renounce on the right of revocation emerging from ingratitude of the donee. 
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 Art 975 (b) PCC. 
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 Art 941 PCC. 
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 G Gorla, “The Theory of Object of Contract in Civil Law: A critical analysis by means of the comparative 
method” (1953-1954) Tulane Law Review, p 457. 
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Common law jurisdictions, H E Willis, “Rationale of Bargain Consideration” (1938) Georgetown Law Review, 
p 414-423. 
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 M Palma Ramalho, “Sobre a Doação Modal” (1990) O Direito, p 730. 
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donee, this modo is enforceable if representing a legitimate interest of the donor. But it is 
also necessary to notice that the modo may only be demanded from the donee, up to the 
pecuniary value of the benefit received1009. This limit represents an important protection for 
the donee, considering the importance of the pecuniary value of transactions in a market 
context. 
 
 Samples and small gifts  
 
As mentioned above, a doubt exists under Portuguese law of donation as to how to classify 
a gratuitous juridical act entered into in accordance with social usage: should it be regulated 
under the law of donation, or should it qualify as a gift (dádiva), where no legal regulation 
would apply to this gratuitous act? These gifts, which elude the law, are defined by their 
social expectation (usos sociais)1010. Different acts have been classified by the Portuguese 
courts as gifts (dádivas), such as small gifts for the promotion of sales, rewards to employees 
and small gifts to charities or beggars1011. But leaving aside the qualification of an 
agreement, even if gratuitous, to the casuistic assessment of the courts1012, creates a high 
degree of uncertainty, in particular in a market context. Bearing in mind that Portugal is a 
civil law country, and court decisions do not create a precedent1013, it is possible to argue 
that this would create uncertainty and insecurity, in particular with regard to non-Portuguese 
market players, who are not used to the Portuguese cultural and social norms of the 
Portuguese community. This security is therefore particularly relevant in an EU single 
market context. Although it is possible to argue that the rules on objective product liability 
of the producer1014 balance the lack of regulation provided to gifts made according to social 
usage1015, it is also important to notice that these rules fail to regulate the full extent of the 
relationship created between the parties1016. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the 
existence of a subjective criterion for the disqualification of a gratuitous act as a donation 
under Portuguese law, based on social usage, creates an uncertainty which is contrary to the 
principles of security in the market. It would be more appropriate to classify any transaction 
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 Art 963 n 2 PCC. 
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 Art 940 n 2 PCC. 
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 Decision of the Portuguese Supreme Court n 2380/05.2TBOER.S1, of 27/01/2010. 
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 Portugal is a civil law country, and therefore, court decisions do not create precedent. Art 1 PCC. 
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 Art 1 and 4 PCC. 
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 Decree Law 131/2001 of 24 April, which transposes Directive 1999/34/CE of 10 May and Decree Law 
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1015
 Art 940 n 2 PCC. 
1016
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occurring in the market as a donation. This would provide security to all parties involved in 
the gratuitous transaction, as well as granting to the beneficiary the, albeit limited, protection 
granted by the law of donation to the quality of the object, among others. 
 
4.5.3. Protection of third parties 
 
On one side, third parties may be defined as those parties which are potentially affected by 
the donation (such as the creditors of the donor/donee or the potential heirs of the donor). As 
mentioned above, donations are revocable under article 970 PCC. These revocation rights 
may potentially affect rights and expectations of third parties, who interact with the donee 
in a market context1017. If a donation is revoked, all effects produced by the relevant donation 
will revert to the moment when the donor started court proceedings1018 and all benefits must 
be returned to the donor or his heirs in its present state1019. Revocation rights granted to the 
donor do not, as a rule, affect third parties’ rights, if any donated rights are then further 
alienated by the donee or his heirs. In this case, the donee (or his heirs) must compensate the 
donor to the same pecuniary value as the rights had at the time when they were alienated (or 
at the time when returning the rights became impossible) plus legal interest counting from 
the moment when court proceedings began1020. The rights acquired/held by third parties 
before the beginning of the court proceedings are not affected by the declaration of 
revocation of the donation, therefore remaining in the patrimony of the relevant third 
parties1021. 
 
4.5.4. Protection of the community 
 
 Remuneratory donations 
 
The community may be conceptualised, for the present purposes, as the group of people 
subject to a relevant law of donation, and which is, therefore, directly affected by it. It may 
be argued that the existence of specific regulations guiding remuneratory donations are good 
for the increase of security in donations made in a market context as they protect donations 
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 Either by receiving the relevant right by subsequent donation or by onerous juridical act, or by expecting 
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 Art 978 PCC. 
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 Art 978 n 2 PCC. 
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 Art 978 n 3 PCC. 
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made as non-mandatory payment of services received by the donor. This protection is 
conferred against acts of unilateral revocation by the donee. It should be noted that it is also 
possible to assign any rights received by donation in Portugal, a faculty which promotes 
efficiency in the market context, and facilitates the circulation of property in both, the 
internal and in the European Common Market1022. However, donations made in a market 
context raise issues such as the security of those who enter into market transactions and 
confidence that the quality of what was received complies with the quality stated in the 
contract. 
 
 Safety and quality of the subject-matter 
 
The quality of the object and subject-matter of donation is regulated under article 957 PCC. 
Under the PCC, the donor is not responsible for the obligations or limitations of the rights 
donated, nor is he responsible for the defects of the subject-matter of the donation. From a 
safety perspective, this means that, as a rule, the donor is not responsible for the defects or 
harm caused by the subject-matter of the gift to the done. Nor, from the perspective of the 
quality of the object of the donation, is the donor responsible for obligations which are 
attached to the object of the donation – these pass, along with the relevant right, to the donee. 
Furthermore, the donor is not responsible for the malfunction of the subject-matter of the 
donation. If the donor is the producer of the good, then he may be found liable under Decree-
law 383/89, as amended, which has transposed the Council Directive 85/374/EEC into the 
Portuguese jurisdiction. This objective liability for any harm caused by a faulty good is only 
undertaken by the donor, under Article 2 if the donor is also the manufacturer of the finished 
product, the producer of any raw material or the manufacturer of a component part. If any 
person who, by putting his name, trade mark or other distinguishing feature on the product 
presents himself as its producer or if he has imported the product into the EU in view of 
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profit; or if he is the supplier of the product cannot be named, then the donor is also liable 
under Decree-law 383/89. 
 
This lack of responsibility of the donor, under the PCC, for any harm caused by the subject-
matter of the donation, or its malfunctioning, contrasts with the above-mentioned objective 
responsibility of producers for faulty items1023, or the responsibility of producers and sellers 
in consumer contracts1024. In fact, under the PCC, a donor is only responsible for the quality 
and safety of the subject-matter of the donation if he undertook responsibility for the goods 
donated in the contract of donation, or if he donated with dolus, therefore aiming to use the 
donation do harm to the donee or others1025. It may therefore be argued that the absence of 
rules on product liability applicable to donations compromises the fitness of Portuguese law 
of donation, in its current form, for the purpose of regulating donations made in a market 
context. 
  
 Interim conclusion 
 
Donation as a contract. It is possible to conclude that a donation is defined as a contract 
under Portuguese law of donation, which always comprises the following cardinal elements: 
(i) it is a bilateral juridical act: donation is always defined as a contract under Portuguese 
law; (ii) made with a spirit of liberality, often defined as animus donandi; (iii) causing 
sacrifice to the donor, who must see his patrimony reduced after the donation; (iv) and 
benefiting the donee; (v) in a gratuitous manner, which is defined by the lack of 
correspondent benefit being provided to the donor by the donee; and finally, (vi) being a 
contract where the provision of the benefit is made inter vivos, meaning that all effects of 
the donation must be produced while both contracting parties are alive. 
 
Legal effects of donation. Under Portuguese law of donation, several typical effects are 
produced by a contract of donation, those being; (i) the transfer of the property, or otherwise 
transfer of the right/creation of the benefit to the donee; (ii) the creation of the obligation to 
deliver the subject-matter of the donation; and/or (iii) the undertaking of an obligation by 
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 As mentioned above the rules on Objective Product Liability are found in Portugal under Decree Law 
131/2001 of 24 April. 
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 As mentioned above, the quality of the object in consumer contracts is regulated under Decree Law 84/2008 
of 21 May, as amended by Decree Law 67/2003 of 8 April. 
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the donor, if this is the object of the contract of donation. Furthermore, different types of 
donation exist under Portuguese law of donation, a distinction between types of donation 
with consequences, in particular in respect of the protection of the donee against revocation 
rights.1026.  
 
Fitness for purpose. Among others, the need for acceptance and the protection against 
revocation rights for remuneratory donations have been identified as able to protect 
donations in the market. In particular, the need for acceptance protects against insecurity 
caused by otherwise legally binding unilateral acts of the donor. However, the existence of 
legal powers of revocation may cause distrust and disturb confidence in the market – because 
donations which are valid may be unilaterally revoked by the donor. The biggest problems, 
however, faced by donations made in a market context in Portugal are those connected with 
the safety and quality of the subject-matter of the contract. In that context, a donor is only 
responsible for the quality and safety of the subject-matter of the donation if he undertook 
responsibility for the goods in the contract of donation, or if he donated with dolus, 
intentionally causing harm to the donee or others1027. The absence of rules on product quality 
and liability applicable to donations made particularly in a market context compromises the 
fitness of Portuguese law to regulate donations made in a market context. Finally, it is also 
important to mention that the exclusion of social gifts from being regulated under the law of 
donation opens the door for the definition of samples or other small gifts given in view of 
the profit as donativos. The exclusion of these gifts from being regulated by the law, and 
leaving it to be regulated by religious or moral norms, is not suitable for a market logic, in 
particular when considering the European Common Market, where parties from different 
religions, cultures or backgrounds interact with each other. The relationship of these parties 
should not be regulated by Portuguese social norms because these norms are unknown to 
foreign parties. On the contrary, these gratuitous transactions should be regulated under the 
law, a set of rules which promotes equality and bring security to the market. 
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 These types are: (i) pure donations; (ii) conditional donations; (iii) remuneratory donations; (iv) donations 
in view of the wedding; and (v) donations between married parties/spouses. 
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 Art 957 n 2 PCC. In this particular cases, the bona fide donees may request to court the annulment of the 
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 France 
 
 Introduction 
 
The present chapter will shed light on the French law of donation with the objective of 
assessing its suitability to regulate donations made in a market context. This critical review 
of the French law of donation will have as its main focus the regulation of donation found in 
the French Civil Code (“FCC”), which will be studied together with the review of relevant 
legal writings on donation and relevant decisions of the French courts, aiming the assessment 
of the fitness of French law of donation to regulate donations in the market. The assessment 
of the fitness for purpose of French law of donation will analyse if the need for security and 
the promotion of confidence are overshadowed by family-related policies in France or if, on 
the contrary, any family considerations undertaken by the French law of donation are also 
suitable to regulate gratuitous juridical acts (in particular donations) in the market context. 
 
This chapter is the last of three chapters which aim to review different European laws of 
donation, with the objective of using them as case studies of how donations made in a market 
context are being regulated in Europe. The critical review of French law will primarily rely 
on the critical analysis of literature and philosophical ideas of French writers, considering 
that these sources are the most suitable to provide a better understanding of French law of 
donation as it is today. This study builds on the increase of commercial exchanges between 
European countries, an area which is regarded as key to a prosperous EU1028. The present 
chapter is therefore relevant to the overall thesis because it investigates the suitability of 
French literature and philosophical ideas to influence the legal regulation of donations in the 
market context. 
 
 Placement of donation in French private law 
 
5.2.1. The French writers’ perspective 
 
French literature and philosophical ideas have an important impact on the development of 
law in Europe. It is therefore important to understand which philosophical ideas have 
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contributed to the concept of donation as it is today in France. French legal writers who are 
devoted to the study of donation may be divided into two groups: those who distrust 
gratuitous juridical acts, and those who regard gratuitous juridical acts as normal acts, i.e. 
acts of everyday life. The first group of legal writers is composed of those who distrust 
donation1029, while the second group of legal writers regard gratuitous juridical acts in 
general, and donation in particular, as one of the most common instruments provided by the 
law to circulate property1030. The debate between these two factions can be used to 
demonstrate the existence of a prejudice against donation in France, which has often led to 
the creation of rules which are intended to protect the donor, his family and his creditors.  
 
The existence of a prejudice against donation has the effect of creating policies wishing to 
undermine what is perceived as an unbalanced relationship. By looking at the parties as not 
equals, the French law of donation provides the donor (his family and his creditors) with 
rights aimed at protecting the donor from his own acts or these other parties from the donee, 
who is here regarded as in a privileged position1031 because he has received a benefit 
gratuitously. One such case is the right to revocation1032, which as will be critically reviewed 
below, provides the donor with the right to unilaterally revoke donation under certain 
circumstances1033. 
 
Legal writers who regard gratuitous acts as suspicious tend to describe donation as the 
manifestation of an act of love1034. Guided by strong feelings, the actions of the donor are 
regarded as out of his control, therefore producing abnormal results: a gratuitous (juridical) 
act is produced, often economically impoverishing the donor. This willing impoverishment 
of the donor is classified as abnormal, because such legal writers do not understand why 
someone, in his right mind, would want to benefit another when such an act has no 
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 P Malaurie, Les successions, Les Libéralités (5th ed 2012); A Foubert, Le don en droit (2007); D Guével, 
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délits ou injures graves ; 3° S'il lui refuse des aliments.” 
1034
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correspondent (legal or economic) benefit for the donor. Benefiting other(s) with no 
correspondent gain for the benefactor happens, according to this faction of legal writers, for 
one main reason: the will of the donor is not free, but formed under the influence of 
“benevolence”, “illusions produced by one’s self-esteem”, the “seductions of the passion”, 
or “obsession”1035. The presumption that donations are always connected to powerful 
feelings explains why many legal writers1036 define donation as abnormal1037, “dangerous, 
suspicious and fragile”1038. For these writers, the main danger of a donation is, therefore, the 
lack of self-control of the donor. Because he is acting upon very strong feelings, his actions 
are not entirely free, measured and rational. 
 
Arguments for the qualification of donation as “abnormal”, “dangerous”, and “suspicious” 
must therefore be reviewed in order for us to better understand the underlying prejudice of 
French legal writers towards donation. This analysis will cover several French legal writers, 
as well as Henri de Page, a Belgian jurist, judge and university professor, widely known by 
his 13-volume Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge (1950), the leading textbook on Belgian 
civil law1039, due to his notorious influence on the subjects of liberalities, donation and 
contract law in continental Europe in general, and in France in particular1040. Among the 
several French legal writers reviewed below, the teachings of Didier Guével, a contemporary 
French jurist and university professor1041, will be critically reviewed in particular, because 
of his influence in the most recent doctoral thesis and writings on succession and donations 
in France1042. 
                                                 
1035
 M Colin, “Etude de jurisprudence et de législation sur les dons manuels“, Revue pratique de droit français 
(1833) p 194: "Lorsqu’il donne, en effet, l’homme ne cède pas toujours seulement aux « entraînements d’un 
bon cœur », [mais aussi aux] « illusions de l’amour propre », aux « séductions des passions », et aux 
« obsessions » des gens intéressés". 
1036
 P Malaurie, Les successions, Les Libéralités (5th ed 2012) p 146: "Les libéralités exercent un rôle social 
très particulier, car étant à titre gratuit, elles ne sont pas, à la différence des actes à titre onéreux, muées par la 
recherche du profit.” ; J Levy, A Castaldo, Précis d’Histoire du droit civil (2002); A Foubert, Le don en droit 
(2007); D Guével, Droit des sucessions et des libéralités (2nd ed 2010); G Pacilly, Le Don Manuel (1936); P 
Delnoy, Les libéralités et les successions, Précis de droit civil (3rd ed 2010); D Guével, “La gratuite intéressée: 
oxymore d’avenir ?", Mélanges en l’honneur du professeur F. Goubeaux (2009) p 229 ; and C M Mazzoni, 
“Le don, c’est le drame. Le don anonyme et le don despotique“, RTD civ. (2004) p 701. 
1037 A Foubert, Le don en droit (2007) p 4. 
1038
 J Levy, A Castaldo, Précis d’Histoire du droit civil (2002) p 1245. 
1039
 E Holthöfer, "De Page, Henri" (2nd ed 2001) Juristen: ein biographisches Lexikon, p 163. 
1040
 Henri de Page is widely quoted by European lawyers writing about liberalities, donation and contract law, 
one such case is A Foubert, Le don en droit (2007). 
1041
 In particular, D Guével, Droit des sucessions et des libéralités (2nd ed 2010); D Guével, “La gratuite 
intéressée: oxymore d’avenir ?" (2009) Mélanges en l’honneur du professeur F. Goubeaux. 
1042
 See as examples: A Foubert, Le don en droit (2007); N Peterka, Les Dons Manuels (1999); C Larroumet, 
Droit Civil, Les Obligations, le Contrat (5th ed 2003) III; P Malaurie, L Aynes, P Gautier, Les contrats spéciaux 
(5th ed 2011); or M Grimaldi (e), Droit Patrimonial de la Famille (2011). 
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 Abnormal 
 
Gratuitous juridical acts in general, and donations in particular, are classified as “abnormal” 
by French legal writers who presume that all interventions in the market / society are made 
for the purpose of economic profit. To clarify their views on the abnormality of donation, it 
is common for those legal writers to define donations as acts which are (only) performed 
and/or expected within the family – i.e. only people with a common genetic heritage or 
linked by emotional bonds would enter into gratuitous agreements. One such case is Henri 
de Page1043, who states that donations are dangerous and abnormal, after considering that a 
“pure” donation contradicts what he sees as “normal” in a typical social relationship. De 
Page further explains that a “liberality is inspired by other reasons [which are not 
benevolent], and is based on a will which is not the will to donate. It is nothing but a way” 
to achieve something else1044. 
 
Because donations are not deemed as “normal” in the social context, they are even less 
expected in a market context and, for this reason, De Page claims donations to be an 
“extremely rare act”1045. Bearing in mind the potential abnormality of donations, Henri de 
Page further states that “on the other side, even if a liberality is found in its pure form, i.e., 
it is only inspired by the will of the donor to gratify the donee, the liberality represents great 
danger”, and therefore protection needs to be conferred upon (a) the donor himself; (b) his 
family; and (c) his creditors1046. A donation is therefore defined by De Page as abnormal 
because, in his view, donation is mainly a way to achieve something else – a vehicle for non-
obvious intentions leading to unpredictable consequences. If the donor does not expect to 
achieve an objective, solely wishing to reward a donee for something he did, this is also 
regarded as distant from legal and social normality, in particular in the market context: the 
donor is impoverishing himself without previous legal obligation to do so. For this reason, 
                                                 
1043
 H De Page, Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge (3rd ed 1962) I, p 55. 
1044
 H De Page, Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge (3rd ed 1962) I, p 56: “[…] la libéralité s’inspire d’autres 
mobiles et, partant d’une autre cause que la volonté de donner. Elle n’est qu’un moyen total ou partiel d’arriver 
à un autre but, en telle sorte que l’acte subit parfois par rapport à sa justification apparente, une véritable 
déformation”. 
1045
 H De Page, Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge (3rd ed 1962) I, p 55. 
1046
 H De Page, Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge (3rd ed 1962) I, p 56: “D’autre part, même lorsqu’elle se 
rencontre à l’état pur, c’est-à-dire lorsqu’elle s’inspire uniquement de la volonté de donner, de gratifier, la 
libéralité présente de graves dangers; et ce à un triple point de vue : au point de vue de l’individu lui-même, 
tout d’abord ; au point de vue de sa famille, ensuite ; au point de vue de ses créanciers, enfin.” 
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it is possible to argue that “legal normality” is disturbed by non-legal normative orders, 
which compel the donor to donate as a moral reward for an action or inaction of the donee.  
 
Consequently, it may be argued that De Page disregards the essential interaction between 
law and society, where law brings security and empowers individuals in their social 
interaction with others. Furthermore, donation should not be regarded as an abnormal act. 
On the contrary, donation is available to all, legal and individual people, considering that 
they all hold rights which may be disposed or used to create a gratuitous benefit for 
another(s). This act of everyday life happens on a regular basis, with everyone potentially 
being in the position of benefactor and beneficiary: tipping; tasting a sample; 
giving/receiving a birthday present, among many other examples emerging from everyday 
life. As a consequence of their constant presence in all persons’ lives, gratuitous acts in 
general, and donations in particular, cannot be classified as abnormal. On the contrary, 
donations are normal acts of life in society. 
 
 Dangerous 
 
Donations are regarded as dangerous due to the belief that no individual acts freely when 
acting under the influence of strong emotions. This assumption explains why the 
enforcement of donations is not well regarded by some legal writers1047, who consider 
donations as the outcome of morally/culturally enforced actions. The immediate response to 
this viewpoint, however, is that the law exists to serve moral and social-economic interests. 
It is also worth mentioning that, to some legal writers, the danger lies in the impoverishment 
of the donor. Such impoverishment may lead to harmful consequences, both present and 
future, to the donor himself, his creditors and his family (heirs)1048. The impoverishment of 
the donor which is caused by a donation is even classified as “threats to the public order”1049 
and peace, being described by Pacilly as capable of disrupting a “desired” stability and 
confidence of all legal actors in the social status quo1050. The above authors justify this 
assertion by regarding donation as disruptive for life in society, due to its potential to cause 
social change: a wealthy family may be left to starve, while another family, or some of its 
                                                 
1047
 M Colin, “Etude de jurisprudence et de législation sur les dons manuels“ (1833) Revue pratique de droit 
français, p 194. 
1048
 G Pacilly, Le Don Manuel (1936). 
1049
 G Pacilly, Le Don Manuel (1936) p 7. 
1050
 G Pacilly, Le Don Manuel (1936) p 7. 
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family members, may enrich. This fluctuation of property is argued to cause social 
disruption, by changing the balance of power between individuals in a community, an idea 
which is disputed in the present thesis. 
 
The main issue signposted by these French legal writers who regard donation as dangerous 
is the concern that it may be used by the donor to alienate a portion, or all, of his property. 
By no longer holding a substantial amount of property rights, the donor may undermine the 
expectations of his heirs and creditors. Departing from this view, it is possible to argue that 
classifying donations as dangerous, in order to protect non-legally enforceable expectations 
(of future gratuitous benefits or the expectations of ill-informed third parties), shows an 
excessively paternalistic view of life in society. The law is and should be used to defend 
public order and social stability, however, the law cannot be used to stop the transfer of 
patrimony between willing parties unless this transfer prejudices a right or an otherwise 
legally protected expectation. 
 
 Suspicious 
 
Didier Guével further considers donations to be suspicious. This view is based on the nature 
of donation, which is defined by Guével as syncretic and contradictory1051. In this lawyer’s 
perspective, donations may lead to a more harmonious and altruistic society, but may also 
allow the donor to assume an undesirable position of dominance towards the donee. This 
contradictory nature of donation is reflected by legal and non-legal literature, where two 
contradictory conceptualisations of donation are presented: (a) the idea of a “poisonous gift”, 
being portrayed in some of the most relevant literary novels of our time such as the Trojan 
horse1052, or the Sleeping beauty1053; and (b) the idea of an “altruistic gift”, which is aimed 
at helping others1054. 
 
Guéval starts by recognising the “undeniable” positive repercussions that donations have on 
(French) society. But he departs from an idea of necessary reciprocal gifts, as postulated by 
the doctrine of sociologist Marcel Mauss1055. In Mauss’ perspective, a collective exchange 
                                                 
1051
 D Guével, Droit des sucessions et des libéralités (2nd ed 2010) p 26. 
1052 Homer (8th century B.C.) Odyssey (2010), Deborah Steiner (ed.), XVII-XVIII, p xi-242. 
1053
 C Perrault, ”La Belle au bois dormant” (1697). 
1054
 “No one is useless in this world who lightens the burdens of another”, commonly attributed to Charles 
Dickens. 
1055
 M Mauss, “Essai sur le don”, l'Année Sociologique (1923-1924) p 2. 
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of gifts is produced due to a sense of pre-existent obligation, also described as a “community 
service”1056. Mauss further emphasises the importance of the gift-giving phenomenon not 
only for the individual, but also for collectives and communities in particular1057. Guével 
explains that while donations have positive effects, they also carry many risks. The first risk 
presented by this legal writer is the danger of an escalation in the pecuniary value of 
reciprocal donations – the “chain” of donations established might lead to the “ruin” of the 
donor, caused by an excessive impoverishment of his patrimony1058. The second risk is 
caused by the potential use of donations by the donor in order to humiliate others, who, in 
certain circumstances, may be too poor to reciprocate the “favour”. This situation would be, 
according to Guével, (morally) wrong and therefore unacceptable1059. Based on these 
arguments, Guével argues for the distrust in donations, which may be recognised, under his 
view, in Roman law, ancient European law, customary French law, and the French Civil 
Code alike1060. 
 
5.2.2. The call for protection 
 
Regarded with suspicion1061, donation is addressed by a substantial body of French legal 
writers as a legal institution which, due to the fears demonstrated above, must be regulated 
by the law1062. The claim for a substantial regulation of donation is particularly aimed at the 
protection of the community against the alleged “hazard” of donation. As a rule, the French 
legal system uses the law of donation in order to protect those who are potential victims of 
the legal effects of donation. The potential victims are the donor himself, his family, and his 
creditors. Understanding what conceptions have contributed to the shaping of the law of 
donation in the past will help us to better understand the present French law of donation. The 
consequences of the suspicions towards donation raised by French legal writers in the past 
will therefore be further reviewed below. This will lead to greater understanding of whether 
the consequences of a heavy set of rules designed to respond to non-market related fears 
                                                 
1056
 C Hann, K Hart, Economic Anthropology: History, Ethnography, Critique (2011) p 50. 
1057
 M Mauss, “Essai sur le don”, l'Année Sociologique (1923-1924) p 2. 
1058
 D Guével, Droit des sucessions et des libéralités (2nd ed 2010) p 27. 
1059
 D Guével, Droit des sucessions et des libéralités (2nd ed 2010) p 27. 
1060
 D Guével, Droit des sucessions et des libéralités (2nd ed 2010) p 27: "Tout cela explique la méfiance du 
droit à l’égard de la donation : méfiance du droit romain, de l’Ancien droit, du Droit intermédiaire (…) et du 
Code civil". 
1061
 As a demonstration, see A Seriaux, Manuel de droit des successions et des libéralités (2003) p 11. 
1062
 D Guével, “La gratuite intéressée : oxymore d’avenir ?" (2009) Mélanges en l’honneur du professeur F. 
Goubeaux, p 229; C M Mazzoni, “Le don, c’est le drame. Le don anonyme et le don despotique" (2004) RTD 
civ., p 701. 
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(being often linked to the protection of family-related expectations) are also suitable to 
regulate donations made in a market context. 
 
The first consequence of the French suspicion of donation is the call for protection of the 
donor from himself, i.e. the need to protect the donor from his own “ill-considered” 
actions1063. Following this perspective, a reckless act from the donor may happen for 
different reasons: error; dolus; moral or religious gratitude; reverence, respect and wonder 
inspired by authority; among many others1064. The call for protection of the donor is 
connected with the assumption that he may need the benefit given to the donee in the future. 
Secondly, under this perspective, the creditors of the donor are to be protected against several 
types of gratuitous transactions, which are able to compromise the fulfilment of the debtor’s 
obligations. But the oldest class of individuals protected against the “maleficent” effects of 
donations are the donor’s family. The protection of the family deals with the protection of 
the family as a unit, by presuming that all elements of the same nuclear family1065 retrieve 
benefits from the aggregated patrimonies of all family members – which form, all together, 
what is often referred to in France as the “family patrimony”1066. 
 
The fear that one family member, acting alone, may disrupt the whole family’s patrimonial 
affairs, their social status and lifestyle, can be traced back to the Roman tradition1067. Under 
Roman law, the pater familias was the manager of the family patrimony, with full 
administrative powers1068. In this tradition, acts of the pater familias were able to effectively 
create a disadvantage to his family, affecting their lifestyle and what was regarded as their 
communal patrimony. It is clear that a systematic comparison between the Roman family 
patrimony (where the family’s patrimonial affairs were administered by one person only, the 
pater familias) and the artificially created concept of “family patrimony” of France today1069 
(where all family members’ patrimonies are theoretically combined), cannot be easily 
conducted. Such a comparison is prevented by the fact that today, under French law, each 
person has their own patrimony and, in principle, the right to administer their own patrimony 
                                                 
1063
 D Guével, Droit des sucessions et des libéralités (2nd ed 2010) p 27. 
1064
 C M Mazzoni, “Le don, c’est le drame. Le don anonyme et le don despotique" (2004) RTD civ., p 701. 
1065
 The concept “nuclear family”, in this case, is used to describe the group formed by the de cujus and his 
legal heirs. 
1066
 H Mazeaud, L Mazeaud, F Chabas, Successions – Libéralités (5th ed 1999) III - La protection du patrimoine 
familial contre sa transmission par les libéralités. 
1067
 E Chenon, Histoire Générale du Droit Français Public et Prive (des Origines a 1815) (1929) II, p 129. 
1068
 E Chenon, Histoire Générale du Droit Français Public et Prive (des Origines a 1815) (1929) II, p 129. 
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 H Mazeaud, L Mazeaud, H Mazeaud, F Chabas, Successions – Libéralités (5th ed 1999) IV, p 543. 
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at will1070. As a result, it is possible to argue that the family patrimony can no longer be 
regarded as a unit, but as an account of all the rights that may, in the future, circulate between 
family members (i.e. legal heirs) after their holder’s death1071. However, it may also be 
argued that there is, at present, an interaction between individual and family patrimonies 
(these being regarded as the combined patrimonies of all members of a relevant family). 
Families are bound by legal, moral, religious and affective bonds, which bind their members 
in solidarity across their lives. In this sense, family members help each other economically 
and in other senses. Many factors must be taken into account, such as the proximity of the 
family members, sharing of the table/house, etc, but it seems possible for an argument to be 
constructed where a larger combined family patrimony potentially allows a better quality of 
life of all members of the relevant family. 
 
 Definition and taxonomical placement of French law of donation 
 
5.3.1. Definition of donation in French law 
 
Donation inter vivos is defined by the FCC as “an act by which the donor divests himself 
now and irrevocably1072 of the thing donated in favour of the donee, who accepts it.”1073. 
Donation is further defined under the FCC as one of the listed institutions able to transfer 
property1074 in France (the others being succession, testament and obligations). Donation is 
presented under the FCC as a bilateral juridical act, where one of two or more parties, the 
donor, gives something gratuitously to another party, the donee, who receives the benefit. 
Furthermore, this act of “disposition” is defined as producing its legal effects in the present, 
and cannot be freely revoked by the donor. As mentioned in previous Chapters 3 and 4, if 
certain cardinal elements are present in a juridical act, then this juridical act may be defined 
as a donation under the relevant national law of donation. In respect of French law, and 
taking into account the legal definition of donation, as stated under article 894 FCC, different 
legal writers regarded some cardinal elements as more relevant than others. This has created 
different definitions of donation in France. One such case is Van Gysel, who by interpreting 
systematically article 849 FCC, defined donation in France as “a contract by which a person 
                                                 
1070
 Art 2284 FCC (regarding the individual patrimony) and art 544 FCC (regarding the disposition of property). 
1071
 The rules on who may inherit may be found in art 731 to 732 FCC. 
1072
 Please see below the discussion on the irrevocability of donation in France, at 5.3.4.3. 
1073
 Art 894 FCC. 
1074
 Art 711 FCC. 
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disposes presently and irrevocably of a good or a patrimonial right, without consideration 
(or, anyway, without a consideration deemed equivalent), in behalf of another person who 
accepts, and the parties act with a reciprocal intention, the first of benefit and the second of 
receiving a benefit”1075. It is therefore clear that the bilateralism of the legal definition of 
donation led Van Gysel to define donation in France as a contract, as well as interpreting the 
word “disposes” as an indication that the object of donation is always a patrimonial right. 
 
Bearing in mind the objective of defining which cardinal elements are always found in a 
donation in France, in order to better identify a relevant juridical act as a donation, it may be 
argued that, under French law of donation, donation is defined by three cardinal elements. 
These cardinal elements are: a) the existence of a bilateral act of disposition; b) a liberal 
intention or animus donandi; and c) the production of immediate legal effects. First, the 
bilateralism necessary for a juridical act to be classified a donation means that at least two 
parties must intervene for the creation of the relevant juridical act, which presupposes an 
offer (from the donor) and an acceptance (by the donee). The bilateralism or contractual 
nature1076 of the juridical act leading to a donation in France, further includes the idea of 
irrevocability. Bearing in mind that both parties must be in agreement to create a bilateral 
juridical act, then one of the parties cannot, except in special circumstances, change the terms 
of the agreement or refuse to discharge the obligations emerging the contract. On the 
contrary, based on the principle of freedom of contract1077, neither party can change the terms 
of the agreement on his own. Because the bilateral essence of donation in France requires 
agreement from both parties, both the beginning and term of effects of donation require 
consent from both parties (an offer and an acceptance), and neither of the parties may revoke 
the agreement unilaterally. 
 
Secondly, the benefit granted by the donor to the donee must be given with a liberal intention. 
The concept of liberal intention is often associated with gratuity, and with an agreement 
reached by the parties that the donee is to be the beneficiary of the transaction1078. As will 
                                                 
1075
 A Van Gysel (e), Précis du droit des successions et des libéralités (2008) p 95 : « La donation est un contrat 
par lequel une personne dispose actuellement et irrévocablement d’un bien ou d’un droit patrimonial, sans 
contrepartie (ou, en tout cas, sans contrepartie jugée équivalente), en faveur d’une autre personne qui l’accepte, 
les parties agissant dans l’intention réciproque, la première de gratifier et la seconde d’être gratifiée. » 
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 A Foubert, Le don en droit (2007) p 10 : « [La donation] forme avec les contrats de bienfaisance la catégorie 
des actes a titre gratuit. » ; G. Pacilly, Le Don Manuel (1936) p 18 ; A Van Gysel (e), Précis du droit des 
successions et des libéralités (2008) p 95. 
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 Art 6, 1123 and 1134(1) FCC.  
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 A Van Gysel (e), Précis du droit des successions et des libéralités (2008) p 95. 
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be discussed below, complete gratuity is not an essential element of donation under French 
law, and animus donandi is to be assessed under French law, by looking at the combined 
will of both parties. Finally, the legal effects of a donation must be produced while all parties 
are alive. This criterion answers to the demand for a disposition which happens 
actuellement1079, which means that the legal effects are to be produced upon the completion 
of the donation as a rule, or, that such legal effects may only be delayed to a future moment 
where both parties are alive1080. The need for the production of effects while all parties are 
alive is based on the distinction found in article FCC between liberalities inter vivos 
(donations) and those where effects are produced mortis causa (testament). Both juridical 
acts are classified by the FCC as liberalities1081 and both follow the same body of generic 
principles1082. However, they are each regulated by a different law1083. 
 
5.3.2. Sources of French law of donation 
 
The main body of the French law of donation is found in the French Civil Code (FCC), in 
particular in its third book, “Of the Various Ways In Which Ownership is Acquired”, under 
the title “Donations Inter Vivos and Testaments”1084. The FCC is the first of five Codes 
passed for France under Napoleon, becoming law in March 18041085, and regulates donations 
inter vivos and mortis causa under the same title. However, the FCC has devoted a sole 
chapter to the regulation of donations inter vivos, therefore distinguishing between donations 
in stricto sensu (where legal effects are produced while both parties are alive) and testaments 
(gratuitous juridical acts which produce their legal effects upon the death of the benefactor). 
Donations inter vivos are regulated under chapter four of the third book of the FCC: 
“Donations Inter Vivos”: i.e. articles 931 to 966.  
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 Art 894 FCC. 
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 Conditional donations are regulated under art 944 and 945 FCC, according to which a modo may be agreed 
between donor and donee, however, donations which execution depends on a discretionary act of the donor or 
depending on the future charges to be undertaken by the donee are deemed null and void. 
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 Art 893 FCC. 
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 Among others, see art 893 to 930-5 FCC and 1048 to 1099-1 FCC. 
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 Testament is defined under art 895 FCC and regulated in particular under art 967 to 1047 FCC, while 
donation is defined under art 894 FCC and regulated in particular under art 931 to 966 FCC. 
1084
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translations, last accessed 28/10/2016. 
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 C Ilbert, “The Centenary of the French Civil Code” (1905) Journal of the Society of Comparative 
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More than 200 years have passed since the FCC was enacted, and several amendments have 
been made to the articles on donation1086. These amendments have reflected the changes 
which have occurred in French society, such as the empowerment of women and the 
introduction of new values such as the equality of gender. One such case is, among others, 
the amendment made to article 934. In its original terms, article 934 declared that a married 
woman was not able to accept a donation without the consent of her husband. That provision 
was repealed by Law of 18 February 1938. But it is necessary to note that none of these 
amendments was able to produce a real change to the core essence of the regulation of the 
French law of donation. As a demonstration, the formal requirements requested by the FCC 
for the validity of a donation in France are still regulated under the unchanged article 931, 
wherein the necessary form for an act of donation remains a contract, specifically a public 
deed1087. It is also necessary to notice that, in the last two centuries, several articles on 
donation found in the FCC were developed by the French courts; interpreting them in a new 
light to suit the needs of progress in society or further developing their scope. One such case 
is article 931, where delivery (and correspondent physical acceptance by the donee) is 
regarded as the only necessary formal requirement for the validity of a donation of moveable 
property (don manuel). In fact, French courts have created a presumption where a donee in 
possession of the subject matter of a donation, as long as the donation corresponds to the 
gratuitous transfer of a real right on movables, does not have the burden of proof that all the 
cardinal elements of donation are fulfilled1088. 
 
5.3.3. Liberality 
 
Liberality is defined under the FCC as the act by which a person “disposes by gratuitous title 
of all or part of his assets or his rights to the advantage of another person. A liberality may 
be accomplished only by donation inter vivos or by testament”1089. In respect of French law, 
the conceptualisation of a macro-categorisation of gratuitous juridical acts is of particular 
relevance, because it is able to shed light on the principles regulating all gratuitous juridical 
acts (commonly in opposition to those which regulate non-gratuitous juridical acts) in 
general, and to donation, in particular. Under French law, two parties are required for the 
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production of a liberality: the beneficiary (the party who gratuitously receives the benefit) 
and the benefactor (the party which allows the creation of the benefit).  
 
Liberalities may therefore be described, under French law, as comprising two core elements: 
a formal element, which relates to the form these acts must adopt in order to produce legal 
effects; and a real element, which can be described as the creation of a gratuitous benefit (or 
the receipt of a benefit with no counterpart)1090. A liberality can therefore be defined as any 
juridical act able to produce a gratuitous benefit (such as a gift or a legacy) to a counterparty, 
which is legally protected and enforced under the law. “Liberality” may therefore be 
regarded as a macro-concept which comprises all benefits provided by gratuitous juridical 
acts between private parties in France. For the same reason, a liberality may take place either 
between living persons (inter vivos) or on the death of the granter (mortis causa).  
 
In conclusion, it is possible to argue that donation is one liberality, among others, under the 
FCC. This conclusion is important because, by defining donations as liberalities, it may be 
argued that any gaps found in the legal regulation of donations inter vivos under French law, 
may be resolved by the analogical application of solutions found in the FCC to other 
liberalities. Bearing in mind that French legal writers regard donation with suspicion, and 
see it as deeply related to the family, it is particularly relevant to regard donations inter vivos 
in France as a sub-branch of liberalities. This will allow, by analogy, the integration of gaps 
found in French law of donation, by resorting to solutions found elsewhere, where other 
liberalities are regulated in a way that recognises their presence in the market. 
 
5.3.4. Cardinal Elements 
 
 Bilateralism 
 
French legal writers are unanimous in describing donation as a bilateral juridical act1091. 
Ferre-André and Berre are among the legal writers who best describe the ever-present 
                                                 
1090
 M Planiol, G Ripert, Traité Théorique et pratique de droit civil français (2nd ed 1957) V, p 21-22. 
1091
 The definition of donation as a bilateral juridical act refers to the need for agreement between the 
contracting parties. However, because donation is regarded as a gratuitous juridical act, this institution is also 
often described as a unilateral contract, i.e. the benefit is only received by one of the parties, while both need 
to agree on the legal effects. See N Peterka, Les Dons Manuels (1999) p 1; C Larroumet, Droit Civil, Les 
Obligations, le Contrat (5th ed 2003) III, p 91; R M Ricard, Traite des Donations entre-vifs et testamentaires 
(1783) I, p 1; J Hachin, De la Cause en matière de Donation ((1907) p 33; J Ray, La notion de donation en 
droit civil français (1912) p 33; J Montredon, La désolennisation des libéralités (1987) p 73; F Chabas (e), 
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bilateralism in donation in France, by declaring that “donation inter vivos needs two parallel 
wills: that of the donor and that of the beneficiary”1092. By defining donation as an agreement 
/ contract1093, the FCC denies to the donor the power to bind himself to a gratuitous 
obligation. This also means that French law of donation does not allow the creation of a 
benefit to the donee without his previous consent. On the contrary, under article 894 FCC, a 
donation can only occur after express acceptance is given by the donee. 
 
The freedom to perform juridical acts is commonly designated as contractual freedom and, 
together with the principles of contractual security and contractual loyalty (along with their 
sub-principles), is considered of vital importance for French Private law1094. If respecting 
the donor’s contractual freedom means that he will not be subject to a contractual obligation 
to which he did not agree, then respecting the donee’s freedom means that he should not be 
forced to receive, without his consent, a juridical benefit. Furthermore, it may also be argued 
that, if a unilateral juridical act performed by the donor was able to create a right to the 
donee, then a subsequent refusal of acceptance would be no more than another unilateral 
juridical act1095. This would mean that the right would have entered into the non-accepting 
donor’s patrimony for a certain amount of time, which may produce burdensome public or 
private legal consequences such as the payment of taxes or suchlike. For this reason, the 
need for express acceptance by the donee is required under article 932 FCC, according to 
which, a donation “a donation inter vivos is binding upon the donor and produces its effects 
only from the day it is accepted in express terms”1096. 
                                                 
Leçons de Droit Civil, Biens, Droit de propriété et ses démembrements (1994) II, p 351; M Grimaldi, Droit 
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 S Ferre-André, S Berre, Successions et libéralités (2012) p 616: « la donation entre vifs suppose le concours 
de deux volontés : celle du donateur et celle du gratifie ». 
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 A Gysel (e), Précis du droit des successions et des libéralités (2008) p 95; M Grimaldi (e), Droit 
Patrimonial de la Famille (2011) p 776; S Deville, L’objet de la libéralité (2012) p 2; J Levy, A Castaldo, 
Précis d’histoire du droit civil (2002) p 1352; E Tarbouriech, De la Cause dans les libéralités (1894) p 8; 
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1094
 Art 1101 FCC. 
1095
 The lack of acceptance may also increase doubt in the legal sphere, which would compromise the 
expectations and interests of those who did not want such benefits in their patrimonies (maybe even being 
forced to pay taxes for holding rights they never wished to hold). This is a reality that cannot be accepted by 
juridical systems which have their private law structured under the principles of private autonomy and 
contractual freedom. 
1096
 Art 932 FCC: “a donation inter vivos is binding upon the donor and produces its effects only from the day 
it is accepted in express terms. Acceptance may be made during the lifetime of the donor, by a subsequent and 
authentic act, an original of which will be retained by the notary; but then the donation is effective, in regard 
to the donor, only from the day he has been notified of the act that evidences that acceptance.” 
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The need for bilateralism in all donations regulated under French law may also be found in 
a steady stream of decisions, such as, for example, decision of the Court of Cassation of 29 
June 20111097 and decision of the Court of Cassation of 2 March 19991098. In the first 
decision, it was held that an act which is regarded as unilateral (such as an act of disposition 
which aims to anticipate succession) cannot be perfected by acceptance, even if this 
acceptance takes the form of a subsequent deed1099. In the second decision, it was declared 
that requesting an explicit acceptance does not collide with article 1 of the Protocol to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms1100. In this 
second ruling it was decided that gratuitous acts of disposition, even when made with a 
liberal intention, performed by a father to the benefit of his son, in the presence of his son, 
are deemed as lacking acceptance if the donee did not give express acceptance to the 
donation1101. It is therefore possible to conclude that the lack of bilateralism, either created 
by the lack of express acceptance or by any other reason, invalidates the juridical act which 
leads to a donation under French law of donation. 
 
 The need for acceptance  
 
The principle that acceptance is a core element of donation under French law, and that such 
acceptance shall only become binding for the donor after the notification of acceptance1102, 
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 Decision of the Court of Cassation, 1re civ, 10-17562, of 29 June 2011. 
1098
 Decision of the Court of Cassation, 1re civ, 97-11430, of 2 March 1999. 
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 “La clarté des termes de la minute de l'acte authentique par lequel la donation initiale avait été reçue ne 
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 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended 
by Protocol No. 11, Paris, 20 March 1952. Art 1 (protection of property): “Every natural or legal person is 
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the 
public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international 
law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws 
as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the 
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties”. 
1101
 ”M. X..., notaire, fait grief à l'arrêt […], par lequel René Ferre faisait donation à son fils, M. Jean-Claude 
Ferre, de 100 parts de la société civile La Ferronnière, alors que, selon le moyen, il résulte de l'acte que le 
donataire était présent à l'acte authentique qu'il avait signé, de sorte qu'en se fondant sur l'absence d'acceptation 
du donataire, la cour d'appel a violé l'article 1er du protocole additionnel à la Convention européenne des droits 
de l'homme ainsi que les articles 932 et 938 du Code civil; Mais attendu qu'aux termes de l'article 932 du Code 
civil, la donation entre vifs ne produira effet que du jour qu'elle aura été acceptée en termes exprès ; que, 
contrairement à ce que soutient le moyen, l'acceptation expresse de la donation ne saurait résulter de la seule 
présence du donataire lors de la rédaction de l'acte de donation et de la simple signature de celui-ci ; que le 
moyen, en sa première branche, n'est donc pas fondé”. 
1102
 Art 932 FCC: “a donation inter vivos is binding upon the donor and produces its effects only from the day 
it is accepted in express terms. Acceptance may be made during the lifetime of the donor, by a subsequent and 
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remains unchanged in the letter and spirit of article 932 FCC. This principle has not only 
been enforced by French courts in the past1103, but remains essential for the application of 
the law of donation in recent years1104. Recent court decisions, such as the decision of the 
Court of Cassation of 3 March 1998, follow a systematic line which clarifies that the absence 
of an express acceptance by the donee cannot be replaced by the behaviour of the donee 
from which it is possible to extract a tacit acceptance1105. As an example, in this case, M 
intended to make a donation for the benefit of his child and followed the formalities under 
the FCC1106. However, his child did not accept expressly as required under the FCC and, 
therefore, acceptance was not deemed as valid1107. 
 
The need for an express acceptance under the French law of donation may also be found in 
recent court decisions, such as the decision of the Court of Cassation of 5 April 20051108, 
where it was held that with regard to indirect donations– i.e. for the benefit of a third party - 
the benefit cannot be imposed upon the donee / beneficiary. In this particular case, the Court 
of Cassation held that the forgiveness of a debt is to be regulated in France under the law of 
donation and, therefore, cannot take the form of a unilateral juridical act1109. This decision 
was followed by other similar decisions, one such case being the decision of the Court of 
Cassation of 20 February 20071110. 
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 As example, please see the decision of the Court of Cassation, DP 1902, 1, 214, of 4 March, 1902, which 
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 Decision of the Court of Cassation, 1re civ, 95-12053, of 3 March 1998; Decision of the Court of Cassation, 
1re civ, 97-11430, of 2 March 1999; Decision of the Court of Cassation, 1re civ, 03-19614, of 5 April 2005; 
Decision of the Court of Cassation, 1re civ, 04-16817, of 20 February 2007; and decision of the Court of 
Cassation, 1re civ, 10-17562, of 29 June 2011. 
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 Decision of the Court of Cassation, 1re civ, 95-12053, of 3 March 1998. 
1106
 Art 931 to 952 FCC. 
1107
 “Attendu que, pour rejeter cette demande, la cour d'appel a retenu que M. Gérard Y... avait manifesté sans 
équivoque sa volonté d'accepter la donation de cet immeuble que ses parents lui avaient consentie par acte 
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 Decision of the Court of Cassation, 1re civ, 03-19614, of 5 April 2005. 
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 "La donation indirecte est soumise aux conditions de fond non seulement de toute donation, quelle que soit 
sa forme, mais aussi de l'acte dont elle emprunte le support ; qu'en vertu de l'article 932 du Code civil, la 
donation entre vifs n'engage le donateur, et ne produit effet que du jour de son acceptation en termes exprès ; 
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 Decision of the Court of Cassation, 1re civ, 04-16817, of 20 February 2007. 
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Acceptance of an offer may be given either explicitly or implicitly1111. Acceptance is explicit 
if clearly expressed or demonstrated by the donee by his actions (for example, resorting to 
the clear statement “I accept”) and follows the formalities set under the relevant law1112. It 
is implicit where the counterparty’s actions do not expressly demonstrate acceptance, but 
acceptance may be inferred from their actions or their silence, when the law says so. It is, 
however, possible to conclude that donation cannot be accepted implicitly (or in a tacit 
manner), but, on the contrary, it must be accepted by the donee in express terms1113. 
 
 Irrevocability 
 
As mentioned above, under French law of donation, donations are bilateral juridical acts 
which are often associated with feelings of generosity and benevolence. According to several 
French legal writers, these feelings are then materialised by the parties as a donation, by 
using the tools provided by the law on principles such as the principle of private 
autonomy1114. Donations are also considered dangerous due to the “stigma” imposed by the 
principle of irrevocability1115, and the idea that donation in France is by principle 
irrevocable1116. Renowned French scholars have argued that the donor, and in particular his 
creditors, are no longer able to access the benefit granted to the donee if a donation is 
complete. Irrevocability is also consistently used to distinguish between donations and 
legacies. It is common for French legal writers to use the “irrevocability” criterion to 
distinguish donation – a juridical act with effects in the present, which after performance, 
may no longer be revoked1117 –, and legacy – based in a unilateral juridical act, the testament, 
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 W Gloag, The Law of Contract (2nd ed 1929) p 25.  
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 In the case of French law of donation, the formalities necessary for the validity of an acceptance are 
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 Art 932 FCC. 
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 H Meau-Lautour, La donation déguisée en droit civil français, contribution à la théorie générale de la 
donation (1985) p 24; J Hachin, De la Cause en matière de Donation (1907) p 33; S Deville, L’objet de la 
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1116
 L Josserand, Les mobiles dans les actes juridiques de droit privé (1928) p 233; A Epée, Le don d’argent – 
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which may be changed at any time by the de cujus during his lifetime1118. Take for example 
Guével’s approach to donation1119: under this writer’s teachings, one of the cardinal elements 
of donation is its irrevocability. Article 894 clearly states that a donation must be present 
and irrevocable1120. In other words, after performance, the benefit conferred upon the 
beneficiary of the donation may no longer be removed by a discretionary act of the donor. 
Donation therefore acts as legal title for the benefit or as a justifying causa for the enrichment 
of the donee, entitling him to retain the benefit received. This principle seems, at first glance, 
to be a clear and straightforward principle, but further inquiry is necessary. 
 
The freedom to revoke the unilateral juridical act of testament is clearly stated under the 
FCC1121. Donation, on the contrary, is considered to be irrevocable1122. According to this 
perspective, once the donation is final, the donor, his heirs and his creditors are no longer 
able to access the benefit granted to the donee. But, in reality, donations may be revoked in 
multiple circumstances under French law1123. It is therefore necessary to acknowledge that 
“in reality, the irrevocably [of the donation] is not always the rule”1124. In fact, several 
exceptions to the principle of irrevocability of the donating juridical acts have been accepted 
under French law: (i) the failure to fulfil the obligations undertaken by the donee; (ii) 
ingratitude of the donee; (iii) subsequent birth of descendants, and (iv) future and unforeseen 
poverty of the donor. Timbal is one of the few French legal writers who clearly identify a 
duality in the essence of donation: on the one hand, donations may become irrevocable, 
while on the other hand, a donation may also be characterised as “temporary and revocable” 
if the right circumstances are present1125. This means that a “regretful” donor is not able to 
unilaterally revoke a (bilateral juridical act of) donation. However, French law of donation 
provides the donor with revocation rights in particular circumstances1126. 
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It may therefore be argued that the myth of complete irrevocability of donation in French 
law, leading to its classification as “dangerous”, is unfounded. The comprehensive 
revocation rights1127 provided to the donor under the FCC aim to protect the donor against 
his own actions, against a poor future and against the frustrated objectives of the donation – 
for those donations which are not motivated by altruistic feelings. Finally, it is also necessary 
to bear in mind that the creditors and family members of the donor are protected under 
French law of donation, being granted tools for the reduction or cancellation of the effects 
of a donation. As examples, it is possible to find (a) the law of collation and reduction of 
excessive liberalities1128; (b) insolvency law1129, and (c) actio pauliana1130. 
 
 Liberal intention 
 
Juridical acts are based on legal effects given by the law to the will of the parties1131. French 
legal writers therefore argue that, under the French law of donation, the “cause for the 
donation is the liberal intention of the donor”1132 and, for this reason, intention to donate and 
liberal intention are one and the same1133. This is a line of reasoning which is disputed by 
several legal writers, one such case being Baudry, who regards the will to donate as a will to 
undertake a relevant obligation, while the liberal intention represents the reason why the 
donor wishes to undertake the obligation1134. In any case, it is widely accepted by French 
lawyers that a liberal intention is a cardinal element of donation1135 and the “unbalance”, in 
the obligations emerging from a donation, is justified by the liberal intention of the donor1136. 
 
The need for a liberal intention, described as a cardinal (or essential) element of donation1137, 
was further developed by the French courts. As a demonstration, the French courts have 
clarified that if a contract of sale and purchase creates unbalanced obligations for the parties, 
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the unbalance is not enough for a liberal intention of the seller to be presumed1138. The same 
happens in the case when a husband pays the price of land, where it is his spouse who gains 
ownership of the good. The same applies to the husband who has paid the price of goods 
which are owned by both spouses1139. Bearing in mind these examples, it is possible to argue 
that a liberal intention cannot be extracted from actions which create a benefit alone1140. 
Furthermore, the French courts have also clarified that the liberal intention is only relevant 
at the moment when the donation is concluded1141. 
 
The acceptance that the validity of donation is based on the liberal intention of the donor can 
be traced to the writers of the FCC, who deemed human nature as non-altruistic and assumed 
that one’s “interests are the motors of human behaviour”1142. Because human nature is 
described as non-altruistic, and donation is oppositely described as an act which is motivated 
by an animus donandi, it is hard for these legal writers to look at donation as an everyday 
act of life in society. Despite this prejudice against donation, it is commonly accepted that 
generosity, or to proceed with a liberal spirit, is a “signal of courage and an affirmation of 
liberty”1143. For this reason, and bearing in mind the letter of the law1144, it is possible to 
argue that even those legal writers who distrust donation and see a liberal intention as 
suspicious must recognise that the liberal intention, is a cardinal element of donation in 
France, acting as its motive (or causa). 
 
 Gratuity 
 
The idea of gratuity is closely linked to the idea of liberal intention1145: the donor gives to 
the donee with the intention to benefit him, and not to gain a benefice for himself. But the 
discussion on gratuity is often linked to the idea of reduction of the “patrimony”1146 of the 
donor. Under French law, a personal patrimony may be defined as “all property owned by 
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an individual and all obligations, in the sense of liabilities, which are to be discharged by the 
same person, a legal universality. Patrimony consists in this universality; a notion which 
links all rights held by a person and his obligations”1147. A personal patrimony is therefore 
composed of active and passive elements, or, in other words, it comprises all rights and 
obligations held by a (legal or physical) person1148. 
 
When an onerous contract is entered into by the contracting parties, both parties’ patrimonies 
are presumed to receive advantages (by undertaking obligations and receiving new rights). 
On the contrary, however, in gratuitous juridical acts, this exchange is not presumed to 
happen. In a contrat a titre gratuity, one such case being donation1149, only the donee is 
presumed to receive a benefit, which is granted by the donor without the expectation of 
receiving a counter-performance. In the particular case of donation, the donor will see his 
patrimony reduced, an impoverishment which corresponds to the benefit received by the 
donee1150. 
 
It is important to notice that legal writers are not in agreement to what the concept of 
patrimony is in France, ranging between those who regard patrimony as a universality of 
rights and obligations1151, and those who describe patrimony as only those rights and 
obligations held by a person with pecuniary value1152. This debate has direct consequences 
towards which rights may be the object of donation: if an impoverishment of the donor’s 
patrimony is only brought about by the donation of rights with pecuniary value, then only 
these may be donated. On the contrary, if the concept of patrimony is wider, then any benefit 
granted to the donee may be classified as a donation under French law. 
 
Two different approaches may be taken when addressing the concept of patrimony under 
French law: the first one, where all property is defined as having an intrinsic economic value, 
and the second one, where some items simply do not have an economic value1153. The first 
perspective is the one where all property (and most rights) are seen as containing a possible 
economic value. A perspective which may create major inequalities when applied by 
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different courts, which may value the same right differently. Such insecurity may potentially 
undermine the confidence of market players, leading to a reduction of the number of 
transactions made in a market context. However, if the second approach is followed, and 
patrimony is defined as comprising only rights with pecuniary value, then only donations of 
rights with a pecuniary value would be able create an enrichment to the donee and a 
correspondent impoverishment to the donor. This second perspective is even more 
prejudicial to the market than the first one, considering that it restricts the principles of 
contractual autonomy and liberty. These principles are essential for a marketplace which is 
flexible enough to adapt itself to the ever-changing demands of supra-national trade. 
 
The definition of the object of donation has changed over time in France, however, today, 
courts and legal writers define the object of donation in wide terms. The object of donation 
is therefore wide enough to comprise benefits granted to the donee found in the release of a 
debt1154; where the donor releases the donee from a debt by returning to the debtor the 
original document, which is the proof of the debt1155, or by agreement reached between the 
parties1156. Bearing in mind that the wider concept of patrimony (as comprising all rights and 
obligations held by a person) is the one which gathers most supporters, and that different 
types of benefits may be granted by donation in France, including those which do not 
produce an enrichment per se, it is possible to argue for an object of donation in France 
which is disconnected with the pecuniary value of the object. 
 
 Present disposition 
 
The final cardinal element for the identification of a donation in French law is the production 
of legal effects in the present, and not in the future. This element may be traced to article 
943 FCC, where it is stated that “donations can only have as their object the present assets 
of the donor; a donation concerning future assets will be void”1157. But this cardinal element 
of donation also has a second meaning: the juridical effects of donations must be produced 
while both parties are alive, or the law of testament will apply to the juridical act1158. It is for 
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this reason that Seriaux has described donations as gathering “the elements shared by all 
liberalities: the impoverishment, the correspondent enrichment and the liberal intention”1159, 
but the “actuality of the act implies that the donor makes an element leave his patrimony, 
making a right or a debt against himself enter the patrimony of the donee”1160.  
 
The actuality of the disposition is of prime relevance here, considering that, under article 
944 FCC, “all donations made under the condition that its execution depends on the will of 
the donator” shall be void1161. When interpreted systematically, it is easy to understand why 
the FCC took this stance: if the donor is able to decide in the future if he is still donating the 
benefit or not, then a donation would potentially never have existed. Similarly, if the donor 
is able to decide if and when the donee will gain access to the subject-matter of the donation, 
then, in practice, this would mean that the donee might never actually receive a benefit. This 
would also mean that the donating act would not produce its legal effects until the existence 
of a subsequent juridical act of the donor (left at his sole discretion). In conclusion, a present 
disposition has different meanings: a donation must only grant rights available to the donor 
at the time of the donation, and not in the future; and a donation must benefit the donee while 
donor and donee are still alive, under the consequence of the juridical act being defined as a 
testament, and being, therefore, regulated under the law of testament. 
 
5.3.5. Types of donations 
 
Donations under French law may be divided following two main criteria1162: the purity of 
the donation and the formalities involved for their creation1163. With regard to the purity of 
the donation, donations may be pure, i.e. no counter performance is expected from the donee, 
or conditional, where a modo is imposed upon the donee1164. Several legal writers have 
addressed the topic of the purity of donation in Europe in general1165, and in France in 
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particular1166. Two different answers were given by lawyers and courts to this question: on 
one side are those who defend the purity of principles, and therefore, do not accept the 
classification of a relationship where all counterparties are legally obliged to return a benefit 
received as “gratuitous”1167. Writers such as Savigny see in the modo a restriction to the 
gratuity of the juridical act, therefore defining these acts as a negotium mixtum1168, which 
means that, for Savigny, only part of the donating act is a proper donation. On the other side, 
we can find those who admit the existence of different types of donations, some of which 
are not entirely gratuitous. The latter perspective is the dominant one in France1169. Finally, 
it is relevant to mention that the FCC expressly allows conditions to be imposed by the donor 
on the donee, as well as the creation of obligations to the donee, arising for the contract of 
donation1170. As a demonstration, under article 900 FCC all impossible conditions are 
deemed as unwritten; under article 900-1 FCC, the donee may be stopped from disposing of 
the benefit received, as long as this limitation is temporary and justified by a serious interest 
of the donor. 
 
 Effects1171 
 
The main legal effect of classifying a juridical act as a donation under the French law of 
donation is the vesting of a benefit in the donee1172. This benefit is always a determined 
benefit, or the relevant juridical act cannot be qualified as a donation under French law of 
donation1173. Following the letter of the law, the FCC states that a donation “produces its 
effects only from the day it is accepted in express terms”1174. Article 893 FCC states that the 
legal effects of a donation are, in general a gratuitous disposition of all or part of the donee’s 
assets or rights for the advantage of the donee1175. Article 894 FCC specifies that, in 
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particular, a donation is a juridical act by which the donor (i) divests himself, (ii) now and 
irrevocably of the thing donated, (iii) in favour of the donee1176. 
 
 Sacrifice of the donor 
 
The sacrifice of the donor is often regarded by legal writers as one of the legal effects of 
classifying a juridical act as a donation in France. Legal writers such as Savigny, and those 
who follow a similar approach to him in France1177, often use the element of impoverishment 
of the donor to distinguish between donations and testament. Therefore, for Savigny, “the 
transfer mortis causa does not diminish the patrimony of the de cujus; such patrimony 
remains the same, passes only into other hands. Therefore, the enrichment of the donee by 
the donor is of the essence of donation. However, a testator cannot know if he will benefit 
his heir, because misfortune[/debts] might absorb or reduce the benefit”1178. French courts 
have further defined the concept of divestment of the donor, bringing it closer to the idea of 
alienation of all or part of the donor’s patrimony. In this sense, it has been clarified that “a 
juridical operation does not present the character of a donation if its author, although acting 
with a charity intent and for the exclusive advantage of another, does not divest himself 
voluntarily of a portion of his patrimony”1179. In this sense, it is possible to conclude that the 
patrimony of the donor (as a compilation of his rights and duties) must be sacrificed, either 
by the alienation of a right he holds in the present, or by undertaking of a new obligation he 
did not hold before. 
 
 Effects that are produced now 
 
The need for a present effect to be produced by the donation is not only found in the FCC1180, 
but has also been developed by the writings of legal writers1181 and by court decisions1182. 
One such case is Van Gysel, who declares that “the actuality of the act implies that the donor 
immediately releases an element of his patrimony, making it enter the patrimony of the 
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donee, or undertake a debt”1183. The idea that a donation must produce immediate effects is 
further developed by the French courts, claiming that in the case of a property right, this 
right is transferred immediately by the donation1184. Without repeating the discussion on the 
irrevocability of donation in France undertaken above1185, articles 894 and 895 FCC 
distinguish between donations inter vivos and testament by the moment when the legal 
effects are produced. Therefore, in relation to donations, the benefit is provided by a bilateral 
juridical act and received by the donor immediately (while both parties are alive). 
Conversely, in the case of testament, the benefit is provided by a unilateral act of the testator, 
and the benefit is only received by the heir in a future moment (after the death of the testator). 
 
 The donor is vested in a benefit 
 
Bearing in mind the discussion above, where the different cardinal elements of donation in 
French law were critically analysed, it is possible to argue that the donee may have vested 
in him the right to several types of benefits, as long as the benefit is able to increase his 
patrimony. For example, donation is defined under the FCC as a juridical act able to transfer 
property1186, to release the donee of an obligation or vest in him a personal right he did not 
hold before1187. It is also relevant to notice that, due to its relevance in French society, the 
transference of property rights by donation has been regulated under articles 949 FCC, and 
following. Several rules therefore regulate the gratuitous transfer of both moveable and 
immoveable property from donor to donee in France. Among others, the donor is allowed to 
reserve for his benefit the usufruct of the property donated1188. He may also stipulate a right 
of return of the property donated if he dies before the donee and/or his descendants1189. 
 
 Regulation of market donations 
 
As mentioned before, the dominant views in early 19th century French political and legal 
philosophy regarded economic interest as the main motivation of human behaviour1190. It 
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was therefore commonly accepted that all voluntary acts were the mere reflection of an 
interest being pursued1191. These conceptions have influenced the drafters of the FCC, who 
developed feelings of suspicion towards donation, and led to distrust towards gratuitous 
juridical acts such as donation. It is therefore commonly stated by French lawyers that a 
transaction’s economic rationality is disturbed by a gratuitous causa1192. This assumption 
may be explained by the fact that a donation is able to create an economic benefit to one of 
the parties – the donee - but no correspondent economic benefit may be conferred on the 
donor. 
 
The imbalance in the “economic rationality” of the donation is regarded by French legal 
writers as unnatural, an unnatural transaction that is only justified by the “liberal intention” 
of the donor1193. But no stable definition exists to fully describe the essence of a “liberal 
intention” in France. In the case of the FCC, the existence of a liberal intention as the 
justification for an economically unbalanced transaction is traced by legal writers to the 
humanitarian ideas of the nineteenth century1194. For example, in Lambert’s view, the 
humanitarian vision of society of the drafters of the FCC, where the individual will must 
always be respected, explains its use in the FCC1195. The respect for the individual will 
therefore led to a wide definition of “liberal intention” in the FCC and while animus donandi 
is not defined under the FCC, it is described by French lawyers as “an expression of altruism, 
an expression of uninterested desire”1196. 
 
Given that donation is regarded with suspicion, several legal writers call for the protection 
of those potentially affected by the donation1197. The claim for substantial regulation of 
donation is particularly aimed at the protection of French society against a perceived 
“hazard” of donation1198. Therefore, it may be argued that, as a rule, the French legal system 
uses the law of donation in order to protect those who are potential victims of the legal effects 
of donation1199, protecting any potential victims of donation. These victims may be identified 
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as the donor himself, his family, and his creditors. Bearing in mind this distrust and call for 
protection against donation, a critical analysis of the fitness of French law of donation for 
the purpose of regulating donations made in a market context will be conducted on three 
different levels: (i) protection of the parties; (ii) protection of third parties; and (iii) 
protection of the community, in general. 
 
5.5.1. Protection of the parties 
 
The first consequence of the French suspicion towards donation is the need to protect the 
donor from himself, i.e. the need to protect the donor from his own “ill-considered” 
actions1200. These ill-considered actions may occur due to a different number of reasons, 
such as: error; dolus of the donee; moral or religious gratitude; reverence, respect and wonder 
inspired by authority; among many others1201. Therefore, the FCC specifies that only those 
of “sound mind” may make a donation1202, and consent will be null if tainted by error, fraud 
or violence. In addition, French law of donation grants revocation powers to the donee1203, 
as well as the necessary tools for the invalidation and reduction of donation to be used by 
the donor’s family and his creditors1204. 
 
It may be argued that the powers of revocation granted to the donor, where he alone is able 
to revoke an otherwise valid and binding bilateral juridical act, are able to create a high 
amount of instability and insecurity when in a market context. It may be argued that in the 
market context, the parties are not presumed to be motivated by strong emotions or others 
which led them to “ill-considered” actions1205, on the contrary, the parties often deal with 
unknown counterparties, donating and/or receiving donations from strangers. This 
characteristic of donations in a market context separates them from other donations where 
strong emotions may impair the donor’s judgement (such as those made in a family context). 
Following this line of argument, it is possible to conclude that a protection towards acts of a 
donor motivated by strong feelings (such as love) is not needed, and may even oppose the 
principles of freedom and security in the market context. This level of insecurity cannot be 
deemed as compatible with creating the best conditions for donations to be used in a market 
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context because they lead to distrust of donee – those who receive a benefit in a market 
context, because they fear that this benefit may be removed from them at any time by the 
donor. The negative impact of this distrust is, however, balanced by requesting firm formal 
requirements for the creation of a donation in France (whether in a market context or not)1206. 
These requirements are formalistic in nature, and considerably stricter than those applied to 
other bilateral juridical acts such as contracts of sale and purchase1207. 
 
 Formalities and need for acceptance 
 
The French law of donation imposes heavy formal duties for the validity of a juridical act 
which is to be classified as a donation. Under article 931 FCC all donations must be executed 
“before notaries, in the ordinary form of contracts; and the notaries shall retain an original 
of them, on pain of nullity”, with the exception for moveable property, which may be donated 
by simple physical conveyance1208. Another formality, which is of prime relevance for the 
protection of the security of the parties is the need for acceptance. As stated before, French 
law of donation demands acceptance to be given “in express terms”1209. It may be argued 
that, because of the distrust in donation, heavy formalities are set under French law of 
donation, for the validity and productions of effects of a donation1210. These formalities are 
both suitable to increase security in the market, because the parties are able to trust in the 
contract if it follows the legally required formalities; but they can also decrease the exchange 
of products in the market, operated by gratuitous transfer (donation) when their subject-
matter is not a movable. This decrease of market donations may be caused by high 
formalities being used as a deterrence against donations, due to the time and expense 
consumed, which may repel some parties from donating. In conclusion, a generic formalistic 
approach must be regarded as good for the promotion of security in the market, which means 
that French law of donation is suitable to regulate the relationship of parties in a market 
context, in what the promotion of security is concerned. This assessment is only possible 
due to the exclusion of movables from this heavily formalistic approach, where donations 
for sales promotions and others are facilitated. 
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 Revocation 
 
With regard to revocation, as critically analysed above, donations are primarily treated as 
irrevocable under French law of donation1211. It may be argued that the exceptions to the rule 
on irrevocability are family-orientated, or at least, have been created for parties who maintain 
or will maintain a personal relationship in the future. In this sense, article 953 FCC 
establishes that a donation may be revoked due to the following reasons: (i) “on account of 
the non-performance of the conditions” under which a donation was made1212; (ii) “on 
account of ingratitude”1213; and (iii) on account of the occurrence of the birth of new children 
for the donor1214. 
 
Considering the scope of application of these rights of revocation, it is possible to conclude 
that, although they regard the donor’s acts with suspicion and are aimed at protecting the 
donor from an ungrateful donee or his children from disinheritance, they have a small impact 
on donations made in a market context. Because market transactions are often conducted by 
persons who do not have a relationship previous to the donation, or who may not pursue this 
relationship afterwards, they are not expected to remain in contact afterwards, reducing the 
possibility of the rules on revocation for ingratitude to ever be applicable to them. Similarly, 
the rules on revocability due to the birth of new children for the donor should be presumed 
inapplicable in a market context, as they have been designed to prevent the disinheritance of 
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the new child, as a rule. Consequently, this would only ever concern persons close to the 
donee. 
 
5.5.2. Protection of third parties 
 
 Protection of creditors and heirs 
 
In terms of French law of donation, the protection of third parties is mainly connected with 
the rules aimed at protecting the expectations of the creditors of the donor or his heirs (who 
expect to inherit in the future). In this sense, the creditors of the donor are protected against 
several types of gratuitous transactions which are able to compromise the fulfilment of the 
debtor’s obligations in the future. This rationale also formed the basis for legal rules outside 
of the law of donation, such as those connected with actio pauliana1215, where a fraudulent 
conveyance or transfer is reduced in order to preserve the rights of the general creditors, or 
insolvency, and which will not be discussed in the present study. 
 
But the oldest class of individuals protected against the “maleficent” effects of donations are 
the donor’s family. The protection of the family deals with the protection of the family as a 
unit, by presuming that all elements of the same family1216 retrieve benefits from the 
aggregated patrimonies of all family members – which form, all together, what is often 
referred to in France as the “family patrimony”1217. In this sense, the expectations of the heirs 
are protected under French law of donation through different sets of rules, being the most 
relevant those dealing the revocability of donation on account of the occurrence of the birth 
of new children for the donor1218. The second set of rules may be found in articles 912 FCC 
and following, dealing with the reduction of donations due to infringement of the limits of 
the disposable portion of the donor’s patrimony in what the law of succession is concerned. 
The disposable portion of the donor’s patrimony is defined under the FCC as the “part of the 
assets and rights of the succession that is not reserved by legislation and of which the 
deceased can freely dispose by” donation or testament1219. Building on this concept, article 
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913 FCC further clarifies what limits are imposed to the donor on the disposition of his 
patrimony, which will be reduced when exceeded1220. As it was argued in the paragraph 
critically analysing the protection of creditors, the protection of the heirs’ expectations, as 
third parties in a donation, are widely regulated under French law of donation. Therefore, it 
is possible to argue that third parties, both creditors and heirs are protected against 
undesirable effects of donation in the market by both, rules present in the FCC, aimed at 
protecting the heirs of the donor, and those found in the French Commercial Code, which 
protect creditors against suspected gratuitous transactions occurring in a “suspected period”, 
which are defined as null and void under French law1221. 
 
5.5.3. Protection of the community 
 
As mentioned before, different rules exist under French law of donation, aiming to promote 
security and confidence in the French community. These rules are mainly found in articles 
913 FCC and following, establishing heavy formalistic rules to be followed by the juridical 
act which created a donation in France. But it is also worth reviewing the rules which protect 
the French community, as a whole, against impossible conditions or modus which are 
contrary to legislation or French “good morals”1222. 
 
 Protection against impossible conditions, contrary to legislation 
or good morals 
 
The FCC confers protection against impossible conditions or those conditions which are 
contrary to legislation or “good morals”. The most relevant of these rules may be found 
under article 900 FCC, according to which any obligation demanded from the donee, in 
exchange for the benefit received by the donation, are set aside if declared impossible, 
contrary to legislation or to “good morals”. This generic rule is further clarified in articles 
900-1 FCC and following, where it is specified that any clauses preventing to donee from 
alienating the subject-matter of the donation are deemed unwritten unless they are temporary 
                                                 
1220
 Art 913 FCC defines that a donation “may not exceed one-half of the property of a disposing party, if he 
leaves only one child at his death; one-third, if he leaves two children; one-fourth, if he leaves three or more. 
A child who renounces the succession is counted among the number of children left by the deceased only if he 
is represented or if he is bound to collate a liberality by application of the dispositions of Article 845”. Other 
rules are also set by art 914 to 920 FCC. 
1221
 Art L632-1 to L632-4 of the French Commercial Code, comprising all donations apart from those which 
are considered as remuneratory in nature (without losing their gratuitous nature). 
1222
 Expression used by art 900 FCC. 
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or justified by a serious and legitimate interest of the donor1223. These rules are relevant in 
the market context because if a donation is received by a donee where the above-mentioned 
charges are imposed, he may request a judicial review of the conditions and charges if they 
become “extremely difficult, or seriously detrimental” to him1224. 
 
 Interim conclusion 
 
A law of protection. Considering that French law of donation acts as a “law of protection”1225 
against the potentially maleficent consequences of donation, different levels of protection 
are therefore placed in order to protect the family, the donor (against his own actions) and 
his creditors under articles 913 FCC and following. For example, aiming to protect the 
family, the donor cannot alienate by donation more than a legal quota of his own patrimony, 
which is defined considering different criteria such as the number of descendants or the 
matrimonial status of the donor1226. If this quota is exceeded, then the donation should be 
reduced for the benefit of the donor’s heirs1227. 
 
The abnormal donation. Prejudices against donation are particularly connected to their 
perception as abnormal while irrevocable in France. These considerations are particularly 
perceived as dangerous to the French society when affecting the donor, his families or his 
creditors. By not looking at both parties in a donation as equals, but instead choosing to 
distrust acts made with a liberal intention, French law of donation is creating uncertainty and 
potential distrust in market donations. One such case is the revocation right provided to the 
donor based on the birth of a child1228. By providing the donor with rights of revocation 
based on family considerations, French law of donation is creating excessive uncertainty in 
non-family related contexts, such as the market, where the parties are expected to interact in 
view of profit. By imposing a regulation based on family-orientated considerations to other 
aspects of life in society, such as the market, an unbalance will be created between the 
parties, parties which do not make their decisions upon family considerations, but profit-
orientated considerations. This leads to a further need of equality between the parties, 
                                                 
1223
 Art 900-1 FCC, according to which “a donee or legatee may be judicially authorized to dispose of the asset 
if the interest that justified the clause has disappeared or if it happens that a more important interest so requires.” 
1224
 Art 900-2 FCC. 
1225
 F Terre, Y Lequette, Précis de Droit Civil, Les successions, Les libéralités (3rd ed 1997) p 206. 
1226
 In particular, see art 913, 914-1, 917 and 919-1 FCC. 
1227
 Art 919-2, 921, 922 and 923 FCC. 
1228
 Art 960 FCC. 
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because when acting in a market context, the parties are presumed not to be motivated by 
strong feelings, but by the pursuit of profit or other economic considerations. By over-
protecting one of the parties, an imbalance is created, which will cause uncertainty, leading 
to a reduction of the transactions entered into by the parties. As a demonstration, if the law 
of sale was as protective as the law of donation, the seller of a five-bedroom flat would be 
able to revoke (unilaterally) a contract of sale and purchase based on the birth of new 
children. If he is not able to do so, then the donor should not be able to do so. 
 
Distrust creates an unbalanced law of donation. Regarding donation as dangerous and as 
leading to an unbalanced relationship disrespects the principles of private autonomy and 
freedom of contract. These principles are of primordial relevance in a market context and 
their disrespect compromises the need for a promotion of security. By reconsidering the level 
of protection conferred upon the donor (and connected persons), the French law of donation 
would be promoting equality between donor and donee. This would promote confidence in 
the irrevocability of donation in France. Furthermore, property would circulate more freely 
and a greater autonomy of the donor would respect the principles of freedom of contract and 
private autonomy. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
Principles and objectives to be followed by the law of donation 
 
It was stated in the present thesis that a law of donation which is fit to regulate donations 
made in a market context must provide the parties with the freedom to enter into gratuitous 
transactions with both connected persons and strangers alike1229. In other words, the parties 
must be free to choose their counterparties and the terms of the donation. Providing security 
to the parties is also essential1230, by reassuring the parties that no unilateral revocation rights 
are going to endanger the donation. This protection of the parties’ expectations is particularly 
relevant when the donation is made between strangers in the market. This confidence will 
potentially lead strangers to enter into more donating agreements, considering that both 
parties are aware that they have the right to enforce performance and the right to rely on the 
situation created by the donation. Because different communities coexist and trade with each 
other, while potentially following diverse moral and religious norms, it is also imperative 
that they are regulated by the same law, providing them security and confidence in the legal 
outcome of an eventual dispute. In short, the rules guiding donation in the market must be 
secular and equal for all. 
 
In addition to following these principles, it was argued that a law of donation which is fit for 
the purpose of regulating market donations should assume that donations in the market are 
explained by economic rationality, and that they are no longer compelled by powerful 
feelings such as love or affection1231. This means that donations made in a market context 
no longer need a protective law aimed at correcting a presumably irrational decision on the 
part of the donor. The parties may therefore be treated as equals and the law of donation 
should only intervene where the balance is threatened by illicit behaviour of the parties. In 
addition, the law of donation should promote confidence and security in the market1232. The 
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 See Chapter 1 – Revisiting the law of donation, 1.2. Changes occurred, p 27. 
1230
 See Chapter 2 – European contributions to the law of donation, 2.5. Principles and objectives of donations 
in the market, p 65. 
1231
 See Chapter 1 – Revisiting the law of donation, 1.3.4. Different contexts where donation may be found, p 
36. 
1232
 See Chapter 2 - European contributions to the law of donation, 2.5. Principles and objectives of donations 
in the market, p 65. 
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focus on the market being relevant, considering that this is a context far away from the 
family, a context where the parties are expected to interact in view of profit. If donations are 
regulated by family-orientated considerations, an unbalance will be created between the 
parties, parties which acting, for example, in the market, do not make their decisions upon 
family considerations, but profit-orientated considerations. If the parties are not deemed to 
be equals, but instead, one of the parties is protected against the other, this will cause 
uncertainty, leading to a reduction of the transactions entered into by the parties. For 
example, if an Italian business decides to donate items to Danish consumers with the 
intention of entering the Danish market and promoting its sales, both Italian donors and 
Danish donees should be protected and certain about the rights and duties emerging from the 
donation. This means that both parties should trust that their rights are protected under the 
relevant national law of donation. 
 
Are the national laws of donation under analysis fit for the purpose of regulating donations 
made in a market context? 
 
Protection of the parties 
 
Scotland1233. In Scots law, the protection of the donor in case of mistake extends to all 
donations, including donations in a market context. As a rule, the donor may avoid the 
donation if this donation was concluded because of a mistake. For the same reason, when 
entering into a donation, each party must have full capacity to act by himself or in his own 
benefit. Because donation is conceptualised as a flavour of multiple juridical acts, the right 
to enforce performance is, under Scots law, regulated under the general rules for enforcing 
the performance of the relevant juridical act. In addition, it is possible to conclude that Scots 
law of donation is fit for the purpose of protecting the parties’ expectations, in particular 
when a donation is made between strangers, considering that the law of donation only exists 
in addition to the law which regulates the relevant juridical act, which was, due to its 
characteristics, classified as a donation. This allows the parties to rely on the situation created 
by the donation. Finally, it is necessary to bear in mind that donations made in a market 
context may occur as a one-off juridical act between the parties. The Scots law of donation 
also caters for these situations, because the law regulating the juridical act which gives rise 
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 See Chapter 3 – Scotland, 3.5.1. Protection of the parties, p 125. 
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to the donation is presumed to be able to regulate new market relationships or one-off market 
relationships. 
 
Portugal1234. Donation is defined as a contract under Portuguese law of donation, which 
means that donation is conceptualised as a specific juridical act in Portugal. The need for 
acceptance emerging from the classification of donation as a contract protects the donee 
from receiving benefits (or holding rights) without his consent. This protection shields the 
donee against responsibility created by an undisclosed transfer of real rights to him, 
including liability for damages caused by property, taxes or fees, among others. The rules 
on the revocation of donations are applicable to all contexts where donation is made, 
however, they are tempered by the rules on remuneratory donations. The definition of a 
donation as remuneratory has consequences for the parties, in particular when donations are 
made in a market context. One such case is the protection of donees such as doctors, nurses 
or priests, who may validly accept a donation as remuneratory payment for medical care or 
spiritual aid services, previously provided to the donor. It is also important to notice that the 
modo may only be demanded up to the pecuniary value of the benefit received by the done. 
This gives important protection to the donor because of the importance of the pecuniary 
value of transactions in the market context. Finally, it is important to mention that it is not 
clear if Portuguese law of donation defines samples or small gifts for the promotion of sales 
as donations. If they are not qualified as a donation, a legal gap is created and these gifts are 
not regulated under the law. This creates a high degree of uncertainty, only tempered by the 
rules on objective product liability of the producer. It was therefore concluded that it would 
be more appropriate to classify any gratuitous transaction, as long as occurring in market 
context, as a donation, therefore providing further security to all parties involved. 
 
France1235. French law of donation highly regards consent and the free formation of the will 
of the donor, which must not be tainted. It also grants revocation powers to the donor, as 
well as revocation rights to be used by the donor’s family and his creditor, aiming to protect 
what is perceived as the family patrimony from gratuitous acts of the donor. This creates a 
high amount of instability and insecurity as the same revocation rights are applicable to 
donations made in a market context. It was argued that, in the market context, the parties are 
not presumed to be motivated by strong emotions such as love, but instead, to be motivated 
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 See Chapter 4 – Portugal, 4.5.2. Protection of the parties, p 188. 
1235
 See Chapter 5 – France 5.5.1. Protection of the parties, p 224. 
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by economic rationality. A high level of insecurity is not, therefore, compatible with the 
objective of creating the best conditions for donations to be used in a market context. This 
distrust in donation has led to heavy formalities necessary for the validity of donations (with 
the exception of dons manuels). Heavy formalistic duties create security by trust in the 
formal validity of the donation, but they also increase the difficulty to interact with others. 
In what revocation is concerned, donations are primarily regarded as irrevocable under 
French law of donation, but it may be argued that many exceptions to this rule exist based 
on family-centred considerations (such as ingratitude or the birth of new children for the 
donor). These rights of revocation are not, however, appropriate for donations made in a 
market context, and irrevocability must be regarded suitable to the promotion of security in 
what market donations are concerned. 
 
Protection of third parties 
 
Scotland1236. Donors and donees maintain relationships with third parties. Due to the 
gratuitous character of donation, third parties are potentially affected by the gratuitous 
dissipation of the donor’s patrimony, and benefit from the non-reciprocal enrichment of the 
donee. Recognising the relevance of third parties’ expectations, in Scots law of donation, the 
donee takes the subject-matter of the donation cum onere. By doing so, third parties’ rights 
or claims secured by heritable securities remain valid. Furthermore, other third party rights 
based on succession law or insolvency rules will also apply. The expectations of third parties 
connected to the donee (expecting him to keep the subject-matter of the donation) are 
protected in Scots law of donation by the principle that the donee cannot be arbitrarily 
deprived of the benefit received. 
 
Portugal1237. Revocation rights exist in Portugal under article 970 PCC. These rights may 
potentially affect expectations of third parties because if a donation is revoked, all effects 
produced by the relevant donation will cease to exist. As an example, in respect of the 
protection of expectations of third parties connected with the donor, Portuguese law of 
donation defines that if any rights are alienated by the donee or his heirs and the donation is 
declared to be void, then the donee (or his heirs) must compensate the donor in the pecuniary 
value of the rights alienated. The protection given to the expectations of third parties 
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 See Chapter 3 – Scotland, 3.5.2. Protection of third parties, p 128. 
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 See Chapter 4 – Portugal, 4.5.3. Protection of third parties, p 193. 
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connected to the donor follows the principle that the donee cannot be arbitrarily deprived 
from the benefit received by the contract of donation. However, third parties’ rights based 
on succession law (coalition) or insolvency law are protected under Portuguese law. 
 
France1238. The protection of third parties in France is mainly represented by rules aimed at 
protecting the expectations of the creditors of the donor or his heirs (who expect to inherit 
in the future). Creditors are protected against fraudulent donations by action pauliana and 
insolvency rules, making French law of donation suitable to regulate donations in a market 
context. In respect of the donor’s heirs, they are protected by different sets of rules dealing 
with the revocability of donation on account of the occurrence of the birth of new children 
for the donor, coalition or other succession law considerations.  
 
Protection of the community 
 
Scotland1239. Scots law of donation establishes a presumption against donation, adding 
efficiency to the market because it eliminates the instability and insecurity brought by the 
subjective element of the motivation/intention of the donor. The presumption against 
donation also provides courts and other legal actors with a tool which allows them to 
objectively evaluate the donor’s will. Security is provided by the formalities required by 
each juridical act which forms the basis of the donation, and by clear rules, under which 
donations are enforceable under the law. It may be argued that Scots law of donation further 
promotes security by providing relevance to the formalities for each juridical act, one such 
case being promise, which in certain circumstances may be defined as a donation under Scots 
law. In the case of promise, the juridical act base for the donation does not need acceptance 
of the promisee-donee to generate juridical effects. But it may also be argued that donations 
which do not require acceptance of the donee for the production of legal effects exhibit a 
grave lack of transactional clarity. 
 
Portugal1240. Under the PCC, the donor is not responsible for the obligations or limitations 
of the rights donated, nor is he responsible for the defects of the subject-matter of the 
donation. From a security perspective, this means that, as a rule, the donor is not responsible 
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 See Chapter 5 – France 5.5.2. Protection of third parties, p 227. 
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for the defects or harm caused by the subject-matter of the gift to the done or others. This 
lack of responsibility of the donor for any harm caused by the subject-matter of the donation 
contrasts with the objective responsibility of producers for faulty items. It is therefore argued 
that the absence of rules on product liability applicable to donations compromises the fitness 
of Portuguese law of donation, in its current form, for the purpose of regulating donations 
made in a market context. 
 
France1241. The FCC confers protection against impossible conditions or those conditions 
which are contrary to legislation or “good morals”. Following the enforcement by the law of 
donation of “moral rules”, any clauses preventing the donee from alienating the subject-
matter of the donation are deemed unwritten unless they are temporary or justified by a 
serious and legitimate interest of the donor. These rules are relevant in the market context 
because if a donation is received by a donee where immoral charges are imposed, he may 
request a judicial review of the conditions and charges if they become “extremely difficult, 
or seriously detriment” to him. It may be argued that these rules create uncertainty in a 
context where persons from different backgrounds, cultures or even nationalities interact 
with each other on a regular basis. By enforcing moral rules, French law of donation opens 
the gates for the application of non-uniform decisions by the French courts, potentially 
creating instability and uncertainty. It is therefore suggested that any moral considerations 
should be removed from French law of donation, in order to prevent instability in the market. 
 
Considerations for the future 
 
The widespread use and regulation of donation in the jurisdictions under analysis in the 
present thesis demonstrates that donation is a well-established institution in European law. 
Although defining donation in different terms, all jurisdictions under study present donation 
as a gratuitous way to convey rights and to create a benefit for the donee without the need 
for a correspondent enrichment of the donor. It is however clear that Scots law of donation 
is the best equipped, of the three laws of donations under analysis, to regulate donations 
made in a market context, considering that its application is limited, and different laws, 
already fit to regulate market transactions, regulate the relationship of the parties, depending 
on which juridical act was used to create a donation. It is also possible to conclude that, 
because it qualifies donation as a contract, without necessarily connecting it to the family, 
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the Portuguese law of donation provides security to the parties involved in the transaction, 
therefore upholding the principles of security and contractual freedom. The French law of 
donation is therefore the one which seems less fit to regulate donations made in a market 
context, due to the significant distrust of legal writers and the law of donation, is often 
presumed to be a threat to the donor or his family. 
 
From an EU perspective, and without forgetting the uncertain position of Scotland within 
the EU1242, it is possible to argue that different ways to look at donation create a level of 
uncertainty in the market. This uncertainty could be prevented by a uniform approach. By 
creating a singular approach towards the regulation of the challenges faced by donations 
made in a market context, the different communities and market players would be fully 
aware of their rights and obligations when donating or receiving a donation in the market. 
Potentially, this could increase confidence and lead to an increase of gratuitous market 
exchanges and/or in a more integrated Common Market. Therefore, there are two possible 
solutions to a closer regulation of donations in Europe: (i) the adaptation of the different 
national laws, where the answers provided by the law of donation would follow a common 
approach aimed at gratuitous market transactions; or (ii) depending on the future 
membership of Scotland in the EU club, further action to be pursued by the European 
legislative organs, aimed at promoting further European integration in what gratuitous 
transactions made in the market are concerned. 
 
On feelings 
 
« L’amour, parce qu’il conduit à cette attitude si pleinement humaine qu’est le 
don, de soi ou de ses biens. »1243 
 
Finally, I would like to conclude by acknowledging that feelings such as love, compassion 
or charity motivate donations. But I also hope to have contributed to the understanding that 
not only these feelings motivate donation. Donations exist in all areas of life, even when 
motivated by “lesser honourable” feelings such as the desire of economic profit or a personal 
advantage. By acknowledging this it will be possible to further advance the study of donation 
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outside of the family and in relevant contexts of life such as the market, therefore 
contributing to the creation of more comprehensive laws of donation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
241 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
Books and Book Sections 
ABRANCHES FERRÃO, A, Doações para casamento e entre casados – Colações, Vol II, 
Coimbra: F. França Amado, 1912. 
ABRANCHES FERRÃO, A, Das doações segundo o Código Civil português, Vol I, Coimbra: 
F. França Amado, 1911. 
ABRANCHES FERRÃO, A, Das doações segundo o Código Civil português, Vol II, Coimbra: 
F. França Amado, 1911. 
ALMEIDA, C F, Contratos I: conceito, fontes, formação, Coimbra: Almedina, reprint of the 
5th edition, 2015. 
ALMEIDA, C F, Contratos II: Conteúdo. Contratos de Troca, Coimbra: Almedina, 4th 
edition, 2016. 
ALMEIDA, C F, Contratos III, contratos de liberalidade, de coopera̧cão e de risco, 
Coimbra: Almedina, 2nd edition, 2013. 
ALMEIDA, C F, Contratos VI, Coimbra: Almedina, 2014. 
ALMEIDA, C F, Direito do consumo, Coimbra: Almedina, 2005. 
ALMEIDA, C F, Os direitos dos consumidores, Coimbra: Livraria Almedina, 1982. 
ALMEIDA, C F, Texto e enunciado na teoria do negócio jurı́dico, Coimbra: Livraria 
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GUÉVEL, D, Droit des successions et des libéralités, Paris: LGDJ-Lextenso, 2nd edition, 
2010. 
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MOSCO, L, Onerosità e gratuità degli atti giuridici con particolare riguardo ai contratti, 
Milano: Vallardi, 1942. 
NUYTS, A, HATZIMIHAIL, N E, Cross-Border Class Actions : the European Way, 
Munich: Sellier, 2014. 
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